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ABSTRACT
The main aim of this thesis is to investigate from both a theoretical and empirical 
point of view how debt management may affect the choice of the monetary and 
exchange rate regimes and ultimately influence the stability of financial systems.
The thesis is organised as follows. In Chapter 1, we develop a simple theoretical 
model to analyse how the choice of the maturity and denomination of public debt 
instruments affects the choice of the optimal monetary target. We then compare 
debt management to alternative institutional mechanism designs and find that 
delegation of monetary policy to an independent central banker is a better solu­
tion to inflationary temptations than the issuance of foreign or indexed debt.
Chapter 2 extends the analysis and shows that foreign currency debt may re­
duce the probability of a collapse of a fixed exchange rate regime. However, 
conditional on a currency crisis, countries with larger shares of foreign currency 
debt tend to experience sharper devaluations. Econometric results referring to 
the countries adhering to the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European Mon­
etary System from 1979 to 1995 confirm these theoretical findings.
In the second part of the thesis we look at the sources of financial vulnerability 
in a sample of emerging and developing countries from 1970 to 1997. In Chapter 
3, we test the role of debt and exchange rate fragility in determining episodes of 
banking crises, while Chapter 4 extends the analysis of the causal link between 
currency and banking crises to episodes of twin crises. The results indicate that 
along with the increasing liberalisation and globalisation of the financial markets, 
banking and currency crises have become closely intertwined and driven by com­
mon fundamentals.
Finally, Chapter 5 contains a description of the econometric specifications and 
simulation-based estimation techniques adopted in the second part of the thesis.
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INTRODUCTION
The focus of this thesis is on the sources of financial fragility. In particular, we 
investigate from both a theoretical and empirical point of view how debt man­
agement -i.e. the choice of the type, maturity and currency composition of debt 
instruments- may affect the choice of the monetary and exchange rate regimes 
and, ultimately, impact the stability of the financial systems.
This topic has received renewed attention in the 1990s, following the intensifica­
tion of episodes of financial system distress in developed and emerging countries. 
Some of the most recent examples include the collapse of the European Exchange 
Rate Mechanism (ERM) in 1992-93, the devaluation of the Mexican peso in 1994, 
the Asian crises in 1997-98, the devaluation of the Russian rouble in 1998, the 
Brazilian crisis in 1998, Argentina’s default in 2001 and the Turkish crisis in 2002.
In most of these cases, the forced abandonment of a fixed exchange rate regime 
and the sharp devaluation of the domestic currency that followed, undermined 
the stability of the financial sectors and led to concurrent episodes of systemic 
banking failures. The Mexican and Russian crises also showed that financial sec­
tor problems can be exacerbated by a sudden reversal of capital inflows, a large 
stock of short-term external debt, and domestic liabilities denominated in foreign 
currency.
Self-fulfilling, bond-led crises were formerly described by Calvo (1988), who showed 
that the presence of a large stock of short-term debt may lead to a crisis of con­
fidence in public debt that can be self-fulfilling. Lately, this argument has been
Introduction 11
revitalised by Obstfeld (1994) within the ‘second generation’ models of currency 
crises to highlight how debt refinancing problems may trigger a self-fulfilling spec­
ulative attack on the currency.
The same theoretical literature on sovereign debt management and currency crises 
has shown that the choice of the maturity and currency of denomination of pub­
lic debt can influence the likelihood of a confidence crisis. Debt indexation and 
foreign currency denomination can be used as commitments devices against infla­
tionary expectations and can help delay, if not avoid, the occurrence of a crisis.
Despite these policy prescriptions, debt managers seem to be reluctant to is­
sue indexed or foreign currency debt. On the contrary, the share of long-term, 
fixed-rate debt in OECD countries has increased on average since the 1980s. Fur­
thermore, the Mexican crisis of 1994 has shown that the markets might react 
negatively to this choice, by attacking the currency and imposing further strains 
on already fragile banking systems. One of the lessons learned from the crises 
in Sweden (1992) and Mexico (1994) is that the decision to issue large amounts 
of debt in foreign currency not only did not help the governments withstand a 
confidence crisis but also exacerbated the balance sheets effect of the devaluation, 
leading to banking sector problems.
At first sight, the facts seem to contradict the main findings of the theoretical 
literature on debt management and financial crises. The research presented in 
this thesis was inspired by the desire to reconcile economic theory and empirical 
evidence. The common thread to the various chapters of the thesis is indeed the 
role of debt (public or external) as a potential source of financial sector fragility.
The first part of the thesis is dedicated to the analysis of the interaction be­
tween the choice of the optimal monetary and exchange rate regimes and debt 
management.
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In Chapter 1, we examine the relative role of institutional design and debt man­
agement for monetary policy. In particular, we show how the choice of the ma­
turity and currency denomination of public debt interacts with the choice of the 
optimal monetary target. We compare debt management to institutional de­
sign mechanisms —like delegation of monetary policy to an independent central 
banker or the adoption of inflation targeting— as alternative solutions to credi­
bility problems.
Our aim is to bridge the gap between the time inconsistency literature, which 
points to policy delegation as the best solution to the inflationary bias, and the 
debt management theory that suggests the use of indexed and foreign currency 
debt to enhance the credibility of an anti-inflationary policy. The original con­
tribution of our work is to look at the interaction between the two by using a 
modified version of the Barro and Gordon (1983a) model where output is affected 
by tax distortions and these, in turn, depend on the type of debt issued by the 
government.
We find that the effectiveness of indexed debt instruments as an anti-inflationary 
device depends on the type of monetary regime. If delegation of monetary policy 
to an independent central banker or an inflation contract are viable, they are a 
better solution to inflationary temptations than issuing foreign or indexed debt. 
By issuing long-term nominal debt the government can increase the sensitivity 
of taxes and output to unexpected inflation, and thus minimise the inflationary 
surprise needed to counteract supply shocks.
This result is important for the following reasons. First, it explains the reluctance 
of debt managers towards indexed-debt instruments by supporting the conven­
tional idea that central bank independence is the best form of commitment to a 
disinflationary policy and little is gained from increasing the cost of inflation by 
issuing indexed or foreign currency denominated debt. Second, it offers a justi­
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fication for the concomitant increase in the degree of central bank independence 
and in the shares of long-term nominal debt observed in OECD countries since 
the 1980s.
In Chapter 2, we extend the previous analysis and investigate the role of debt 
management in the context of a fixed exchange rate regime, where the monetary 
authority is not fully independent or the policymaker and the private sector have 
asymmetric information.
Under these circumstances, we show that debt management and, in particular, 
the issuance of debt denominated in foreign currency or with a short maturity 
may enhance the credibility of an anti-inflationary policy by increasing the cost 
of surprise inflation. We make this point with the help of a stylised model that 
shares with the ‘second generation’ models of currency crises the feature of gen­
erating self-fulfilling multiple equilibria. However, we focus here on public debt 
and its characteristics, rather than external debt as in Velasco (1996).
Within this framework, foreign currency denominated debt can insulate the gov­
ernment budget from the effect of high interest rates associated with devaluation 
expectations, thus preventing the occurrence of a self-fulfilling currency crisis. 
However, if there are other benefits deriving from unexpected inflation than the 
simple reduction of the real debt stock, foreign currency debt can not completely 
eliminate the probability of a devaluation. Conditional on a devaluation taking 
place, countries with larger shares of foreign currency denominated debt have to 
devalue more than those that rely more on long-term nominal debt.
This result is important because it explains why private agents may react nega­
tively to the decision to issue large stocks of debt denominated in foreign currency, 
anticipating a worse devaluation than in the presence of nominal debt.
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In the second part of Chapter 2, we provide some empirical evidence that supports 
these theoretical results with reference to the European countries adhering to the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System (EMS) 
during the period 1979-95.
We focus on the effect of fiscal and debt variables on the likelihood of an of­
ficial realignment within the ERM. Interestingly, we find that the issuance of 
foreign currency debt reduced the probability of a realignment. However, condi­
tional on a realignment taking place, those countries with larger shares of foreign 
currency debt experienced sharper devaluations.
In the second part of the thesis we look at the causal links between debt, ex­
change rate fragility and systemic banking failures in emerging and developing 
countries. We show that debt variables play an important role in determining 
banking and twin crises.1
In Chapter 3, we test empirically the role of debt and exchange rate fragility 
in determining episodes of banking crises using panel data estimation techniques 
on a new sample of developing and emerging markets from the early 1970s to 1997.
Contrary to most existing studies that estimate static logit/probit models on 
pooled observations, we assess the probability of banking crises by applying 
simulation-based estimation techniques on panel data. In particular, we adopt 
the method of maximum smoothly simulated likelihood (MSSL), in conjunction 
with the GHK simulator, to estimate a multiperiod dynamic probit model with 
unobserved heterogeneity and autocorrelated errors.
This approach has several advantages. First, the use of panel data analysis would 
allow us to capture the information deriving from both the cross-country as well
1 This term refers to the joint occurrence of currency and banking crises.
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as across-time variation of our data. This choice is motivated by the belief that 
financial crises are inter-temporal events that should be analysed within a dy­
namic framework.
Second, the dynamic feature of our econometric model would help us understand 
the dynamics leading to, accompanying and following a crisis. In particular, it 
would allow us to test for the existence of state dependence among episodes of 
banking crises, i.e. if past occurrences of banking crises influence the probability 
of observing another banking crisis in the future. Moreover, we would be able to 
test if there is a significant leading effect from currency to banking crises.
Third, the relaxation of the traditional assumption of serially uncorrelated errors 
would account for the possibility of unobserved heterogeneity and autocorrelated 
errors. The first element may reflect historical or institutional factors, which are 
time-invariant and country-specific, that may not be fully captured by the set of 
explanatory variables in our model. The second error component would capture 
serially correlated unobserved determinants of the probability of banking crises. 
The explicit consideration of these two error terms in the model specification is 
necessary to avoid spurious state dependence in the estimation of the lagged de­
pendent variable.
The empirical analysis presented in Chapter 3 focuses on three main objectives. 
First, the identification of a set of domestic and global variables that are potential 
determinants of banking crises. In particular, we would look at the role played by 
debt instruments in triggering or averting such crises. Second, we would test for 
the presence of leading effects from currency to banking crises. Third, we would 
consider alternative error structures and show the importance of using panel data 
estimation techniques and allowing for a flexible serial correlation structure in the 
unobservables.
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The main results of our analysis reveal that macroeconomic fundamentals and 
debt vulnerability indicators are important determinants of the probability of 
banking crises. Developing countries seem also very sensitive to changes in global 
macroeconomic conditions, like an increase in international interest rates or an 
adverse terms-of-trade shock. Countries that have experienced a banking crisis in 
the past are more prone to experience other crises, while there is mixed evidence 
that currency crises lead to banking crises.
After controlling for a large number of explanatory variables, we find evidence 
of unobserved heterogeneity and autocorrelation in the error term, supporting 
our hypothesis of a flexible error term structure. The omission of the autocorre­
lated error component introduces spurious state dependence in the estimates of 
the lagged banking dependent variable, which is even stronger once we omit the 
panel structure and pool together all the observations. This finding is important 
because it questions the robustness of the conclusions reached by previous studies 
that make use of static probit/logit models to estimate the likelihood of banking 
crises.
Chapter 4 extends the analysis of the previous chapter by examining the de­
terminants of twin crises. The joint occurrence of banking and currency crises 
has increasingly attracted the attention of theorists who have tried to explain the 
causal link between the two. Despite the growing interest, few empirical studies 
have tried to assess the determinants of twin crises and detect the direction of 
causality between banking and currency crises since the seminal work of Kamin­
sky and Reinhart (1999). The results presented in Chapter 4 are an attempt to 
fill this gap in the empirical literature.
We estimate by maximum smoothly simulated likelihood a system of two dy­
namic probit equations (similar to the one used in Chapter 3), one for banking 
and another for currency crises. The probability of each type of crisis is modelled
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as a function of a set of explanatory variables encompassing banking or currency 
specific indicators, as well as a set of common determinants that includes debt 
variables. We test for the existence of a causal link from banking to currency crises 
by allowing a leading and contemporaneous effect of the banking dummy variable 
in the currency crisis equation. We thus overcome one of the limitations of the 
model estimated in Chapter 3 by fully endogenising the occurrence of banking 
crises. In addition to the error term structure described above, with unobserved 
heterogeneity and autocorrelated errors, we assume the existence of some unob­
served contemporaneous correlation between banking and currency crises. This 
last effect would allow for the possibility that twin crises are driven by omitted 
common factors.
The results presented in Chapter 4 suggest that, along with the increasing liber­
alisation and globalisation of the financial markets, banking and currency crises 
have become closely intertwined and driven by common fundamentals.
Currency crises seem to lead banking crises, at least during the nineties, but a 
causal link between the two types of crisis cannot be determined unambiguously 
over the whole sample period. Banking and currency crises share some common 
factors but which crisis surfaces first is ultimately a matter of circumstances.
The final chapter of this thesis contains a brief overview of the principal simulation- 
based estimation methods for limited dependent variable models (LDV). The 
main aim of this methodological chapter is to illustrate why we need to use sim­
ulation techniques to overcome the computational problems associated with the 
estimation of the multiperiod dynamic probit models of banking and twin crises 
used in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 of this thesis. We would also derive the appli­
cation of the GHK simulator to these two estimation problems.
1. DEBT MANAGEMENT, CENTRAL BANK 
INDEPENDENCE AND 
THE CREDIBILITY OF MONETARY POLICY
1.1 Introduction
In the 1990s the share of long-term nominal debt —i.e. non-indexed debt denom­
inated in domestic currency— increased in almost all OECD countries. In the 
same period the governments of these countries have made their central banks 
more independent in order to strengthen the commitment to price stability.
This chapter examines the relative merits of public debt management and in­
stitutional design as commitment devices to an anti-inflationary monetary pol­
icy. The literature on public debt management suggests that inflation-indexed 
debt enhances the credibility of monetary policy. The argument has been made 
by Back and Musgrave (1941) and later formalised by Lucas and Stokey (1983), 
Bohn (1988), Calvo (1988), and Calvo and Guidotti (1990). The same role for 
foreign currency debt has been suggested by Bohn (1990a), Bohn (1991) and 
Watanabe (1992). This literature, however, implicitly assumes that the govern­
ment cannot delegate monetary policy to an independent institution.
On the other hand, the literature on central bank independence points to policy 
delegation as the best way to reduce the inflationary bias. Some attention is 
given to the implications of public debt, but not to its composition. Cukierman 
(1994) argues that the larger the debt, the more likely it is that politicians will 
delegate authority to the central bank, and the more independent the bank will
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be. Beetsma and Bovemberg (1997) show that delegation of monetary policy to 
a properly conservative central banker achieves the second-best inflation tax on 
money balances without distorting debt accumulation, but they confine attention 
to indexed debt.
As a matter of fact the interaction between the choice of debt instruments and 
the design of monetary institutions remains largely unexplored. This chapter 
compares institutional design and debt management as alternative solutions to 
credibility problems, showing that the best solution to inflationary temptations is 
to delegate monetary policy to an independent central bank. The point is made 
within a standard rules-versus-discretion framework where output is affected by 
tax distortions and, thus, by the type of debt that the government issues.
We argue that the role of the currency of denomination and indexation of public 
debt depends on the monetary regime. If monetary policy can be delegated to an 
independent, inflation-averse institution, or an inflation contract is viable, then 
indexed or foreign currency debt are not necessary for anti-inflationary purposes. 
The government should instead provide the monetary authority with the largest 
possible share of nominal debt to support output stabilisation.
Intuitively, a greater share of nominal debt implies lower taxes and tax distor­
tions for any given unexpected inflation. By increasing the sensitivity of output 
to inflation, nominal debt makes monetary policy more effective: less unexpected 
inflation is needed to counter supply shocks. Although nominal debt may give 
rise to inflationary expectations, credibility problems are dealt more effectively 
by monetary policy delegation.
This result is important for two reasons. First, it supports the conventional 
wisdom that institutional design and, in particular, central bank independence is 
the best way to avoid the inflationary bias, while little is gained by increasing the
Debt Management, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy 20
cost of inflation with indexed or foreign currency debt. Secondly, it provides an 
explanation for the lengthening of debt maturities observed in OECD countries 
since the late 1980s.
This chapter is organised as follows. In Section 1.2, we describe the theoreti­
cal framework and analyse the role of debt management when the government 
retains full discretion over the choice of the monetary policy target. The results 
are discussed in Section 1.3 in light of alternative specifications of the social loss 
function. The following sections examine the role of debt management when 
monetary policy is delegated to an independent institution. Section 1.4.1 focuses 
on delegation to a weight-conservative central banker. Section 1.4.2 considers 
an inflation contract, while Section 1.4.3 reviews inflation targeting. Section 1.5 
presents evidence on the debt structure, central bank independence and inflation 
in OECD countries which suggests that the normative arguments derived from 
the theory have some positive content. Finally, Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 The Theoretical Framework
1.2.1 The Government Problem
We examine the interaction between debt management and monetary policy by 
using a modified version of the Barro and Gordon (1983a) model in which dis- 
tortionary taxation creates a wedge between the first-best level of output and its 
natural rate. We explicitly model this output loss which is the source of time 
inconsistency in the rules-versus-discretion literature.1
Following Barro and Gordon, we assume that the output loss depends on the 
tax rate but extend the analysis to consider that the tax rate varies with the real 
value of public debt and the tax base. A higher debt level would increase taxes 
and tax distortions, thus reducing the level of output. In turn, the value of debt
1 Along with imperfectly competitive goods and labor markets.
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is determined by its composition and unexpected inflation, which arises from the 
policy response to external shocks.2
The government’s objective is to minimise a loss function that weighs the costs 
of expected inflation against the cost of output deviations from its optimal level 
in the absence of distortions. The expected social loss is equal to3
E0L =  eE0ir2 +  E o ( y - y - k T ) 2 (1.1)
where the parameter 9 reflects the social preferences, i.e. the cost of inflation 
relative to output deviations, 7r denotes the inflation rate, y is the logarithm of 
actual output, y  is its natural rate, r  is the tax rate and k a positive constant.4
A time consistency problem arises because the government aims at the level of 
output yT =  y +  kr  higher than the natural rate, y, because of tax distortions.5
For analytical tractability the output loss, k r , is modelled as a linear function of 
the tax rate, but linearity could be formally derived from labor market equilib­
rium as in Beetsma and Bovemberg (1997).6 The social loss function is further
discussed in Section 1.3.
2 Alternatively, unexpected inflation reduces real interest payments on public debt and thus
frees resources from the budget that can possibly be used for counter-cyclical fiscal policy.
3 For the same specification, or specifications where output is replaced by the unemployment
rate or the level of employment see Barro and Gordon (1983a), Rogoff (1985), Svensson (1997)
and Walsh (1997), among others. For a microfoundation see Herrendorf and Neumann (1998).
4 More precisely, as in Barro (1979), the deadweight loss H  is an homogeneous function of
total revenues tY  and output Y,  so that H  =  Yk(r) .  Then, defining potential output as Y T, 
the natural output level is Y  =  YT[1 — fc(r)]. Taking the log of Y  yields the output target
yT =  y +  k(r)  in the loss function.
5 In the literature, an output target greater than the natural rate is justified by the existence
of either tax or labor market distortions or simply by political pressure (see Eijffinger and Haan
(1996) and Walsh (1998)). In what follows we shall focus on tax distortions.
6 Assume that output (in the absence of shocks) is given by Y  =  La(0 <  a <  1) where L
is labor, so that the maximisation of after-tax profit yields the labor demand L =  [Pa(l — 
t ) / W ] 1^ x~°  ^ where W  is the nominal wage. Assume that workers aim at a target real wage,
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Output is given by an expectations augmented Phillips curve:
y  =  y +  b(7r -  Eq'k) -  u (1.2)
where b is the output sensitivity to unexpected inflation and u is an adverse out­
put shock distributed on the compact support [ul , uh], with mean Equ  =  0 and 
variance E qu2 =  g 2.
Following the literature, we assume that the output loss depends on the tax 
rate, but extend the analysis to allow the tax rate to vary with the real value 
of public debt. The latter is affected by unexpected inflation depending on its 
currency composition, indexation and maturity structure.7
Assuming that the entire debt and public spending are repaid at the end of 
the following period and using a linear approximation for the impact of inflation, 
the tax rate is equal to:8
r  =  G +  [l +  r — m( tt — Eq7t)\B  (1.3)
the log of which is normalised to zero, and contracts are signed one period in advance based on
inflation expectations. It follows that the log of output is given by y =  (a/(I  — a))(7r — Eir —
t  4- Ina), and the output loss is kr  =  (a /(1 — a))r.
7 It is worth noting that, as the tax rate and thus distortions vary, so does the natural rate of
output, y  =  yT — kr.  This suggests that debt management may have implications for monetary
policy even if the authorities target the natural rate of output.
8 Note that, due to the linear approximation, unanticipated inflation may turn the real value
of the debt negative, clearly a nonsense since the most inflation can do is to cancel the debt. 
In order to rule out negative real payments, an upper bound on the distribution of u must be 
imposed such that
« <  „» =  (1 +  r ) (kB  +  A  +
If we assume that the government can raise funds in nominal bonds to lend in inflation-indexed 
bonds, then m tends to infinity, but a positive upper bound would still exist and be equal to 
uh =  (1 +  r)kB.
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where G and B  are the ratios of government spending and public debt to the 
natural rate of output, respectively, and r  is the constant real interest rate.9
The important variable here is m, which measures the impact of unexpected 
inflation on the real value of the debt. Notionally, m  is the share of debt that 
can be devalued by inflation; it excludes both inflation-indexed debt and foreign 
currency debt insofar as monetary policy does not systematically affect the real 
exchange rate.10
Although the model does not allow to distinguish between debt of different matu­
rities, whether m  includes nominal debt of any maturity or only long-term debt 
is important for policymaking. In a multi-period framework m would be the 
share of debt which matures after the next monetary policy decision. Certainly, 
m would include fixed-rate debt with a maturity longer than three months and 
probably shorter maturities than that, but whether one-month or one-week debt 
would qualify it is difficult to say.11
In practice, there are two other reasons for further restricting the definition of 
long-term debt. First, because of price stickiness, monetary policy decisions may 
not immediately develop into higher inflation. Second, inflation may turn out 
to be higher than currently anticipated over a long period ahead and strongly 
affect the value of long-term debt, while short-term debt would be rolled-over at 
interest rates which reflect the revision in expectations.
9 Note that G  and B  should be in terms of actual output which would make the tax rate 
depend on the realisation of the output shock, u. We shall discuss this approximation in Section 
1.3.
10 This is certainly the case if Purchasing Power Parity holds. In that case the value of foreign
currency debt would depend on unexpected foreign inflation.
11 In the case of floating-rate debt the choice would depend on how frequently coupons are
revised.
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In what follows we refer to m  as nominal debt —i.e. debt other than inflation- 
indexed and foreign currency debt—, but in the empirical analysis of Section 1.5 
we shall consider an alternative definition of m  which excludes debt with a ma­
turity shorter than one year and floating-rate debt.
The sequence of events is as follows: (i) the government designs monetary in­
stitutions and chooses the debt composition; (ii) private agents form rational 
inflation expectations; (iii) the output shock is realised; (iv) the monetary au­
thority sets the inflation rate.
In the next section we derive the basic insights from the model when mone­
tary policy is not delegated to an independent central bank. In Section 1.3 we 
shall discuss microfoundations and robustness when alternative specifications of 
the social loss function are considered.
1.2.2 A Dependent Central Bank
Consider a government that does not delegate monetary policy and retains full 
discretion over the choice of the inflation rate. After observing the realisation of 
the shock, u , the government chooses inflation so as to minimise the social loss
EqL =  OEott2 +  E0[(n — Eoir)(b +  kmB) — u — k(G  +  B  +  rB)]2 (1.4)
that is obtained by substituting the values of y  and r  from equations (1.2) and 
(1.3) in (1.1).
Assuming rational expectations, inflation and output are given by
7T = f ( D  +  Au) (1.5)
y =  yT — D — Xu (1.6)
where Z =  b +  kmB  denotes the marginal output gain from unexpected infla­
tion, D =  k(G +  B  +  rB)  is the expected output loss due to tax distortions, and
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X =  6/[9 +  (6 +  kmB)2] is decreasing with the share of nominal debt, m.
In this setting, inflation allows the government to dampen the impact of out­
put shocks — the more so, the lower is A or the larger is the share of nominal 
debt, ra. However, a larger share of nominal debt leads to higher expected and 
equilibrium inflation, because the private sector anticipates the incentive to in­
flate. This, in turn, increases the government loss.
At time 0, when the government chooses the indexation and currency denom­
ination of the debt, the government’s expected loss is:
E0LD =  ^  +  Act2 (1.7)
A
The government would clearly be better off if it could ‘precommit’; i.e. if it could 
credibly commit to follow a ‘state-contingent inflation rule’ with zero average 
inflation w =  ZXu/0.  Then, the expected loss would be equal to
EqL d =  D 2 +  Act2 (1.8)
Equation (1.8) shows that with precommitment the government should issue the 
largest possible amount of nominal debt while lending in inflation-indexed or for­
eign currency debt. Intuitively, nominal debt makes taxes and output sensitive to 
unexpected inflation thus minimising the inflation needed to offset output shocks. 
A large, possibly infinite, share of nominal debt would make the social loss tend 
to the global minimum D 2.12
However, since a state-contingent inflation rule is difficult to implement, the gov­
ernment’s choice is between discretion and a ‘fixed rule’ of zero inflation and de­
preciation. When the government credibly commits to the ‘fixed rule’ n =  e =  0, 
the expected loss is equal to
E0LR =  D 2 +  c2 (1.9)
12 See Calvo and Guidotti (1990).
Debt Management, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy 26
This loss can be contrasted with the discretionary solution (1.7). Noting that 
0 <  A <  1, equations (1.7) and (1.9) show that under the fixed rule the govern­
ment loses flexibility in reacting to output shocks but avoids the costs of expected 
inflation (or depreciation). Indeed, the expected loss (1.7) depicts the trade off 
between credibility and flexibility that is at the heart of the rules-versus-discretion 
literature. This trade off is spanned by A =  6/[6 +  (6 +  kmB) 2] varying between 
zero and one, and thus by the share of nominal debt, ra­
in general, the government can do better than the fixed rule by choosing a proper, 
possibly negative, ra, so as to select the optimal point on the credibility-flexibility 
spectrum.13 The optimal share of nominal debt increases with output variabil­
ity, cr2, while it decreases with the temptation to inflate. The latter depends on 
tax distortions, D , and thus on the level of government expenditure and debt, 
as in Bohn (1988) and Calvo and Guidotti (1990). Therefore, with a dependent 
central bank, inflation-indexed debt and/or foreign currency debt are optimal if 
the impact of tax distortions on inflationary expectations is large relative to the 
variance of output shocks.
1.3 The Social Loss Function: A Motivation
In this section we discuss the motivation behind the choice of the loss function 
(1.1) and examine whether the trade off between credibility and flexibility, which 
emerges in our basic set-up, can be generalised to other specifications.
The choice of the loss function is important because it defines a particular policy
13 In fact, if the government can choose any debt combination, including the possibility of 
raising funds with one type of debt to lend in the other type, the expected loss under discretion 
can be made no greater than the loss under a fixed rule. This conclusion follows immediately 
from the fact that the zero inflation rule is equivalent to setting a negative m  such that b +  
k m B  =  0 and hence A =  1. However, the government can do no better than a fixed rule when 
D 2 >  a 2.
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regime. For example, it characterises the preferences, the nature, and extent of 
independence of the institution in charge of monetary policy. We adopted the loss 
function (1.1) which is standard in the literature on central bank independence14 
and model the output loss as a function of the tax rate.
A possible objection to this approach is that the marginal cost in welfare terms 
of tax distortions is relatively higher in bad states of nature, i.e. when adverse 
output shocks occur so that y — y <  0 (as shown by equation (1.1)). This partly 
reflects the assumption that society has a preference for stabilising output fluc­
tuations arising from nominal rigidities.15
However, the implication that the marginal cost of tax distortions is counter­
cyclical is quite strong from the viewpoint of real business-cycle theory of output 
fluctuations, where distortionary taxation is the only source of inefficiency. In 
fact, in utility-based models where the output loss reflects disincentives to work 
induced by proportional taxation of labor income (as opposed to losses from tax 
collection), the relation between the marginal cost of taxation and the level of 
output is uncertain.16 Intuitively, taxation could be less distortionary in bad out­
put states as labor could be supplied more inelastically.
In the absence of nominal rigidities, a possible motivation for equation (1.1) 
is that a greater marginal cost in bad output states would capture the higher tax 
rates that are required to ensure fiscal solvency.17 In fact, the same implications
can be derived from a specification of the loss function where the marginal cost
of tax distortions is independent from the state of nature.
14 See Walsh (1998).
15 See e.g. Walsh (1998) and Herrendorf and Neumann (1998).
16 See Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1999).
17 Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1999) show that, for reasonable parameter values, in bad 
states of nature it is optimal to cover most of the financing needs in contingent markets for 
debt even when raising tax rates is efficient.
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The formal argument is as follows. Suppose that society cares about output 
expansions rather than output stabilisation, as in Barro and Gordon (1983b) and 
Cukierman and Meltzer (1986).18 Then, the social loss is linear in output and 
tax distortions:
E0L =  OEq'k2 +  E0(y -  y) +  cE0t2 (1-10)
where the output loss from distortions is assumed to be quadratic in the tax rate.
Although the marginal cost of taxation is independent from the output shock, u, 
the dependence of the tax rate from the level of output implied by the budget 
constraint may lead to the same specification as in equation (1.4). While this 
is easily verified in a one-period framework where tax revenues, rV, must cover 
spending commitments and debt repayments, a negative relation between out­
put shocks and the tax rate also emerges over longer horizons if the government 
smooths taxes.
For instance, using the linear approximation around a zero output growth of 
the intertemporal budget constraint suggested by Bohn (1990b), it can be shown 
that tax-smoothing implies the following tax rule:
rt = Gt* + i{ 1 + + i ~  m(irt -  E t- in ^ B * ^  -  fS£0(l + i)~lEtyt+i
where Gf* =  G f Y / Y t - i  is permanent (or normal) public expenditure relative 
to time t — 1 output, B^_x =  Bt- \Y /Y t- \  is the debt-to-output ratio, and yt+i =  
yt+i — yt+i- 1  Is the rate of output growth. Finally, f  =  iB^_x +  Gf* is the point of 
linearisation for the tax rate. Assuming that the initial output level corresponds 
to its natural level, i.e. yt~i =  y, and that output shocks are not persistent, so 
that Etyt+i =  y for i =  {1 ,2 ,3...oo}, the tax rate is equal to:
rt =  f -  ——: [(7T* -  Et-i7rt)m B t-i +  f ( y t -  y)] (1.11)
j .  - |-  %
which can be substituted for Tt in equation (1.10) to yield a similar specification 
as equation (1.4).
18 The argument goes through independently of the presence of output in the loss function.
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This motivation for equation (1.1) hinges, however, on tax-smoothing as the rule 
for fiscal policy. In fact, a series of negative output shocks will eventually force 
the government to raise taxes independently of the fiscal rule. If the government 
does not smooth taxes, then the persistence of shocks, the level of debt, and 
the length of time intervals between monetary policy decisions, are all relevant 
aspects to consider.
If tax rates are invariant to economic activity, i.e. if r  — G + [ l+ r —ra(7r—£o7t)]J3, 
both output stabilisation and tax variability are irrelevant for welfare. In this case 
raising funds in inflation-indexed (or foreign currency) debt to lend in nominal 
debt —i.e. a negative m— can completely remove the inflationary bias at no 
cost. Hence, an argument for institutional design would have to be based on the 
existence of practical constraints to this funding policy.
To conclude, our analysis requires either that the government cares about output 
stabilisation (i.e. because of nominal rigidities) and taxes affect output, or that 
it wants to stabilise tax rates that vary in response to output changes.
Acknowledging that our analysis is not fully general, in what follows we maintain 
the motivating hypothesis that a trade-off between credibility and flexibility ex­
ists, which depends on tax distortions, and can be improved upon by designing 
institutions besides choosing the debt composition. In Section 1.5 we shall pro­
vide evidence of a negative relation between central bank independence and the 
shares of foreign currency and indexed debt which is consistent with the existence 
of such a trade-off.
In the next section we consider the choice of debt instruments and highlight 
the role of the monetary regime in this decision. In particular, we study the case 
of a weight-conservative central banker and compare this solution to an inflation 
contract and to inflation targeting.
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1.4 An Independent Central Bank
The merits of foreign currency and inflation-indexed debt as commitment devices 
that can possibly enhance the credibility of anti-inflationary policy are well known 
in the literature on debt management. The new interesting issue that we address 
in this section is how debt policy interacts with, and compares to, institutional 
design as a solution to credibility problems.
1.4.1 A Weight-Conservative Central Banker
The time-inconsistency literature views delegation of monetary policy to an inde­
pendent central bank as the natural solution to inflationary temptations. Rogoff 
(1985) shows that the appointment of a central banker with preferences char­
acterised by a stronger aversion to inflation than society —i.e. by a parameter 
Ob >  0 — increases social welfare. In principle, society could choose the degree of 
conservativeness, Ob , of the central banker so as to attain the desired combination 
of credibility and flexibility.19
The first issue we want to address is whether delegation of monetary policy to 
an independent central bank produces a better outcome than the choice of debt 
instruments.
Noting that any value of A =  0/[0 +  (b +  km B )2] is consistent with alternative 
combinations of the policymaker’s preferences, 0, and nominal debt, m, equa­
tion (1.7) seems to suggest the substitutability of debt management and policy 
delegation. However, we can show that institutional design is a better solution 
to the credibility-flexibility trade-off than debt management.
19 The central bank has both goal and instrument independence. However, an alternative 
interpretation is that society delegates monetary policy to an instrument independent central 
banker that is assigned a particular loss function.
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P roposition  1: Monetary policy delegation increases social welfare even if  the 
share of nominal debt can be chosen optimally.
To prove this result, consider the expected social loss, that is, the government 
loss when the central bank is goal independent:
E0L =  6E0ir% +  E0(yB — y — k r)2 =  - ( 0 B -  0 )E ott2b +  E0LB (1-12)
where irB and yB are the inflation and output chosen by the central banker whose 
loss function is denoted by LB. Note that ttb  and yB follow from the minimisation 
of Lb and thus depend on the preferences, 0B, of the central banker. Define with 
m* the share of nominal debt that minimises the expected loss under discretion 
(equation (1.7)) and the corresponding A* =  9 / [9 +  (b +  km*B)2].
It is possible to show that the social loss is reduced by choosing a greater share 
of nominal debt, m  >  m*, and a central banker with a degree of conservativeness 
0B > 9 which imply the same A =  A* as the optimal debt policy.
By choosing $B =  X*(b +  km B )2/{ I  — A*), the welfare loss for society is equal to
E0V b ^ - { e B - e ) E a'K% +  ^ -  +  \ , a2 (1.13)
A*
that is lower than the loss obtained with the optimal debt policy since the central 
banker is more inflation averse than society; i.e. 0B > 6. This result shows that 
delegation endows the government with an additional control mechanism and en­
larges the space of possible outcomes.
The second interesting issue is how the possibility to use both institutional de­
sign and debt management affects the selection of the central banker and debt 
instruments. We can show that:
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P rop osition  2: The optimal delegation policy involves the choice of an extremely 
conservative central banker and the use of an infinitely large share of nominal debt
To prove this result, note that the expected welfare loss (1.12) can be written 
as
where Z  =  b-\-kmB  denotes the marginal output gain from unexpected inflation, 
and D =  k(G  +  B  +  rB) is the expected output loss due to tax distortions.
From equation (1.14) it is clear that any increase in Z  and 6 b  which increases the 
ratio Z 2/ 6 b  (and thus lowers A#), while reducing Z / 6 b , reduces the social loss.
For example, if we set Z  =  (#s)a, with 1/2 <  a  <  1, the social loss tends to 
the global minimum D 2 as 6b tends to infinity. Hence, if there are no constraints 
on the choice of nominal debt, m, monetary policy delegation approximates the 
‘state-contingent rule’ solution (1.8) in the limit, that is, in the case of an ex­
tremely conservative central banker.
The intuition for this result is as follows. A higher share of nominal debt widens 
the inflation tax base and thus allows for lower conventional taxes and tax dis­
tortions for any given unexpected inflation rate.20 By increasing the sensitivity 
of output to inflation, nominal debt makes monetary policy more effective in 
stabilising output fluctuations: less unanticipated inflation is needed to counter 
negative supply shocks. It follows that more nominal debt, i.e. a lower A h e l p s  
to stabilise both output and inflation as shown by equations (1.5) and (1.6).
This is possible if &b increases at a faster rate than Z  but at a slower rate than Z 2.
20 Alternatively, as shown by Bohn (1990a) and Bohn (1990b), nominal debt reduces the need 
for a higher tax rate when negative supply shocks occur (see equation (1.11)).
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On the other hand, nominal debt gives rise to inflationary temptations that, 
in the absence of institutional arrangements, would lead to a greater inflation 
bias. This can be avoided if the government appoints an independent, weight- 
conservative central banker.
Equations (1.5) and (1.6) show that even when inflation aversion, 6b , goes to 
infinity and inflation tends to zero, the government does not need to give up out­
put stabilisation. This requires the share of nominal debt to increase so that Ab 
goes to zero (i.e. Z 2/&b goes to infinity), though at a slower rate than inflation 
aversion (i.e. Z /6b goes to zero).
In practice, the optimal policy is unfeasible. Realistically, the government would 
not be able to over-fund in nominal debt and invest the proceeds in foreign cur­
rency or indexed assets; there is a limit to the amount of nominal debt that can 
be issued. Then, we can show that:
P roposition  3: If there is a limit to the share of nominal debt, welfare is max­
imised by issuing the largest possible amount of nominal debt and appointing a 
correspondingly conservative central banker.
To see this, define with 0*B the preferences of the central banker who minimises 
the social loss function for any given share, m, of nominal debt. The correspond­
ing A is \*B =  QB/[6B +  {b+kfhB )2]. Then, the social loss (1.12) can be re-written 
as:
It is clear that a share of nominal debt, m, lower than fh cannot reduce the 
social loss. If it could, 0B would not be optimal since an increase in 6b , that 
achieves the same effect on A# as m > fh, further reduces the second term of
(1.15)
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(1.15). On the contrary, the social loss can always be reduced by a higher ra. 
Any increase in 0B and ra, which leaves Ab =  *^b unaffected, reduces the second 
term in equation (1.15).
Therefore, the expected loss for society is minimised by issuing the largest possi­
ble amount of nominal debt and appointing a correspondingly ‘very’ conservative 
central banker. Intuitively, central bank independence is more effective in con­
taining inflationary expectations and should be used to enhance the credibility of 
anti-inflationary policy, while nominal debt increases the sensitivity of output to 
surprise inflation and thus reduces the need for flexibility.
This is an important result that supports the conventional wisdom that insti­
tutional design and, in particular, central bank independence is the effective so­
lution to inflationary expectations while very little is gained by increasing the 
cost of inflation with indexed and foreign currency debt.21 This may also pro­
vide a rationale for the conventional belief that foreign currency debt is a sign of 
weakness of monetary policy rather than an incentive for low inflation.
1.4.2 An Inflation Contract
In this section, we examine the role of debt denomination and indexation when 
the delegation mechanism takes the form of an inflation contract between the 
government and the central bank. The linear contract proposed by Walsh (1995) 
and extended by Persson and Tabellini (1993) removes the inflationary bias at no 
cost in terms of output stability, thus providing the best solution to the problem
21 This conclusion is immediate if one accepts the view of McCallum (1995) that a central 
banker targets the natural rate of output. Indeed, in such event monetary policy delegation 
completely removes the credibility problem making the choice of debt instruments depend only 
on risk considerations, as argued by Miller (1997a).
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of establishing the credibility of monetary policy without losing flexibility.22 23 
The optimal contract delegates monetary policy to a central banker with the same 
preferences as society (equivalently, it assigns to the central banker the social loss 
function) but imposes upon the monetary authority a linear cost to inflation. The 
instrument independent, but not goal independent, central banker minimises
E0LC =  0Eon2 +  E0(y - y -  fcr)2 +  C E &  (1.16)
where C  is the linear penalty associated with inflation.
Except for the cost, C, the central banker faces the same problem as the gov­
ernment under discretion. After observing the shock u, the monetary authority
chooses inflation so as to minimise the loss Lc  subject to (1.2) and (1.3).
Assuming rational expectations, expected inflation is given by
E0« =  ± ( 2 Z D - C )
and the inflation bias can be eliminated by imposing a linear cost to inflation 
equal to
C  =  2 Z D  =  2 {b +  km B)D  (1.17)
Since the temptation for inflationary financing increases with nominal debt, the 
cost C  imposed on the central banker must increase with the share of such debt. 
Using this result, the solution to the government problem is equal to
7r =  ^A u (1-18)
u
y =  yT — D — Xu
22 This result requires that the authorities and the private sector share the same information 
(see Herrendorf and Lockwood (1997)) and that output shocks are not persistent (see Lockwood,
Miller, and Zhang (1998)).
23 McCallum (1997) and Jensen (1997) have challenged this result, by arguing that the Walsh
approach does not solve the time inconsistency problem but simply relocates it, because the 
government will always have the temptation to renege on its choices and change the monetary 
institution. See Persson and Tabellini (1999) and Driffill and Rotondi (2003) for a reply to 
these critiques.
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that implies an expected loss for society equal to
E0LC =  D 2 +  X a2 (1.19)
The expected loss (1.19) is equal to the loss (1.8) obtained under precommitment, 
when the government follows a ‘state-contingent rule’. An increase in the share 
of nominal debt (i.e. a decrease of A) reduces the impact of output shocks and, 
thus, the social loss. Intuitively, nominal debt makes taxes and output sensitive to 
unexpected inflation, thus minimising the inflation needed to offset output shocks.
As in the case of a weight-conservative central banker, a large (possibly infi­
nite) share of nominal debt would be optimal; the social loss would tend to the 
global minimum D 2 as it does in Rogoff’s solution when both the degree of con­
servativeness of the central banker and the share of nominal debt go to infinity.
However, as the amount of nominal debt that can be issued is limited, the in­
flation contract produces a better outcome. By comparing equation (1.19) to 
equation (1.14) or (1.15) and assuming that there is no constraint on the choice 
of the penalty, C, it is possible to show that
P roposition  4: If there is a limit to the amount of nominal debt that can be 
issued, then the inflation contract is a better solution than the appointment of a 
weight-conservative central banker.
It is, however, worth noting that the central bank contract requires a penalty 
for inflation that increases with the share of nominal debt, as shown by equation 
(1.17). Imposing such a cost can be problematic even if justified by the objective 
of avoiding income redistribution from debt holders to taxpayers or simply by the 
objective of defending the real value of wealth.
Debt Management, Central Bank Independence and the Credibility of Monetary Policy 37
1.4.3 Inflation Targeting
Finally, it is important to ask how previous results relate to inflation targets, as 
they currently operate in the United Kingdom and elsewhere. In effect, inflation 
targets can be seen as the practical counterpart of either delegating policy to 
a weight-conservative central banker (Canzoneri, Nolan, and Yates (1996) and 
Haldane (1995)) or choosing the contract solution (Svensson (1997)).
Adopting Svensson’s interpretation of an inflation targeting regime, the central 
bank is given operational independence to minimise the following loss function
E0Lt =  6E0(k  -  7rT)2 +  E o ( y - y -  k r)2 (1.20)
where irT denotes the inflation target. Hence, the central bank is assigned a 
loss function with a target for inflation different from the one which is socially 
optimal, say, it* =  0. It is easy to show that by fixing a target equal to
■kt =  - \ { b  +  km B )D  (1.21)
9
the targeting regime yields the same solution as the inflation contract. In partic­
ular, the expected loss for society, EqLt =  D 2 4 -  A c t2 , is equal to the loss under 
the contract.
While implications for debt management are the same as in the contract so­
lution, it is worth noting that a high share of nominal debt would imply an
inflation target that, if not negative, could lie much below the socially optimal 
rate of inflation, thus creating problems for the implementation of the optimal 
policy.24
24 Haldane (1995) uses the same argument to cast doubts on the relevance of Svensson’s 
interpretation to the UK’s monetary regime.
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1.5 Independence and Debt Structure: The Evidence
In the previous section we have shown that delegation of monetary policy to an 
independent central bank is the best solution to inflationary temptations, while 
nominal debt should be issued to support output stabilisation. If this normative 
argument has a positive content, the share of such debt should increase with the 
independence of the central bank.
A positive relation between central bank independence and the fixed-rate, long­
term component of nominal debt is also suggested by an informal interpretation 
of our model. As argued in Section 1.2, the maturity of the nominal debt should 
be sufficiently long for inflation to have a significant impact on the debt value 
and, hence, for nominal debt to enhance the stabilisation role of monetary policy. 
We discussed a number of reasons, from price stickiness to revisions in expecta­
tions, that could explain why the impact of inflation on the value of long-term 
debt could be stronger than on short-term and floating-rate debt.
In what follows we look at two measures of debt composition: (i) the share of 
nominal debt; and (ii) the share of fixed-rate, long-term nominal debt (long-term 
nominal debt in what follows). The former is defined as the percentage of bonds 
and loans denominated in domestic currency that are not indexed to the price 
level. The latter is the percentage of fixed-rate bonds and loans denominated in 
domestic currency with an initial maturity longer than one year.25
Table 1.1 reports data on the composition of debt for a sample of 20 OECD
industrial countries. The sample includes Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Nether­
25 Nominal debt excludes ECU-indexed bills and bonds. Long-term nominal debt excludes 
floating-rate debt but includes extendible bonds and bonds with an option for early redemption 
if the period preceding the earliest possible maturity is longer than one year.
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lands, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the US.26
In the late 1990s the share of nominal debt varied from 60 per cent in Finland to 
about 70 per cent in Ireland and Sweden, up to 100 per cent in Germany, Japan, 
the Netherland, Switzerland and in the United States until the introduction of 
inflation-indexed bonds in 1997.
Differences across countries can partly be explained by institutional aspects. In 
a number of countries foreign currency debt is not used for deficit financing but 
only for the purpose of managing foreign exchange reserves. This is now the case 
in Canada, Denmark and Britain. Sweden followed this rule until 1993.
However, in 1998 the share of nominal debt was greater than 80 per cent in all 
countries except for Finland, Ireland, Portugal and Sweden. Differences in debt 
compositions were thus relatively minor and certainly smaller than in the 1980s. 
Table 1.1 shows that, while in most countries the share of nominal debt remained 
relatively stable over the last two decades, in eight countries —Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, Greece, Ireland New Zealand and Portugal— such share grew 
substantially with an average increase of 15 percentage points between 1985 and 
1997.
In line with the analysis of the previous section, this evidence could be explained 
by the increasing independence enjoyed by central banks during this period. The 
share of nominal debt has fallen significantly (by about 10 percentage points) 
only in Sweden and in Britain. Interestingly, the Bank of England was granted 
operational independence only in 1997.
26 The sample excludes Norway because of data availability and Luxembourg which has a 
monetary union with Belgium. Data refer to gross central government debt, with the exception 
of Germany, for which only general government debt data are available.
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Tab. 1.1: Change in Nominal Debt Shares -  1985-1997
Increase in the Share of Nominal Debt, m l
A m i <  —5% —5% <  A m i <  0% 0% < A m i <  10% 10% <  A m i
Sweden [78; 67] 
UK [91; 83]
Canada [93; 92] 
France [96; 95] 
Italy [96; 92] 
Spain [92; 91] 
US [100; 99]
Austria [80; 86] 
Denmark [77; 80] 
Germany [100; 100] 
Japan [100;100] 
Netherl. [100;100] 
Portugal [69; 78] 
Switz. [100; 100]
Australia [82; 95] 
Belgium [80; 92] 
Finland [45; 60] 
Greece [61; 79] 
Ireland [55; 74] 
New Zeal. [54; 80]
Notes: The share of nominal debt, m l, is the percentage of domestic-currency debt which 
is not indexed to the price level. The two numbers in brackets are the shares at the end of 
1985 and 1997, respectively, or at the end of March 1986 and 1998 for fiscal years ending in 
March. Nominal debt excludes debt indexed to the ECU. Total debt for the US includes debt 
in Government Accounts.
Source: Missale (1999).
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The increase in the share of nominal debt recorded by the small open economies 
in our sample of OECD countries may also reflect past difficulties and relatively 
higher costs faced by these countries when raising funds on their domestic mar­
kets. In the case of less developed countries, Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) 
and Hausmann and Panizza (2002) have advanced the idea that ‘...the domestic 
currency cannot be used to borrow abroad or to borrow long-term, even domesti­
cally.’. Many emerging markets borrow, instead, in foreign currency, a situation 
that the authors describe as the original sin of international finance.
Stronger evidence in support of the model comes from the evolution of long-term 
nominal debt over the last two decades. As shown in Table 1.2, the share of such 
debt increased sharply since the mid 1980s almost everywhere except that in the 
United States and in those countries, such as Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, 
Switzerland and Britain, where it was already above 70 per cent. Indeed, while 
in 1985 only nine countries had a share of long-term nominal debt greater than 
50 per cent, in 1997 this group included sixteen countries. During this period, 
the average increase in the share of long-term nominal debt was 13 percentage 
points for the entire sample and 24 points for the eleven countries with an initial 
share lower than 50 per cent.
Although economists agree that in this period central banks have enjoyed an 
increasing independence in the conduct of monetary policy27 and the Maastricht 
Treaty established the full independence of European banks, no time series are 
available on the evolution of independence. Thus, the prediction of a positive 
relation between independence and nominal debt is tested in this section using 
cross-sectional evidence for the 20 industrial OECD countries in our sample.
27 See Eijffinger and Haan (1996) and King (1994).
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Tab. 1.2: Change in Long-Term Debt Shares -  1985-1997
Increase in the Share of Long-Term Nominal Debt, m2
Am2 <  —5% -5%  <  Am2 <  0% 0% < Am2 <  10% 10% <  Am2
UK [71; 59] Germany [93; 90] 
Japan [88; 83] 
Netherl. [99; 94] 
Switz. [72; 67]
US [54; 50]
Australia [65; 75] 
Denmark [67; 72] 
Ireland [41; 49] 
Sweden [48; 52]
Austria [41; 61] 
Belgium [51; 71] 
Canada [40; 61] 
Finland [41; 55] 
France [29; 71] 
Greece [0; 31] 
Italy [11; 42]
New Zeal. [42; 57] 
Portugal [4; 34] 
Spain [13; 62]
Notes: The share of long-term nominal debt, m2, is the percentage of fixed-rate bonds and 
loans denominated in domestic currency with initial maturity longer than one year. The two 
numbers in brackets are the shares at the end of 1985 and 1997, respectively, or at the end 
of March 1986 and 1998 for fiscal years ending in March. Long-term nominal debt includes 
extendible bonds and bonds with coupons adjustable after a period longer than one year. 
Total debt for the US includes debt in Government Accounts.
Source: Missale (1999).
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Central bank independence is measured by three main indexes available from 
the literature: the index of political independence developed by Alesina (1989), 
(AL); the total index of political and economic independence of Grilli, Mascian- 
daro, and Tabellini (1990), (GMT); the legal index of Cukierman (1992), (CU). 
The macroeconomic variables used in the estimations are from the OECD.
Table 1.3 reports pairwise and rank correlations between the share of nominal 
debt in 1985 and the three indexes of central bank independence listed above. 
We choose 1985 as the reference year since the indexes of independence refer to 
legal and institutional arrangements of the 1980s, but results are robust to the 
choice of other dates or the use of period averages.
The simple correlation between the share of nominal debt and the indexes of 
central bank independence is positive, as expected, and significant at the 10 per 
cent level for the AL index and at the 5 per cent level for the GMT index. The 
correlation is not significant in the case of the CU index. Stronger evidence in 
support of the theory comes from the rank correlations in Table 1.3. The Spear­
man correlation coefficient is significant at the 5 per cent level for both the AL 
and the GMT indexes.
The last three columns of Table 1.3 report the correlation coefficients with the 
share of long-term nominal debt, which may better reflect actual inflation incen­
tives than short-term and floating-rate nominal debt. In fact, a short maturity 
or variable interest rates limit the time for the impact of unexpected inflation on 
the debt value.
The correlations with the share of long-term nominal debt are strong and sig­
nificant at the 5 per cent level for both the AL and GMT indexes, while there 
is no evidence of correlation with the CU index. The same results hold true for 
rank correlations.
Tab. 1.3: Correlations of Debt Shares and Central Bank (CB) Independence
Nominal Debt Long-Term Nominal Debt
Index of CB Independence AL GMT CU AL GMT CU
Simple correlations 0.45 0.58 0.15 0.57 0.62 0.24
(0.07) (0.01) (0.53) (0.02) (0.01) (0.31)
Rank correlations 0.60 0.58 0.16 0.60 0.60 0.21
(0.01) (0.01) (0.51) (0.01) (0.01) (0.39)
Observations 16 18 19 16 18 19
Notes: Pairwise correlation coefficients and Spearman rank correlation coefficients. P-Values are in 
parentheses. The index by Alesina (AL) is not available for Austria, Greece, Ireland and Portugal. 
The index by Cukierman (CU) is not available for Portugal. The Grilli-Masciandaro-Tabellini (GMT) 
index is not available for Finland and Sweden.
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To examine whether the relation between central bank independence and debt 
structure is robust to the introduction of other variables, we estimate regressions 
of debt shares on independence indexes and a set of control variables. We focus 
our attention on the AL and GMT indexes for which a significant relation has 
been detected. We take debt shares as the dependent variable, even though the 
choice of debt composition and bank independence has been modelled as a joint 
decision taking place contemporaneously at the institutional stage of the game.28
Table 1.4 shows that the relation between debt shares and the AL and GMT 
indexes remains significant after controlling for the fiscal stance, the openness of 
the economy and the adoption of an exchange rate peg. Columns 1-4 show that 
the ratios of government consumption and gross debt relative to GDP in 1985 
have no impact on debt composition. Incidentally, this result is quite robust; it 
holds for different periods, for the use of period averages and for regressions with 
government deficits and interest payments.
In the second part of Table 1.4, we control for an exchange-rate peg and for the 
openness of the economy, as measured by the sum of imports and exports relative 
to GDP in 1985.29 The consideration of the exchange rate regime is important 
since a peg provides further commitment to low inflation because of the costs as­
sociated with the realignments of the fixed parity (Giavazzi and Pagano (1988)), 
and the greater transparency of the exchange rate (Herrendorf (1999)). Open­
ness is suggested by the greater use of foreign currency debt by open economies. 
Furthermore, a larger tradable sector facing international competition may imply 
less distortions and thus lower inflationary temptations, as shown by Lane (1997).
28 This choice reflects less Frequent and more costly changes in institutional arrangements and
central bankers compared to changes in the debt structure.
29 Peg is a dummy variable taking the value of one for those countries that were part of the
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the EMS in 1985, namely Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands. The inclusion of Spain (that joined the ERM in 1989) 
and/or Austria, Finland and Sweden (de facto adopting a peg), does not change the results.
Tab. 1.4: Debt Shares, CB Independence, Fiscal Variables and Openness
Dep. variable Nominal Long-Term Nominal Nominal Long-Term Nominal
AL GMT AL GMT AL GMT AL GMT
Constant 77.1** 81.4** 18.0 5.58 74.2** 74.1** 7.76 -5.56
(3.29) (4.45) (0.50) (0.16) (6.18) (7.62) (0.41) (0.27)
CB Independence 8.31* 3.07** 16.6** 6.81** 9.65** 3.15** 15.4** 5.95**
(1.84) (2.57) (2.40) (3.07) (2.34) (3.28) (2.40) (2.98)
Government Consumption -0.82 -0.83 -0.15 -1.06
(0.91) (0.86) (0.11) (0.59)
Debt Ratio 0.13 -0.09 0.08 0.17
(0.80) (0.62) (0.31) (0.64)
Peg 16.5* 10.7 -9.51 -2.39
(1.76) (1.45) (0.65) (0.15)
Openness -0.42 -0.51** 0.56 0.31
(1.50) (2.29) (1.28) (0.67)
Observations 16 18 16 18 16 18 16 18
Adjusted R 2 0.29 0.39 0.34 0.41 0.39 0.52 0.41 0.41
Notes: ^statistics are in parentheses. * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level.
For the AL and GMT indexes see Notes to Table 1.3.
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Columns 5-8 of Table 1.4 show that the AL and GMT indexes of independence 
perform better than the peg and openness; controlling for exchange rate pegging 
even enhances the significance of the AL index in explaining the variation in 
nominal debt. This is because exchange rate pegging provides a substitute for 
independence. When the GMT index is considered, openness appears to reduce 
the share of nominal debt. There is instead no evidence that either openness or 
exchange rate pegging affect the share of long-term nominal debt.
We then examine the effect of political instability on the composition of pub­
lic debt. Miller (1997b) finds that political instability reduces significantly the 
share of long-term nominal debt, possibly because of an inflation-risk premium 
on long-term debt induced by higher inflation uncertainty. Columns 1-4 of Table 
1.5 show, however, that independence performs better than instability in three 
out of four cases: when nominal debt (of any maturity) is considered, and when 
independence is measured by the AL index. Political instability has a significant 
negative impact on the share of long-term debt only with the GMT index.
Columns 5 to 8 of Table 1.5 consider size and openness as determinants of the 
debt composition, drawing from evidence of a greater use of foreign currency debt 
by small open economies. The log of GDP in 1985 (in US dollars) accounts for 
most of the variation in nominal debt across OECD economies leaving no signifi­
cant role for central bank independence. The last two columns of Table 1.5 show, 
however, that when long-term nominal debt is considered, the AL and GMT in­
dexes remain significant at the 5 per cent and 10 per cent level, respectively, while 
size does not have a statistically relevant effect.
If GDP is viewed as an indicator of the size of the security markets and their 
liquidity, this evidence suggests that the dimension of the market affects the cost 
and thus the choice between alternative instruments to commit to low inflation.
Tab. 1.5: Debt Shares, CB Independence, Political Instability and Country Size
Dep. variable Nominal Long-Term Nominal Nominal Long-Term Nominal
AL GMT AL GMT AL GMT AL GMT
Constant 95.1** 65.3** -13.3 -6.57 14.9 26.6* 3.33 -41.4
(5.75) (5.71) (0.54) (0.37) (0.74) (2.00) (0.08) (1.13)
CB Independence 11.0** 3.08** 12.1* 2.85 1.52 0.93 15.8** 4.35*
(2.54) (2.10) (1.86) (1.27) (0.40) (1.09) (2.14) (1.84)
Political Instability 3.03* 0.35 -4.11 -3.72**
(1.83) (0.31) (1.67) (2.16)
Openness 0.36 0.17 0.45 0.66
(1.47) (0.94) (0.92) (1.33)
Log of GDP 10.7** 9.02** 0.76 7.06
(3.38) (4.08) (0.12) (1.16)
Observations 15 16 15 16 16 18 16 18
Adjusted R2 0.38 0.29 0.46 0.50 0.60 0.75 0.39 0.46
Notes: ^statistics are in parentheses. * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. 
For the AL and GMT indexes see Notes to Table 1.3.
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Although there may be a preference for short-term and variable-rate debt, in the 
mid 1980s debt managers could rely on deep markets for such instruments only 
in large economies, while for small countries borrowing on foreign markets was 
more convenient.
The overall impression is that a relation between debt composition and indepen­
dence exists which gives a potentially positive content to the theory developed 
in the previous sections. There are other important predictions regarding output 
variability and inflation that can be examined.
A stronger testable implication of our theoretical model is that a greater share 
of nominal debt helps to reduce output variability by making the stabilisation 
policy of the monetary authority more effective (see equation (1.6)). To test 
this prediction we follow the standard procedure in the empirical literature stem­
ming from Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1990) and Alesina and Summers 
(1993). We estimate regressions of the standard deviation of output growth on 
the AL and GMT indexes, introducing the two measures of debt composition as 
additional explanatory variables. We consider the standard deviation of output 
growth for the period 1986-1997 so as to avoid potential endogeneity problems 
between output growth and the debt structure.
The results shown in columns 1 and 2 of Table 1.6 are striking: a greater initial 
share of nominal debt significantly decreases output variability. The effect is sig­
nificant at the 5 per cent level for both the AL and the GMT indexes and still 
holds when openness and log of GDP are introduced in the regression as control 
variables (see columns 5 and 6).
The evidence on the impact of the debt structure is however mixed: when the 
share of long-term nominal debt is considered, no significant effect on output 
variability is found (see columns 3, 4, 7 and 8).
Tab. 1.6: Variability of Output Growth, Debt Shares and CB Independence
Dep. Variable Standard Deviation of Output Growth 1986-97
AL GMT AL GMT AL GMT AL GMT
Constant 4.46** 3.19** 1.96** 2.08** 4.89** 3.29** 4.27** 2.76**
(8.13) (5.69) (4.04) (6.70) (7.59) (4.34) (3.96) (3.56)
CB Independence 0.25* 0.003 0.003 -0.06 0.25* 0.002 0.21 -0.04
(2.01) (0.08) (0.01) (1.28) (2.10) (0.06) (0.88) (0.69)
Nominal Debt -0.04** -0.02** -0.04** -0.03*
(5.29) (2.25) (4.61) (1.91)
Long-Term Nominal Debt -0.003 0.002 -0.001 0.003
(0.38) (0.43) (0.17) (0.67)
Openness -0.01 0.001 -0.02* -0.01
(1.22) (0.10) (1.81) (0.54)
Log of GDP 0.06 0.11 -0.39** -0.15
(0.42) (0.65) (2.28) (1.16)
Observations 16 18 16 18 16 18 16 18
Adjusted R2 0.68 0.33 0.01 0.11 0.77 0.35 0.34 0.20
Notes: ^-statistics are in parentheses. ‘Significant at the 10% level. “ Significant at the 5% level.
For the AL and GMT indexes see Notes to Table 1.3.
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Finally, we examine the relation between average inflation for the period 1986- 
1997, central bank independence and debt composition. Since monetary policy 
delegation does not fully eliminate the inflation bias and the share of nominal 
debt is limited, inflation is expected to decrease with independence and rise with 
the share of nominal debt or, in an inflation targeting, bear no relation to it.
The empirical evidence reported in Table 1.7 contradicts this prediction: the 
coefficient of the share of long-term nominal debt is negative and significant with 
both the AL and the GMT index. This result is robust to the introduction of a 
dummy variable for exchange rate pegging (see columns 3 and 4) and the con­
sideration of the debt-to-GDP ratio (see columns 7 and 8). As expected, both 
independence and exchange rate pegging significantly reduce inflation.
The negative relation between inflation and long-term nominal debt may reflect 
inverse causality running from inflation to the composition of debt. A high in­
flation environment is likely to be associated with high expected inflation and 
inflation variability, making it more costly to issue fixed-rate long-term debt.
Alternatively a lower share of long-term nominal debt may reflect a policy reaction 
to high inflation in an attempt to reduce inflationary expectations, as suggested 
by King (1994) and Mandilaras and Levine (2000). In either case the estimated 
relation suffers from an endogeneity problem that the use of initial-period debt 
shares cannot solve, since average future inflation is typically correlated with 
long-term interest rates.
To conclude, the observed debt structures in industrial OECD countries are con­
sistent with the prediction that more independent central banks allow govern­
ments to issue a larger share of long-term nominal debt.
Tab. 1.7: Inflation, Debt Shares and CB Independence
Dep. Variable: Average Inflation 1986-1997
AL GMT AL GMT AL GMT AL GMT
Constant 5.23** 11.4** 6.07** 8.68** 5.91** 15.7** 6.23** 10.6**
(3.36) (3.85) (10.7) (6.68) (4.09) (4.40) (7.03) (5.28)
CB Independence -1.03** -0.39* -0.66** -0.23 -0.94** -0.42* -0.64* -0.30
(3.62) (1.82) (2.56) (1.17) (2.91) (2.06) (2.05) (1.46)
Nominal Debt 0.01 -0.04 0.001 -0.07
(0.46) (1.10) (0.06) (1.66)
Long-Term -0.02* -0.05** -0.02 -0.05**
Nominal Debt (2.02) (2.43) (1.61) (2.27)
Peg -1.14** -1.94* -1.07** -1.82*
(2.31) (1.75) (2.59) (1.87)
Debt Ratio -0.01 -0.05** -0.01 -0.03
(1.15) (2.21) (1.14) (1.70)
Observations 16 18 16 18 16 18 16 18
Adjusted R2 0.60 0.48 0.70 0.60 0.48 0.53 0.57 0.59
Notes: ^-statistics are in parentheses. "Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level.
For the AL and GMT indexes see Notes to Table 1.3.
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However, the negative relation between inflation and long-term nominal debt 
suggests an alternative explanation to the commitment motivation. The positive 
relation between independence and nominal debt may simply reflect the lower 
inflation environment that characterises countries with more independent central 
banks. So far we have been unable to construct a test that allows to distinguish 
between these two competing but related explanations. We leave the investigation 
of this issue to our future research agenda.
1.6 Conclusions
While the role of central bank independence in securing low and stable inflation 
is undisputed, the idea that indexed and foreign currency debt may create incen­
tives and expectations for low inflation is not always accepted.
This chapter argued that the efficacy of debt characteristics as incentives for 
anti-inflationary policy depends on the type of monetary regime. We showed 
that delegation of monetary policy to an independent central bank is a better 
solution to credibility problems than increasing the costs of inflation by issuing 
indexed debt, foreign currency debt and short-term debt. Furthermore, an inde­
pendent central bank may benefit from nominal debt, possibly of a long maturity, 
since such debt increases the sensitivity of taxes and output to unexpected in­
flation, thus minimising the unexpected inflation needed to counter supply shocks.
This explanation is consistent with the decline in the share of debt denominated in 
foreign currency and the lengthening of debt maturity that has taken place since 
the late 1980s in many OECD countries, with the establishment of increasingly 
independent central banks.
2. DEBT MANAGEMENT AND THE SUSTAINABILITY OF 
FIXED EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES
2.1 Introduction
Chapter 1 shows that delegation of monetary policy to either an independent 
central banker or inflation targeting is a superior solution to a ‘fixed rule’ of zero 
inflation and depreciation if the authorities and the private sector share the same 
information. On the other hand, a fixed exchange regime may fare better if infor­
mation is asymmetric or the monetary authority is not granted full independence.
Herrendorf (1998) finds that joining a fixed exchange rate regime can be a better 
solution to credibility problems if the private sector lacks the ability to distinguish 
the relative impact of economic policies and exogenous shocks on the inflation 
rate, i.e. when actual inflation is a noisy signal of monetary policy performance.1
A fixed exchange rate regime can make the commitment to zero-inflation more 
visible and enhance the credibility of monetary policy by increasing the cost of 
inflation. This is the case if the decision to abandon the exchange rate parity in­
volves political and reputational costs.2 The main benefit is to avoid inflationary 
expectations that arise if the government is expected to behave opportunistically.
1 See also Herrendorf (1997) and Walsh (1997).
2 See Giavazzi and Pagano (1988).
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Obstfeld (1991) shows that pegging the exchange rate to a foreign currency can 
be interpreted as a ‘fixed rule with an escape clause’. This solution parallels the 
possibility of removing (at a fixed cost) a conservative central banker in the lit­
erature on bank independence.3
In this chapter, we would examine the implications of a fixed exchange regime 
on debt policy using a model which shares relevant insights with the second gen­
eration models of currency crises.4 We would also test the main predictions of 
the model by looking at the experience of the European countries participating in 
the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System (EMS) 
during the period 1979-1995.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. In Section 2.2, we selectively 
review the literature on self-fulfilling confidence crises by focusing on those con­
tributions where debt management plays a key role in triggering or averting a 
financial crisis. In Section 2.3, we extend the simple theoretical framework used 
in Chapter 1 to show how debt management may affect the sustainability of a 
fixed exchange rate regime. In Section 2.4, we describe in a snapshot the dif­
ferent phases of the ERM, from its foundation in 1979 to 1995 when the band 
of fluctuation of the participating currencies was enlarged to ±15% around the 
central parity. Section 2.5 describes the dataset that we use to empirically test 
the main theoretical conclusions arising from Section 2.3. The estimation results 
are presented in Section 2.6. Finally, Section 2.7 concludes.
3 See Flood and Isard (1989) and Lohmann (1992).
4 See Drazen and Masson (1994) and Velasco (1996).
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2.2 Debt Management and Self-Fulfilling Confidence Crises:
A Partial Review of the Literature
The EMS crisis of September 1992 —which led to the abandonment of the ERM 
system by Great Britain and Italy, and the speculative attack on the French franc 
thereafter— inspired a new strand of literature on the causes of currency crises. 
These new theories are grouped under the common heading of ‘second generation’ 
models of currency crises, or models with an ‘escape clause’.5
Until the early 1990s, the prevailing theoretical framework used to explain the 
occurrence of currency crises was the speculative attack model a la Krugman 
(1979), which inspired the ‘first generation’ models of currency crises. According 
to this approach, the abandonment of a fixed exchange rate regime is the result of 
a run on the foreign exchange reserves of the central bank orchestrated by spec­
ulators with rational expectations of a devaluation. The crisis is thus the result 
of the arbitrage by speculators that anticipate the full depletion of the central 
bank’s stock of foreign reserves. The conflict between an expansionary fiscal or 
monetary policy and a fixed exchange rate regime is what triggers the loss of 
reserves that eventually forces the authorities to abandon the exchange rate peg.
The 1992 EMS crisis revealed the inadequacy of the ‘first generation’ models 
in explaining crises on the basis of bad fundamentals.6 Indeed, while an excessive 
fiscal or monetary policy expansion may explain the collapse of the Italian lira or 
the Spanish peseta, the same argument cannot be applied to the devaluation of 
the British pound or the French franc. The credibility of the French and British 
governments to defend a fixed parity was eroded by their perceived incentives to 
devalue in order to ease the effects of the high unemployment and interest rates
5 For a critical review of the currency crises literature and an assessment of the predictability
of currency crises see, among others, Jeanne (1999), Chui (2002) and Berg and Pattillo (1998).
6 As pointed out by Jeanne (1999), by bad fundamentals we mean here an expansionary
monetary or fiscal policy that makes the devaluation inevitable.
Debt Management and the Sustainability of Fixed Exchange Rate Regimes 57
imposed by Germany after its reunification. These domestic factors increased the 
temptation to devalue and made the choice to increase interest rates to defend 
the currency even more painful, because of self-fulfilling devaluation expectations.
These considerations led to the development of an alternative theoretical ap­
proach to speculative attacks that takes into account economic fundamentals but 
also the self-fulfilling nature of currency crises and the possibility of multiple equi­
libria. The devaluation is no longer the result of a shortage of foreign reserves, 
but the ex-post optimal response of policy makers faced with the incentive to 
devalue the currency. A fixed exchange rate is thus a commitment device to an 
anti-inflationary policy but with an ‘escape clause’ to devalue if the costs associ­
ated with this commitment outweigh its benefits.
In the seminal paper by Obstfeld (1994), the costs of the commitment to a fixed 
exchange rate are measured in terms of higher unemployment. However, another 
reason why policymakers may be tempted to an inflationary surprise is to inflate 
away the value of the outstanding public debt. The policymaker’s choice is thus 
reduced to a problem of optimal taxation, where the choice is between monetary 
seigniorage and taxes.
In what follows, we would review some selected contributions from this last group 
of models. The main aim is to highlight the role that debt management can play 
in triggering or averting a confidence crisis.
Using a model where debt repudiation can be either open or through inflation, 
Calvo (1988) was the first to show that the presence of a large debt stock may 
generate multiple equilibria and self-fulfilling sovereign debt crises. This is be­
cause the expected debt repudiation will tend to be reflected in higher interest 
rates paid on government bonds. Higher interest rates, in turn, will add to the 
debt burden, increasing the likelihood of a debt default.
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This circularity generates multiple equilibria: one with low interests and no re­
pudiation, and another with high interests and debt default. Calvo also shows 
that in a monetary economy, where inflation is the only possible form of repudi­
ation, indexation of public debt can offer a solution to the inflation bias because 
it removes the inflationary incentive associated with a high debt burden.
In the model by Calvo (1988), the incentive to repudiate the debt by creating an 
inflationary surprise is increasing in the total debt burden, no matter what its 
term structure is. The paper by Alesina, Prati, and Tabellini (1990) extends the 
previous argument by focusing on the role played by the maturity structure of 
public debt.
Contrary to Calvo (1988), the model by Alesina, Prati, and Tabellini (1990) 
has an infinite horizon, in which the optimal policy of the government is to roll­
over its debt forever. A bad equilibrium, or confidence crisis, originates from a 
coordination failure among investors who refuse to buy the debt rolled over in 
the anticipation that others will behave likewise in future periods. As no investor 
buys public debt, the government is forced to default, validating the expectations 
of investors.
Multiple equilibria are a feature of this model too, depending on the cost as­
sociated with the government’s default. Moreover, the authors show that the 
likelihood of a confidence crisis is higher the shorter and more concentrated are 
the maturities of public debt. It follows that a way of averting a crisis is to in­
crease the maturity profile of the debt by issuing long-term public debt.
Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) extend the previous analysis by focusing on a small 
open economy with a fixed exchange rate regime and imperfect information on the 
government’s preferences. In this set-up, a confidence crisis does not necessarily 
lead to a devaluation of the currency. The authors show that the ability of the
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government to withstand a crisis depends on the stock of debt outstanding, its 
average maturity and maturity structure. The policy prescriptions that follows 
from this model are clear: the government should smooth the time pattern of the 
debt reaching maturity and possibly index or issue debt in foreign currency. The 
(real) return on the latter is insensitive to expected exchange rate movements 
and thus to confidence crises.
The self-fulfilling debt crises model of Cole and Kehoe (2000) shows how fun­
damentals, such as the level and composition of government debt, can lie in a 
‘crisis zone’ where multiple equilibria are possible. The policy response to avoid 
or contrast a crisis is similar to that suggested by the previous studies, i.e. to 
reduce the stock of debt or lengthen its maturity.
Obstfeld (1994) finds inspiration in the strand of literature on ‘bonds-led cur­
rency crises’ initiated by Calvo (1988) for his model of the 1992 EMS crisis. 
The author extends the findings by Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) by modeling the 
intertemporal decisions of a government that faces a trade-off between a fixed 
exchange rate policy and the financing of its fiscal deficit using distortionary tax­
ation. In his setting, the government chooses the currency composition of public 
debt first, and decides on whether or not to devalue the currency in the second 
period.
Multiple equilibria and self-fulfilling currency crises arise in this framework be­
cause devaluation expectations tend to raise the nominal interest rate and the 
debt burden. The higher the debt burden, the stronger the incentive of the gov­
ernment to devalue in the second period, validating expectations of a devaluation.
A similar argument is presented by Velasco (1996) and Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco 
(1996) with reference to the Mexican crisis in 1994. The focus of these studies is 
on the relationship between debt management, credibility and the sustainability
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of fixed exchange rates. These models contain elements of both first and second 
generation models of currency crises. They share with Obstfeld (1994) the pres­
ence of an optimising policy maker that chooses whether or not to devalue on the 
basis of a cost-benefit analysis and reputational considerations. 7  However, fun­
damentals also matter in determining under what circumstances a self-fulfilling 
outcome is possible.
Velasco (1996) shows that only for sufficiently high levels of external debt there 
can be multiple equilibria. Moreover, the level of the debt stock influences in each 
point in time the incentive of the policymaker to devalue and thus the trade-off 
between flexibility and credibility. The cost-benefit analysis is influenced not only 
be the level of the debt stock but also by devaluation expectations. These, in 
turn, are influenced by the debt stock and by the probability assigned to the 
likelihood of a surprise devaluation. While a high stock of debt increases deval­
uation expectations, a surprise devaluation in t =  1  has an ambiguous effect on 
subsequent devaluation expectations.
The last finding sheds some light on the Mexican crisis. Contrary to conven­
tional wisdom, not devaluing in the presence of bad fundamentals and adverse 
external shocks may have been detrimental to credibility. On the other hand, 
devaluing in the presence of bad fundamentals could have improved expectations 
and the government’s credibility. This is because in Velasco (1996), the expecta­
tions of devaluation depend not only on the policymaker’s reputation but also on 
the level of fundamentals, i.e. the debt stock. If fundamentals are bad and the 
government resists the temptation to devalue, devaluation expectations can raise 
more than they would have, had the government devalued in the first place.
7 In the two-periods extension of the model, Velasco (1996) assumes that a government that 
devalues in t =  1 is never believed again. This implies that agents will expect a devaluation 
with probability one in the second period.
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2.3 Exchange Rate Pegging
The analysis presented in this section follows Velasco (1996), extending his work 
in two directions. First, it considers domestic public debt as opposed to external 
debt. Secondly, it focuses on the choice of the currency denomination of debt, a 
problem which does not arise when only external debt is considered. Within the 
present framework the government must solve an additional problem, which is to 
choose the share of domestic debt denominated in local currency.
The government’s problem is set as in Chapter 1. The loss function of the policy 
maker can be written as follows:
EoL =  OEoe2 +  E0(y -  yTf  (2.1)
where 0 reflects the social preferences, i.e. the cost of depreciation relative to out­
put deviations, e denotes the exchange rate depreciation, yT is the output target 
and y is actual output, lower than optimal because of tax distortions.
If the exchange rate parity is abandoned, the monetary authority decides the 
extent of the devaluation of the currency, e, (and thus inflation since PPP holds) 
so as to minimise (2 .1 ) subject to:
y — yT =  Z{e — E0e) — D — u (2.2)
where Z =  (b +  kmB) denotes the marginal output gain from unexpected depre­
ciation, D =  k(G  +  B  +  rB)  is the expected output loss due to tax distortions, 
and u is an adverse output shock. The parameter b measures the sensitivity of 
output to surprise inflation (depreciation), G and B  are the ratios of government 
spending and public debt to the natural rate of output, r is the constant real 
interest rate, and m  is the share of nominal debt, which can be devalued by in­
flation (depreciation).
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At normal times, under a fixed exchange rate regime, the authority does not 
devalue and maintains inflation equal to zero, so that its loss is equal to
Lfx =  (D +  u +  ZE0e f  (2.3)
However, for sufficiently large adverse shocks to output, the government devalues
and incurs the reputational and political costs of its action. Denoting with C  the 
fixed cost associated with a devaluation, the loss from devaluing is equal to
Ld =  \ ( D  +  u +  ZE<>ef +  C  (2.4)
It follows that the government will devalue for shocks such that l / x >  Ld, or
X(D -{- u -I- Z E q€^  d- C  (D  H- u -f ZE qc^
that can be solved for u to yield
u +  D >  $  — ZE 0e (2.5)
where $  =  [C/( 1 — A ) ] 1^2 is decreasing in Z  =  b +  kmB  and thus in the share of
nominal debt.
Equation (2.5) shows that the decision to devalue or to maintain the fixed parity 
depends on the devaluation expectations of the private sector, a fact which gives 
rise to multiple equilibria.
This can be easily illustrated for a simple distribution of output shocks. Suppose 
that u can take only two values: it can be bad and equal to u with probability 
p, or good and equal to u with probability ( 1  — p). Assume also a zero mean 
shock; i.e. E0u =  pu +  (1 — p)u =  0. Then, three possible equilibria may exist 
depending on the importance of tax distortions (and thus on the level of debt) 
and the magnitude of the shocks: (i) a no devaluation equilibrium; (ii) a contin­
gent devaluation equilibrium; (iii) a devaluation equilibrium.
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In a no devaluation equilibrium the private sector expects the government to 
maintain the exchange rate fixed even when the bad shock occurs, so that Eqc =  0  
and the government never devalues. This is the case if
D  +  u <  3>
the level of debt is low or the fixed cost of devaluation is high.
In a contingent devaluation equilibrium the private sector expects the government 
to devalue only if a bad shock occurs and the government behaves as expected; 
it maintains the exchange rate fixed, e =  0 , for good shocks while it devalues for 
bad shocks, u =  u. In the latter case the government chooses an exchange rate 
equal to
Ze  =  (1 — A)(D u Z E § e )
It follows that the expected depreciation is:
( 2 -e )
Using this result in condition (2.5), it can be shown that a contingent devaluation 
is an equilibrium if the following inequalities are satisfied
$ [ l - p ( l - A ) ]  < u  +  D  (2.7)
u +  D <  ($  +  u — u)[ 1  — p( 1  — A)]
These conditions ensure that the government devalues for bad shocks, since
Ld(u) +  C <  Lfx(u), while it maintains the fixed parity for good shocks, since
Ld(u) +  C >  L*x(u).
Finally, in a devaluation equilibrium the policymaker is expected to abandon the 
fixed parity even for good shocks, so that E^e =  Z D /0 .  The government does so 
at very high levels of debt and tax distortions. Devaluation is an equilibrium if
D > \ { $ - u ) '  (2.8)
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Within this framework, the expectation that the government will devalue can 
be self-fulfilling because pessimistic expectations lead to higher interest rates 
and nominal wages, thus increasing output distortions and the cost of resisting 
a speculative attack. For some range of parameter values the equilibrium can 
be ‘no devaluation’ or ‘contingent devaluation’ depending on the private sector’s 
expectations. For other parameter values, private sector’s expectations determine 
whether devaluation is a sure outcome or is contingent on the output shock. 
Focusing on the former possibility, ‘no devaluation’ and ‘contingent devaluation’ 
are both possible outcomes if the following condition holds:
$[1 — p(l — A)] <  u +  D <  $  (2.9)
As mentioned in the previous section, the potential of fixed-rate nominal debt 
with a short maturity to generate multiple equilibria is known since the semi­
nal work by Calvo (1988), Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) and Alesina, Prati, and 
Tabellini (1990) and has recently been revived in the literature on currency crises 
by Obstfeld (1994). In that literature the choice of the currency denomination 
and the maturity of the debt are shown to play a crucial role: the issuance of 
foreign currency debt can rule out a debt crisis, that is, the ‘bad equilibrium’.
In the present framework the use of foreign currency debt can eliminate the 
contingent devaluation outcome. Foreign currency debt may insulate the govern­
ment budget from high nominal interest rates and thus prevent expectations from 
having any impact on the decision to hold the exchange rate fixed. Formally, the 
condition for a contingent devaluation may not hold — i.e. u + D  <  4>[1—p (l —A)] 
— for a high share of foreign currency debt, since both $  and A increase as con­
ventional debt is reduced.
Although the merits of foreign currency debt arise quite naturally in most mod­
els of currency crises, a less favorable picture emerges when we turn to the facts. 
Large issuances of foreign currency debt have neither prevented the emergence
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nor improved on the outcome of currency crises, such as in Sweden and Finland 
in 1992, and Mexico in 1994. Even more challenging for the theory is that foreign 
currency debt is usually not well received by private investors. There is thus little 
sign of the credibility bonus associated with foreign debt that most theoretical 
models predict.
In an effort to reconcile theory and evidence Obstfeld (1994) relies on the fol­
lowing explanation. If reducing the debt burden provides the only motivation 
for surprise devaluation and inflation, then foreign currency debt is effective in 
ruling out currency crises. However, if there are other benefits from unexpected 
inflation that are unrelated to public debt, then foreign currency debt helps to 
avoid some bad equilibria but may not eliminate the possibility of a crisis. If a 
crisis nevertheless materialises, it would be worse than had foreign debt not been 
issued. This is because foreign debt reduces the inflation tax base and thus the 
cost for the government of any given expected inflation. As a result, expected 
and realised depreciation and inflation must be higher for an equilibrium to exist 
where such expectations are self-validating.
This explanation can be formalised as follows. Suppose that the sensitivity of 
output to surprise depreciation, b, is high enough to make contingent devaluation 
a possible outcome even if all the debt is denominated in foreign currency, i.e. 
m =  0 , and
4>[1 — p(  1  — A)] <  u +  D
Then, the effect of domestic currency debt can be evaluated by examining the 
government loss when the ‘contingent-devaluation’ equilibrium prevails. 8
When the private sector expects the decision to devalue to be contingent on
8 We focus on this particular outcome because in the ‘no-devaluation’ equilibrium the loss is 
equal to D 2 +  <ru and is thus independent from the debt composition.
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the shock, the expected loss of the government is equal to:
E0L =  pC +  pX(D +  u +  Z E 0e)2 +  (1 -  p)(D  +  u +  ZEae f  (2.10)
where the cost from pessimistic expectations, ZE$e, increases with the share of 
nominal debt, m . 9  High interest rates on nominal debt add to the government’s 
costs in both output states, but, since A is decreasing in the share of nominal 
debt, the effect of debt policy is uncertain.
Rearranging terms, and using the value of E^e from equation (2.6), yields
EqL =  pC  +  (1 — p)(u — u) +  (D — u)(D +  u +  ZEoe) (2.11)
which shows that the effect of nominal debt on the government loss depends on 
the difference D — u. If the adverse output shock, u, is larger than the output 
loss due to tax distortions, D, nominal debt reduces the government’s expected 
loss.
Intuitively, domestic currency debt carries a cost in terms of higher interest pay­
ments and output distortions (increasing in the level of debt) but provides an 
insurance against adverse output shocks. For a large enough shock relative to 
distortions the latter effect prevails and nominal debt should be issued up to the 
point where it does not lead to a full devaluation. 1 0
What is crucial for the result is that nominal debt does not alter the equilib­
rium outcome since there are other reasons, such as standard price-output effects 
captured by 6 , which lead to a devaluation. On the contrary, it should be noted
9 This can be easily seen by noting that Z  =  b +  kmB  is increasing with m  and ZEoe is 
equal to
. p(D + v)Z2
0 0 + ( l - p ) Z 2
10 Formally, the optimal share, m, can be found by solving equation (2.8) with an equality.
Debt Management and the Sustainability of Fixed Exchange Rate Regimes 67
that this result does not imply that discretionary policy is optimal; i.e. it is con­
sistent with a fixed rule being a better policy than discretion (see equation (2.7)). 
Indeed, using the fact that pit +  (1 — p)u =  0, the variance of output shocks is 
equal to ou =  u2p /(  1  — p), and the condition for a fixed rule to be preferable 
becomes
(1 —p ) D2 >  Xpu2 (2.12)
which can be satisfied while some nominal debt is still optimal, i.e. D < u ,  for a 
low probability of a bad shock to output.
Therefore, a fixed exchange rate regime can be preferred to a floating regime 
and domestic currency to foreign currency debt if a large adverse shock to output 
may occur but with a small probability.
Indeed, domestic currency debt is not only a valuable hedge against bad out­
put shocks but, in such events, it can also lead to a lower rate of devaluation. 
This is the case if the cost of devaluing, 9 , is low relative to the sensitivity of 
output to unexpected devaluation (and inflation), as shown by the derivative of 
e with respect to m
de _  k B( D +  u) 2
d ^ - [ 9  +  ( l - p ) Z ^ [0~ { 1 ~ p ) Z ]
The reason is that an increase in the inflation tax base may reduce the inflation 
rate needed to offset an adverse output shock.
This explanation captures the idea that if the likelihood of a devaluation is unaf­
fected by the funding policy of the debt — that is, if the incentives set by foreign 
currency debt do not alter the government’s decision to devalue — , the conse­
quences of a currency devaluation in the presence of foreign debt can be worse 
than with conventional debt. Expectations may even react negatively to the is­
suance of foreign debt since a worse outcome, say a higher rate of devaluation, 
may be expected in the event of a crisis.
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In the remaining of this chapter, we would present some empirical evidence based 
on the experience of the countries within the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the 
European Monetary System from 1979 to 1995 that provides support to these 
theoretical results.
2.4 The Exchange Rate Mechanism of the EMS
The European Monetary System was launched in March 1979 by the member 
states of the then called European Economic Community (EEC), now European 
Union (EU). The main aim of the EMS was to achieve a greater monetary integra­
tion among its member countries, including the creation of a European Central 
Bank and the introduction of a single common currency.
The key pillars of the agreement were:
•  The introduction of the European Currency Unit (ECU), defined as a 
weighted average of the currencies of the EEC member states.
•  The Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), which allowed the exchange rate of 
each member nation to fluctuate within a band of 2.5 per cent on either side 
of its parity against the ECU. Italy, a founding EMS member, as well as the 
late comers, i.e. the United Kingdom, Portugal and Spain, were initially 
granted a wider margin of ± 6  per cent around the central parity. Countries 
were also allowed to maintain capital controls and modify their central 
parities, should they become inconsistent with their long-term equilibrium 
exchange rate.
The ERM was, therefore, only one of the elements defining the EMS. Moreover, 
not every member country of the European Monetary System adhered to the 
ERM from the beginning, but only Belgium Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. The ECU, instead, was a basket of all 
the EEC currencies, including the pound sterling and the Greek dracma.
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As observed by Giavazzi and Giovannini (1989), the EMS was inspired by the 
Bretton Woods system and of the latter it mimicked the principle of adjustable 
pegs and bilateral intervention to support the fixed exchange rate parities. The 
central banks of the ERM member countries committed to keep their exchange 
rates within bands of fluctuation around their bilateral central parities. Bilateral 
interventions on the foreign exchange market were compulsory once the spot ex­
change rate of one currency against another had hit the margin of the fluctuation 
band. Intra-marginal interventions were let at discretion of the national authori­
ties and did not have to be co-ordinated because they were unilateral.
Following Giavazzi and Giovannini (1989), we can subdivide the life of the Ex­
change Rate Mechanism in three different periods:
•  An initial phase from March 1979 to January 1987, characterised by a large 
number of official realignments;
•  A second ‘tranquil’ phase from February 1987 to August 1992, with only 
one realignment in correspondence of the adoption of the narrow band of 
±2.5% by Italy;
•  A third phase, which followed the forced abandonment of the Italian lira 
and British pound in September 1992 and lasted until 1995, when the en­
largement of the band of fluctuation to ±15% in August 1993 ended de 
facto the European experiment of a fixed exchange rate system.
Table 2.1 shows the chronology of the official realignments within the ERM from 
March 1979 to 1995, the end-year for the econometric analysis presented in this 
chapter. The currencies involved in each realignment and the variation of the 
official parities are reported in the second and third column of the table, respec­
tively. A positive sign indicates an appreciation of the central parity, whereas a 
negative sign means that the central parity was devalued.
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Tab. 2.1: Official Realignments within the ERM I
Date Country Realignment
March 1979 Belgium franc, Danish krone,
DM, French franc, Irish punt 
Luxembourg franc and Dutch guilder
±2.25% Band
Italian lira ±6% Band
24 September 1979 DM +2%
Danish krone -2.9%
30 November 1979 Danish krone -4.8%
22 March 1981 Italian lira -6%
5 October 1981 DM and Dutch guilder +5.5%
French franc and Italian lira -3%
22 February 1982 Danish krone -3%
Belgian franc -8.5%
14 June 1982 DM and Dutch guilder +4.25%
Italian lira -2.75%
French franc -5.75%
21 March 1983 DM +5.5%
Dutch guilder +3.5%
Danish krone +2.5%
Belgian franc +1.5%
French franc and Italian lira -2.5%
Irish punt -3.5%
21 July 1985 All ERM I countries but Italy +2%
Italy -6%
7 April 1986 DM and Dutch guilder +3%
Belgian franc and Danish krone +1%
French franc -3%
4 August 1986 Irish punt -8%
12 January 1987 DM and Dutch guilder +3%
Belgian franc +2%
7 January 1990 Italian lira -3.75%
Italian lira ±2.25% Band
14 September 1992 Italian lira -3.5%
All other currencies +3.5%
17 September 1992 British pound abandons ERM I
18 September 1992 Italian lira abandons ERM I
Spanish peseta -5%
23 November 1992 Portuguese escudo and Spanish peseta -6%
30 January 1993 Irish punt -10%
14 May 1993 Spanish peseta -8%
Portuguese escudo -6.5%
2 August 1993 DM and Dutch guilder ±2.25% Band
All other currencies ±15% Band
6 March 1995 Spanish peseta -7%
Portuguese escudo -3.5%
Notes: + ( —) =  Nominal appreciation (depreciation) of the official parity.
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As shown in Table 2.1, the first three realignments in the first phase of the ERM 
were driven by unilateral decisions by Germany, Denmark and Italy to realign 
their currencies. From October 1981 onwards, official realignments involved more 
than one currency. Typically, during this first phase, high inflation countries, like 
France and Italy, had to devalue their currencies to try to regain competitiveness 
against the strongest currencies of the EMS, like the DM and the Dutch guilder. 
The other currencies —the Belgian franc, the Danish krone and the Irish pound— 
depreciated in the early years and appreciated thereafter. The United Kingdom 
refused to join the ERM until October 1990; the Spanish peseta joined in June 
1989 and the Portuguese escudo in April 1992.
The ‘tranquil’ period of the ERM, from February 1987 to August 1992, was 
characterised by only one realignment, that of the Italian lira when it entered the 
narrow band of ±2.5%. The empirical evidence reported in Giavazzi and Gio­
vannini (1989) shows that, during this second phase, the countries of the EMS 
achieved a greater degree of convergence in their inflation and interest rates, as 
well as fiscal balances and debt ratios. Moreover, the authors find that member 
countries were characterised by a lower variation in the real exchange rates and 
the money supply than non-EMS member countries.
Other positive institutional developments that occurred during this period were 
the elimination of all forms of restrictions to capital movements within the EEC; 
the creation of the European Monetary Institute (a precursor of the European 
Central Bank); and the abolishment in 1992 of all remaining restrictions on the 
movement of goods, services, capital and labour among member nations that led 
to the creation of a single European market.
Until September 1992, the EMS was largely regarded as a success, having pro­
moted the convergence of the inflation rates of its member countries towards the 
low level of Germany and limited considerably the number of official realign­
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ments. However the events of September 1992 highlighted a big inconsistency of 
the EMS system, i.e. the presence of fixed exchange rate regimes combined with 
perfect capital mobility and limited monetary policy coordination. The system 
worked well in the absence of external shocks, but did not survive an asymmetric 
demand shock that affected only some of its member countries.
In September 1992, the United Kingdom and Italy abandoned the ERM fol­
lowing strong speculative pressures on their currencies. In the presence of high 
unemployment and economic recession, the cost of maintaining a fixed exchange 
rate regime was too high. Britain and Italy thus opted for the ‘escape clause’ of 
abandoning the ERM . 1 1  This decision was followed by another four realignments 
that involved the Irish pound, the Spanish peseta and the Portuguese escudo.
After Britain and Italy, it was the turn of the French franc to withstand a specu­
lative attack. The currency survived September 1992 thanks to massive bilateral 
interventions by the Banque de France and the Bundesbank. In August 1993, 
when the French franc was under renewed speculative pressures, the finance min­
isters of the EU agreed to abandon the narrow band and allow the fluctuation of 
their exchange rates within a 15% band on either side of the central parity. Only 
the Dutch guilder retained the narrow band vis-a-vis the Deutsche Mark. For all 
the other countries, the establishment of a 30 per cent wide band of fluctuation 
meant, de facto, the shift to a floating exchange rate system.
11 For these reasons, the 1992 crisis has been interpreted as a typical example of ‘second 
generation’ currency crisis episode a la Obstfeld (1994).
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2.5 The Data
Our dataset includes the countries within the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the 
European Monetary System in the period 1979-1995. These are: Belgium, Den­
mark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and 
the United Kingdom. The frequency of the data is annual due to difficulties in 
collecting observations on the debt composition and denomination at a higher 
frequency for all the countries within the ERM. The set of explanatory variables 
has been derived from the theory and encompasses monetary and debt variables, 
as well as an indicator of central bank independence to control for institutional 
differences among EMS countries.
The first subset of variables includes net foreign assets growth and domestic credit 
growth. These are key variables in the ‘first generation’ models of currency crises 
that relate speculative attacks to unsustainable economic fundamentals. 1 2  The 
idea is that countries experience balance-of-payments crises because of monetary 
and fiscal policies which are inconsistent with a fixed exchange rate regime. Ac­
cording to this view we should observe an acceleration in domestic credit creation 
and a slowdown in the rate of accumulation of foreign reserves in the period pre­
ceding an attack . 1 3
We consider Germany as the ‘core’ of the system. We thus take the short-term 
interest rate differential with Germany as a proxy for the anticipated component 
of a devaluation. In order to test if the probability of a realignment was affected 
by Germany’s reaction to the appreciation of the US dollar, we include the rate 
of depreciation of the Deutsche Mark (DM) versus the US dollar as an additional 
control variable.
12 See Krugman (1979) and Flood and Garber (1984).
13 For an empirical assessment of the role of fundamentals in generating speculative pressures 
on European currencies, see for example Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1995) and Otker and 
Pazarba§ioglu (1997).
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The analysis in Chapter 1  suggested that the choice of a fixed exchange rate 
regime may depend on both the degree of independence of the central bank and 
the characteristics of debt instruments. Therefore, we add the legal index of 
central bank independence developed by Cukierman (1992) to control for institu­
tional differences among EMS countries. The index refers to the 1980s and varies 
between zero (minimal central bank independence) and one (maximum central 
bank independence). Germany is classified near the top, with an index value of 
0.69, whereas Belgium has the lowest value in our sample. 1 4
We also consider a second group of regressors that includes public debt vari­
ables. These are the shares of debt by currency of denomination and term to 
maturity, the debt-to-GDP ratio, and the growth rate of the debt denominated 
in foreign currency. In fact, the issuance of foreign currency debt, besides its level, 
can be crucial to minimise roll-over costs and to signal the government intentions 
at the time of a crisis. 1 5  By including these variables in the estimation, we can 
directly test for the effects of debt management on the sustainability of a fixed 
exchange rate regime.
The main data sources are the International Financial Statistics (IFS) by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) for the monetary indicators; the OECD Eco­
nomic Outlook for GDP and interest rate series; national sources for public debt 
data . 1 6
14 As showed in Chapter 1, the index of central bank independence by Cukierman exhibits 
the lowest correlation with the debt variables. We preferred this index to those of Alesina and
Grilli-Masciandaro-Tabellini to avoid multicollinearity among the regressors.
15 See Giavazzi and Pagano (1990).
16 See Appendix A for the full list of variables’ definitions and sources.
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2.6 Estimation Methods and Results
This section reports the main results of our empirical investigation on the in­
teraction between debt management and exchange rate policy. As mentioned in 
Section 2.5, we look at the experience of countries within the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System (EMS) in the period 1979- 
1995. The focus is on the official realignments of the central parities listed in 
Table 2.1, and on other episodes of speculative pressure defined below.
The first step in our analysis is to examine how the choice of debt denomina­
tion and maturity affected the decision to realign the exchange rate within the 
ERM. Following the mainstream empirical literature on currency crises, we first 
estimate by maximum likelihood the probability of an official realignment within 
the ERM by using an ordinary binary probit model. 1 7
The dependent variable, y;, is discrete and takes the value of one in correspon­
dence of an official realignment of the national currencies within the ERM, and 
zero when the currencies were under speculative pressure but resisted an attack . 1 8
The control episodes of speculative pressure are identified by fixing a cut-off level 
of 1  per cent on the monthly change in the nominal exchange rate (measured in 
units of national currency per DM ) . 1 9
17 The choice of this estimation approach is motivated by two main considerations. First, 
the desire to obtain results that could be compared to those of existing empirical studies like 
Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1996). Second, the small number of observations and the 
short time span of our sample, somewhat prohibited the use of more sophisticated panel data 
estimation techniques. For a discussion of the limitations of this approach, we refer the reader
to Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 of this work.
18 Depreciations resulting from an official realignment of the DM are however excluded.
19 For countries that entered the ERM with a wider band of 6 per cent above and under the
central parity, we applied a 1.5 per cent threshold.
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This approach differs from Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1996) who define 
episodes of speculative pressure on the basis of an Exchange Market Pressure 
(EMP) index constructed as a weighted average of the exchange rate depreci­
ation, the variation in the stock of international reserves and the interest rate 
differential with Germany. As the interest rate differential and the change in 
foreign assets appear on the right hand side of our probit equation, we decided to 
use a cut-off measure rather than an EMP index to define our dependent variable.
We exclude from the control sample cases of speculative pressure recorded in 
the same year of an official realignment of the domestic currency, because they 
would represent unsuccessful defenses of the parity. Finally, consecutive viola­
tions of the threshold occurred in the same year are counted as a single episode. 
In this way, we identify a sample of 75 total observations, with 43 official realign­
ments.
We model the conditional probability of an official realignment in country i, Pi, 
as the expectation of the crisis event, yi =  1, conditional on a certain information 
set, Qi, which contains exogenous and predetermined explanatory variables:
P, =  P r{Vi =  1 | fij) =  E(y, | Q.) (2.13)
In binary probit models, like the one estimated here, this conditional probability 
is obtained by applying the cumulative standard normal distribution function, 4>, 
to a linear index function that depends on the explanatory variables, Xi, and the 
parameters to be estimated, (3:
Pi =  E {Vi I fii) =  $(*;/?) (2.14)
This is because the realignments within the ERM can be thought as the observed 
outcome of an unobservable latent, variable y*. Assume that:
y* =  +  u* (2.15)
Debt Management and the Sustainability of Fixed Exchange Rate Regimes 77
where u* is normally distributed. The latent variable, y*, is not directly observ­
able. What we observe is the binary variable, yi? that in our model takes on the 
value of one if a realignment takes place and zero otherwise. The relationship 
between yi and the latent variable, y*, is modelled as follows:
Vi =  \
0  if %f <  0
1  if y* >  0
x
Since we observe whether a realignment has taken place or not, we ultimately 
observe only the sign of y*. We can thus normalise the variance of u* to be unity.
It follows, that the probability of an official realignment, i.e. y* =  1, is:
Probfa  =  1) =  Prob(y* >  0)
=  Prob(xiP +  Ui) >  0 
=  1 — Prob{ui <  —xfl)
=  i  -  * (-*;/?) =  *(*;/?)
The likelihood function associated with this problem can be defined as the joint 
probability of observing a sequence of realignments and episodes of speculative 
pressure. Assuming that the y* are independent and distributed according to the 
standard normal distribution function, the joint density is simply the product of 
the individual probabilities for each observation.
The likelihood function can be defined as follows:
L = Probfr = yu V2 = y2, ■ ■ ■ , Yn = yn) = I1 ~ $(^)1 II
J / t = 0  V i = 1
that can be written as
n
l = (2 -i6 )
*=i
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The maximum likelihood estimation results are presented in Table 2.2. Since 
probit coefficients are not immediately interpretable, we report the effects of a 
unitary change in the regressors on the probability of a realignment (measured 
in percentage points), evaluated at the mean of the data. We also indicate, in 
parenthesis, the associated z-statistics that test the null hypothesis of no effect, 
and the x 2 statistic which tests for the joint significance of the regressors.
All the regressors are lagged one period to avoid endogeneity problems.
As shown in column 1  of Table 2 .2 , both the growth of net foreign assets and the 
growth of domestic credit have a strong impact on the likelihood of a crisis and 
are significant at the 5 per cent level. This finding is in line with the predictions 
of the first generation models of currency crises, which focus on misalignments in 
fundamentals to explain speculative attacks. The interest rate differential with 
Germany is instead not significant, though its coefficient is positive as expected. 
Interestingly, the likelihood of a realignment within the ERM increases when the 
DM was under pressure: the coefficient of the rate of depreciation of the DM with 
respect to the US dollar is positive and strongly significant. 2 0
Focusing on the debt variables, we find a strong and significant effect of the 
growth rate of foreign currency debt. An increase of such debt significantly re­
duces the probability of a devaluation. The impact of the debt-to-GDP ratio and 
of the share of foreign currency debt is also as expected, though not significant; 
a higher debt ratio increases the likelihood of a devaluation while a higher share 
of foreign currency debt reduces it.
20 Most of the official realignments are concentrated in the first phase of the EMS, which was 
characterised by a strong appreciation of the US dollar. At the same time the Bundesbank 
was tightening monetary policy, thus undermining the exchange rate stability of the periphery 
countries.
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Tab. 2.2: Probit Estimates
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Net foreign assets growth -0.954** -0.960** -0.960** -0.695**
(-3 .18) (-3.19) (-3.19) (-2 .55)
Domestic credit growth 2.694** 2.751** 2.895** 0.618
(2.01) (2.04) (2.20) (0.53)
Short-term interest rate differential 0.038 0.040 0.078** 0.058*
(1.21) (1.29) (2.23) (1.74)
Depreciation of the DM against the US$ 1.771** 1.773** 1.774** 0.988*
(3.18) (3.19) (3.13) (1.83)
Cukierman index of CB independence -0.174 -0.096 -2.314** -1.164
(-0 .20) (-0.11) (-1.96) (-1 .15)
Public Debt to GDP ratio 0.215 0.244 0.284 0.181
(-2 .74) (-2.57) (-1.37) (-1 .47)
Foreign currency debt growth -0.853** -0.848** -1.135** -0.718**
(-2 .46) (-2.45) (-2.98) (-2 .08)
Foreign currency debt share -0.240
(-0 .30)
-0.354
(-0.45)
Long-term fixed rate debt share 1.091**
(2.15)
0.724*
(1.69)
Number of observations 72 72 72 61
Pseudo R 2 0.22 0.22 0.27 0.23
Ho: Slopes=0 x 2(8) 22.04 22.15 26.96 17.46
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
Notes: The table reports estimated probit derivatives, which measure the effect of a unitary 
change of each regressor on the probability of observing an official realignment. Associated 
z-statistics are reported in parenthesis.
The dependent variable takes the value of 1 in correspondence of an official realignment within 
the ERM, zero in cases of speculative pressure on the currency not followed by an official 
realignment. The foreign currency share in column (2) includes indexed debt. Column (4) 
is estimated over a restricted control sample that excludes episodes of speculative pressure 
contemporaneous to an official realignment of the DM.
* =  10% significance level. ** =  5% significance level.
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As shown in column 2 , the estimation results are invariant to the addition (for 
the United Kingdom) of price-indexed debt to foreign currency debt in order to 
determine the share of debt which is not affected by inflation. Again, such a share 
is not significant but an increase in the rate of growth of foreign and indexed debt 
has the effect of reducing the probability of a realignment.
So far, the evidence on the role of debt variables is mixed, with little effect 
arising from the currency composition of the debt whereas an important role is 
played by foreign currency financing in the period preceding a crisis. These find­
ings may reflect the fact that actual inflation incentives depend on the maturity 
of conventional debt, in addition to the currency denomination. As discussed 
in Chapter 1 , debt duration is the relevant concept for the effect of inflation on 
the real value of the debt. This consideration suggests to look at the share of 
fixed-rate long-term debt denominated in the domestic currency.
The third column of Table 2 . 2  reports estimation results when the share of long­
term conventional debt replaces the share of foreign currency debt. The effect of 
long-term debt on the probability of a devaluation is positive and significant at 
the 5 per cent level. This finding is consistent with the predictions of the model 
in Section 2.3. Countries with a lower share of long-term conventional debt, and 
accordingly with a lower inflation-tax base, are characterised by a lower proba­
bility of realignment of the official parity.
The last result is reinforced by the fact that a greater reliance on foreign cur­
rency financing has the effect of reducing the probability of a crisis. Indeed, the 
coefficient on the rate of growth of the foreign currency debt is still significant at 
the 5 per cent level.
Interestingly, the substitution of long-term conventional debt for foreign currency 
debt results in a better specification of the probit. In particular, the coefficient
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of the interest rate differential with Germany becomes significant as well as the 
coefficient of the Cukierman index. The probability of resisting a speculative 
attack increases with central bank independence. It is worth noting that these 
empirical findings are robust to the model specification and persist even if we 
correct the gross figures from the effect of exchange rate depreciation. 2 1
Finally, the last column of Table 2.2 reports the estimates of the specification 
with long-term conventional debt based on a restricted control sample that does 
not include episodes of speculative pressures which were contemporaneous to re­
alignments of the DM. Clearly, the results do not depend on the specification 
of the control observations. The share of fixed-rate long-term debt in domestic 
currency and the increase in the foreign currency denominated debt are still sig­
nificant at the 10 and 5 per cent level, respectively. The likelihood of an official 
realignment within the ERM is greater, the larger the interest rate differential 
with Germany, the weaker the DM and the lower the rate of growth of net foreign 
assets.
The somewhat weak results of the probit estimations in terms of R2 may be 
the consequence of omitted variables. We explored different specifications of the 
probit model. However, the results do not change substantially when the follow­
ing variables are considered: (i) the standardised unemployment rate in levels 
or differences to the average of OECD countries; (ii) the structural primary sur­
plus, to capture the ability of governments to generate future fiscal revenues; (iii) 
lagged inflation or its differential with Germany; (iv) the change in the fixed-rate 
long-term debt instead of foreign currency debt.
21 We ran the same probit regression with the growth of the debt denominated in foreign 
currency net of the change of the nominal exchange rate with respect to the DM, in order 
to get a measure of the effective increase (decrease) of the debt. The results did not differ 
significantly from those reported here.
Debt Management and the Sustainability of Fixed Exchange Rate Regimes 82
In brief, according to this first set of results, the decision to issue foreign currency 
debt by EMS countries seems to have reduced the probability of a devaluation of 
the official parity, while a higher share of long-term, conventional debt appears 
to have increased it.
So far, we estimated the probability of an official realignment within the ERM by 
using a binary probit model, where the alternative to an official realignment of 
the currency (yt =  1 ) are episodes of successful defense of the central parity, i.e. 
cases of speculative pressure that have not been followed by an official realignment 
(yt =  0)- By doing so, we excluded from the estimated sample all the tranquil 
periods, in which the ERM currencies were not under speculative pressure. If the 
determinants of the choice between attacking or not a currency, in the expecta­
tions of an official realignment, are correlated with the set of determinants of the 
decision to realign the central parity once the currency is under pressure, then 
the estimates of the binary probit model presented in Table 2.2 would be biased.
To avoid this risk, we can model the official realignments within the ERM as the 
worse outcome of a sequence of ordered events that would also include tranquil 
periods and unsuccessful speculative attacks, i.e. cases of speculative pressure on 
the currency not followed by an official realignment.
A common way or dealing with ordered response data is to use an ordered pro­
bit model, which is built around a latent regression in the same manner as the 
binomial probit model estimated before. Let
c* =  X-/3 +  t i  (2.17)
be a latent dependent variable. What we would observe is a discrete variable c* 
that can take on only three values:
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Ci
0  if c* <  7 1
1 if 7i <  ci <  72
2 if 72 <  c?
The parameters to be estimated are (3 and 7  =  [7 1 , 7 2 ]- The 7 *’s are thresholds 
that determine what value of c* a given value of c*t will map into. Assuming that 
e is normally distributed across observations, with zero mean and variance equal 
to one, the probability that c» =  0 , i.e. a tranquil period is observed, is equal to:
Prob(ci =  0) =  Prob(c% < 7 1 )
=  Pro 6 (x-/? +  €i < 7 1 )
=  Prob(ei <  7 1  -  x'ifi)
=  $ ( 7 1  -x'ifi)
Similarly, the probability that c* =  1 , or a currency is under pressure, is equal to:
Prob(ci =  1) =  Prob^ i <  c* <  7 2 )
=  Prob(ei <  7 2  -  x'ifi) -  Prob{ti <  7 1  -  x\p)
=  $ (7 2  -  x ’iP) -  $ (7 1  -  x'iP)
and the probability that q =  2, or an official realignment takes place, is equal to:
Prob(ci =  2 ) =  Prob(cl >  7 2 )
=  Prob(xip  +  6i >  7 2 )
=  Prob(€i >  72 -  x'ifi)
=  $ ( 2 ^ - 7 2 )
The log-likelihood function associated with this ordered probit model is thus:
KP, 7 i ,72) = 'Y^log{${'jl - x ip)) 
a=o
+  X  ~  x\P) -  $ ( 7 1  -  x’iP))
d = 1
+  x m ^ ; / ? - 7 2 ) )
C i = 2
Debt Management and the Sustainability of Fixed Exchange Rate Regimes 84
The results of the estimation of the ordered probit model defined above are pre­
sented in Table 2.3. As for the binomial probit model, we report the marginal 
effects of each of the regressors on the probability of an official realignment within 
the ERM, i.e. the probability that q  =  2. We also indicate the associated z- 
statistics (in parenthesis), which test the null hypothesis of no effect, and the x 2  
statistic which tests for the joint significance of the regressors.
As it can be seen in Table 2.3, the best model specifications are those in columns 
3 and 4, where the share of long-term fixed-rate debt in domestic currency is 
substituted for the share of foreign currency or indexed debt. As in the binary 
probit estimations, an increase in the debt stock denominated in foreign currency 
reduces the probability of an official realignment within the ERM. However, the 
latter increases with the stock of debt that is denominated in domestic currency.
According to this new set of estimates, monetary variables seem to play a minor 
role in determining the likelihood of a realignment of the central parities. The 
interest rate differential with Germany is instead strongly significant at the 5 per 
cent confidence level. This variable clearly reflects expectations of a realignment.
Overall, the only robust result that emerges from the estimation of both the 
binary and ordered probit models is that debt management and, in particular, 
the choice of the currency denomination of public debt, seems to have played 
an important role in averting realignments within the ERM. The effect of other 
macroeconomic fundamentals is less robust to the model specification.
The next step of our empirical investigation is to look at the effects of debt 
management conditionally on the occurrence of a crisis. To this end, we restrict 
the sample to the episodes of official realignment and focus on the cumulative 
devaluation — per year and country — of the official parity with respect to the 
ECU, (PAR), and on its determinants.
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Tab. 2.3: Ordered Probit Estimates
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Net foreign assets growth -0.032 -0.033 -0.035 -0.718
(-0 .40) (-0.41) (-0.52) (-0 .94)
Domestic credit growth 0.803 0.801 0.792 1.302*
(1.25) (1.25) (1.47) (1.92)
Short-term interest rate differential 0.061** 0.061** 0.063** 0.058**
(3.14) (3.18) (4.27) (3.64)
Depreciation of the DM against the USS 0.175 0.174 0.123 0.566
(0.52) (0.51) (0.44) (1.62)
Cukierman index of CB independence -0.182 -0.190 -0.539 -0.610
(-0 .30) (-0.32) (-1.30) (-1 .30)
Public Debt to GDP ratio -0 .137 -0.141 -0.125 -0.068
(-0 .57) (-0 .61) (-0.91) (-0 .46)
Foreign currency debt growth -0.205 -0.206 -0.216* -0.384**
(-1 .53) (-1.53) (-1.67) (-2 .00)
Foreign currency debt share -0.139
(-0 .26)
-0.129
(-0.25)
Long-term fixed rate debt share 0.275*
(1.67)
0.268
(1.34)
Number of observations 106 106 106 106
Pseudo R2 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
Ho: Slopes=0 x2(8) 20.52 20.59 22.03 19.83
P-value 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01
Notes: We report estimated ordered probit derivatives, which measure the effect of a unitary 
change of each regressor on the probability of observing an official realignment. Associated 
z-statistics reported in parenthesis.
The dependent variable takes on the value of 0 in correspondence of tranquil periods, 1 in 
instances of speculative pressure on the currency, and 2 in correspondence of an official re­
alignment within the ERM. The foreign currency share in column (2) includes indexed debt. 
Column (4) is estimated over a restricted control sample that excludes episodes of speculative 
pressure contemporaneous to an official realignment of the DM.
* =  10% significance level. ** =  5% significance level.
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We first look at some descriptive statistics, by dividing the sample of official re­
alignments according to the size of the nominal devaluation of the official parity 
with respect to the ECU. Values of PAR higher than the sample average (0.04) 
characterise the observations in the Large devaluations sub-sample, while cumu­
lative devaluations below the sample mean are included in the Small devaluations 
sub-sample.
Table 2.4 reports the simple averages of the key macroeconomic fundamentals 
and explanatory variables in our probit model, computed over these two sub­
samples of observations. As it can be seen, big realignments of the official parity 
within the ERM are characterised by a higher ratio of debt denominated in for­
eign currency over GDP and a faster rate of growth of the same debt component. 
Moreover, the Large devaluations sub-sample stands out for having larger interest 
rate differentials with Germany and faster money growth. These results are in 
line with the findings of Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1996).
Table 2.4 also shows the stabilising effect of the share of public debt that is 
denominated in domestic currency. Small devaluation events are characterised 
by a comparatively higher share of debt denominated in domestic currency and 
more independent central banks, as shown by the higher average of the Cukier­
man index.
To be able to draw some conclusions on the real determinants of the size of the 
exchange rate adjustments we must supplement this qualitative characterisation 
of the episodes of realignment within the ERM with the result obtained using 
multivariate analysis. The simple averages presented in Table 2.4 are indicative 
of a potential relationship between episodes of Large devaluations and some of 
the explanatory variables in our dataset. What remains to be checked is if these 
relationships still hold true once we simultaneously control for other potential 
determinants of PAR. In order to do so, we have to revert to regression analysis.
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Tab. 2.4: Cumulative Devaluations and Fundamentals.
Explanatory Variables Large Small
Net foreign assets growth 0.05 0 . 0 0
Domestic credit growth 0.13 0 . 1 1
Short-term interest rate differential 6.46 3.65
Cukierman index 0.29 0.33
Foreign currency debt growth 0 . 2 1 0.07
Foreign currency debt share 1 0 . 6 9.86
Long-term fixed-rate debt 32.23 57.09
Number of observations 24 33
Notes: Simple averages of the key explanatory variables.
The Large sub-sample contains all the realignment observations characterised by a cumulative 
yearly percentage devaluation of the central parity with respect to the ECU larger than the 
sample average (0.04). The Small sub-sample contains all the realignment observations char­
acterised by a cumulative yearly percentage devaluation of the central parity with respect to 
the ECU smaller than the sample average
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Table 2.5 presents the results of simple OLS regressions. The dependent variable 
is the cumulative devaluation of the official parity, PAR, which is regressed on a 
constant and the two sets of monetary and debt indicators used before. All the 
regressors are lagged one period.
The estimates of the benchmark regression are presented in column 1. Accord­
ing to our results, countries with more expansionary monetary policies and less 
independent central banks experienced larger devaluations. The coefficients on 
domestic credit growth and the Cukierman’s index of legal central bank indepen­
dence are both significant at the 10 and 5 per cent, respectively.
More interestingly, the currency denomination of public debt has a significant 
effect on the size of the devaluation. The coefficient of the share of foreign cur­
rency debt is indeed positive and significant at the 5 per cent level. This implies 
that, conditional on a realignment taking place, the EMS countries with a higher 
share of foreign denominated debt experienced larger devaluations of their pari­
ties with respect to the ECU.
This last result seems to support the theoretical argument that expected and 
actual inflation (depreciation) may be higher when the authorities are forced to 
devalue and foreign denominated debt has been issued. A positive growth of for­
eign currency debt, though not significant, tends to reinforce the effect of a high 
share of such debt.
The debt-to-GDP ratio is also significant and the estimated coefficient is neg­
ative. This somehow counterintuitive result is not completely at odds with the 
theory because, for a given composition of debt instruments and financial needs, 
countries with a higher debt ratio, and therefore a larger tax base, ex-post need 
to devalue less.
Tab. 2.5: Cumulative Devaluations: OLS Estimates
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Net foreign assets growth -0.32 -0 .50 0.04 0.38
(-0.11) (-0.17) (0.01) (0.17)
Domestic credit growth 28.77* 29.03* 18.36 8.37
(1.98) (1.96) (1.25) (0.84)
Short-term interest rate differential -1.05 2.67 -5 .81 -0 .26
(-0.04) (0.10) (-0 .19) (-0 .01)
Depreciation of the DM against the USS -4.71 -4 .87 -4 .50 2.41
(-1.00) (-1.03) (-0 .94) (0.73)
Cukierman index of CB independence -23.29** -22.32** 3.55 -5 .84
(-3.14) (-2.99) (0.36) (0.76)
Public Debt to GDP ratio -8.82** -8.24** -3 .20 -2 .61
(-2.74) (-2.57) (-1 .37) (-1 .47)
Foreign currency debt growth 2.81 2.82 5.41* 3.87**
(1.07) (1.06) (1.91) (2.21)
Foreign currency debt share 16.55** 15.05**
(2.48) (2.29)
Long-term fixed rate debt share -9.34** -8.37**
(-2 .22) (-2 .65)
Constant 8.47** 7.78** 4.44 6.58**
(2.37) (2.20) (1.50) (2.91)
Number of observations 
Pseudo R 2 
Ho: coefficients=0 
P-value
40
0.35 
F(8,31) =  3.68 
0.00
40
0.34 
F(8,31) =  3.49 
0.00
40
0.33 
F(8,31) = 3 .42  
0.00
54
0.26 
F(8,45) =  3.39 
0.00
Notes: OLS estimated coefficients and associated t-statistics in parenthesis. The dependent variable is PAR, the total percentage devaluation 
of the central parity with respect to the ECU. * =  10% significance level. ** =  5% significance level.
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In column 3 of Table 2.5, we substitute once again the share of fixed-rate long­
term debt denominated in domestic currency for the share of foreign currency 
debt. Consistently with the previous result, the share of long-term debt has a 
stabilising effect, since it significantly reduces the size of the realignment. Inter­
estingly the growth rate of foreign debt becomes significant in this case, though 
at the 10 per cent level.
Finally, we take more explicitly into account the role of Germany as the EMS 
center. Column 4 of Table 2.5 reports the estimated coefficients of the same 
model in column 2, but estimated with a new dependent variable, which counts a 
contemporaneous revaluation of the DM as a further devaluation of the national 
currency. The consideration of DM revaluations as devaluations for the other 
currencies is because the size of the realignment of the national currency could 
have been larger, had the DM not realigned.
The results strongly suggest that the debt composition variables are the main 
determinants of the ex-post devaluation size. This evidence clearly supports the 
theoretical predictions of Section 2.3: within the ERM, countries with the largest 
shares of foreign currency denominated debt were forced to devalue more.
The final step in our analysis is to compute the effect of an increase in foreign 
currency denominated debt on the ex-ante, or unconditional, devaluation expec­
tations. In our framework, we can interpret the fitted values of the binary probit 
model as the probability of a change in the official parity, given the existence 
of speculative pressures on the currencies within the ERM. This probability is 
estimated as follows:
f (x)  =  Pr(y =  1) =  /(m onetary, debt variables) (2.18)
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Correspondingly, through the OLS regression we estimated the size of the deval­
uation conditional on the occurrence of a realignment:
g(y | x ) =  g(m onetary , debt variables) (2-19)
It follows that the unconditional expected devaluation, h(y), is simply the product 
of (2.18) times (2.19). The sign of the total derivative with respect to the change 
in foreign currency denominated debt is informative about the relative impact of 
the two opposite effects we found, namely a negative effect on the probability of a 
crisis and a positive effect on the ex-post devaluation. The total derivative of the 
ex-ante devaluation expectations is negative and equal to (—0.02), suggesting a 
positive role for debt denominated in foreign currency. Therefore, the decision to 
increase its share seems to have reduced the ex-ante expectations of devaluation 
within the ERM.
2.7 Conclusions
This chapter has shown that if the central bank is not independent, or has not 
enough of a reputation for being tough with inflation, the issuance of debt denom­
inated in foreign currency or with a short maturity may enhance the credibility 
of the anti-inflationary policy. In this case, a fixed exchange regime makes the 
zero-inflation commitment more visible and enhances the credibility of monetary 
policy by increasing the cost of inflation. Under such regime, foreign currency 
debt reinforces the commitment to the fixed parity and helps to maintain low 
inflation expectations, possibly preventing the emergence of a currency crisis.
Despite these effects, debt managers prefer to limit the use of foreign currency 
debt and at times even the market appears to react negatively to the issuance of 
such debt. This may happen because a devaluation can never be ruled out and 
foreign currency debt would exacerbate the effects of a crisis if it ever occurred.
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In this chapter, we formalised this well-known argument by using a very sim­
ple model those conclusions are supported by evidence from the EMS. Probit 
estimates show that the decision to issue foreign currency debt significantly re­
duced the likelihood of an official realignment within the ERM, after controlling 
for changes in foreign exchange reserves and other macroeconomic fundamentals. 
However, conditional on a crisis taking place, those countries with higher shares 
of foreign currency debt experienced more severe devaluations.
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Appendix A
Tab. 2.6: Data Sources and Definitions
Variable Name Source and Definition Frequency
Net foreign assets growth International Monetary Fund (IMF) - International 
Financial Statistics (IFS). Difference between Foreign 
Assets and Liabilities of the Monetary Authorities. 
IFS lines (ll-16c). Growth rates.
Annual.
Domestic credit growth IMF - International Financial Statistics (IFS line 32). 
It includes Claims on central government and on the 
private sector. Growth rate.
Annual.
Short-term interest rate differ­
ential
OECD. 3-months interbank rates. Difference between 
the domestic series and the corresponding German 
rate.
Annual.
Exchange rate series IMF. End-of-period nominal official exchange rate 
(IFS line ae). Growth rates of the series converted 
into units of national currency (n.c.) per DM
Monthly.
Debt to GDP ratio Public debt data are from National Sources as pub­
lished in Missale (1999). Usually they refer to Central 
Government debt but the rule is amended in a few 
cases when data on debt composition were available 
only for the General Government. GDP data are from 
the OECD. Ratios.
Annual.
Foreign currency debt Foreign currency debt is defined as the sum of bonds 
and loans denominated in foreign currency and debt 
bearing coupons indexed to the ECU.
Annual.
Long-term fixed rate debt Sum of fixed-rate bonds and loans denominated in do­
mestic currency with an initial term to maturity longer 
than one year. Extendible bonds and bonds with an 
option for early redemption (such as those issued in 
Belgium and Italy) have been considered as long-term 
debt if the period preceding the earliest possible ma­
turity is longer than one year.
Annual.
3. BANKING CRISES IN DEVELOPING AND EMERGING 
MARKETS: THE ROLE OF DEBT AND EXCHANGE RATE
FRAGILITY
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we extend our analysis of the causes of financial sector fragility 
to consider instances of systemic banking failures.
The severe episodes of currency and banking crises experienced by emerging mar­
kets over the past decade have stimulated quite a large number of theoretical and 
empirical work to explain and predict financial crises.1
Although the empirical literature has mainly focused on currency crises, a parallel 
stream of studies about the origins of banking crises has also flourished, following 
the pioneering work by Demirgiig-Kunt and Detragiache (1998a) and Kaminsky 
and Reinhart (1999) on leading indicators of banking crises.
The empirical analysis presented in this chapter fits into this second strand of 
literature. We investigate the causes of banking crises in a large panel dataset 
including developing and emerging markets from the early 1970s to 1997. We 
would focus on three main issues.
1 See Nouriel Roubini’s Global Macroeconomic and Financial Policy Site at 
http://www.stern.nyu.edu/globalmacro/ for an up-to-date list of research papers and 
other contributions about the causes of financial crises.
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First, in line with the previous chapters of this thesis, we would devote partic­
ular attention to the role of external debt indicators —public and private— as 
potential determinants of banking crises. By doing so, we would fill a gap in the 
financial crises literature because relatively few empirical studies have focused on 
the fiscal aspects of financial crises.2 This is despite the fact that the Mexican 
crisis in 1994 and the more recent crises in Argentina (2001) and Turkey (2002) 
have shown that a financial crash can be precipitated by fiscal problems and 
aggravated by excessive short-term external debt and domestic liabilities denom­
inated in foreign currency.
Second, we would examine the causal link between currency and banking crises 
and test whether currency crises —defined as instances of sharp devaluations of 
the domestic currency— lead banking crises once we control for the simultaneous 
effect of other variables.
Third, we would look at the dynamics of banking crises to take into account the 
intertemporal links between past and current episodes of banking crisis. While 
cross-sectional variation in countries’ characteristics can provide important in­
sights on the determinants of the probability of a banking crisis, the time dimen­
sion can help us understand the dynamics leading, accompanying and following 
a crisis event. This consideration motivates our choice to use panel data analysis 
and model banking crises in a dynamic framework, where we allow for country- 
specific heterogeneity and temporal serial correlation in the unobservables.
Formally, we estimate the probability of a banking crisis by applying the method 
of maximum smoothly simulated likelihood (MSSL) to a dynamic probit model 
with unobserved heterogeneity and autocorrelated errors.3 The main advantage
2 One exception is the recent paper by Hemmig, Kell, and Schimmelpfennig (2003) that
focuses on the relationship between fiscal vulnerability and financial crises.
3 Simulation-based estimation methods are reviewed in the methodological chapter that con­
cludes this thesis.
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of this approach is that it would allow us to test directly for the existence of state 
dependence, i.e. past episodes of banking crisis affecting the probability of future 
banking crises. This estimation approach is new in the empirical literature on 
the causes of banking crises and represents one of the key original contributions 
of this thesis.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the empir­
ical literature on the causes of banking crises, while Section 3.3 highlights the 
main points of departure of our study from the existing literature. Section 3.4 
describes the dataset, by providing the definition of banking and currency crises 
and defining the set of explanatory variables used in the estimation. Section 3.5 
explains the empirical methodology. The main results are presented in Section 
3.6. Finally, Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Review of the Empirical Literature
We can classify the existing empirical studies on banking crises into two main 
groups, according to the empirical methodology used. Earlier studies have adopted 
a leading indicators approach, that consists in identifying variables that display an 
anomalous behaviour at the onset of a banking crisis and thus can be periodically 
monitored to anticipate future events. The papers by Goldstein (1998), Kamin­
sky (1998), Rojas-Suarez (1998), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), and Goldstein, 
Kaminsky, and Reinhart (2000) fall into this first category of studies.
A different approach is the one adopted by Demirgug-Kunt and Detragiache 
(1998a), Eichengreen and Rose (1998), Hardy and Pazarba§ioglu (1999), and 
Eichengreen and Arteta (2000), among others, who use limited dependent vari­
able models to estimate the probability of occurrence of banking crises. Our study 
follows this second empirical strategy but with important distinctions. In what 
follows we would critically review these two strands of literature and highlight 
the main differences with our approach.
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3.2.1 Leading Indicators Analysis
In their seminal paper, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) use leading indicator anal­
ysis to identify a set of early warning indicators of banking sector problems. Their 
original sample includes 20 industrial and developing countries from 1970 to mid- 
1995.4 They identify a total of 26 banking crises and 76 currency crises and 
also define episodes of ‘twin crises\ as banking crises followed by a balance-of- 
payments crisis within a period of 4 years. They study the distribution of crises 
over time and compare unconditional probabilities of crises to the probability of 
observing a banking (currency) crisis conditional on the previous occurrence of a 
currency (banking) crisis.
The evidence presented by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) does not reveal a 
clear link between banking and balance-of-payments crises during the 1970s, 
whereas most often banking sector problems precede currency crises in the fol­
lowing decade. The conditional probability of observing a currency crisis after 
the occurrence of a banking crisis is indeed higher in their sample than the simple 
unconditional probability of currency crises. However, the authors also find that 
the peak of a banking crisis generally follows the collapse of the currency, pointing 
to the existence of a two-way causality between banking and currency crises.
The next step in their analysis is to make use of a non-parametric approach to 
verify countries’ vulnerabilities to specific macroeconomic indicators. This tech­
nique entails, first, selecting a set of variables that may potentially lead banking 
crises and, second, deciding upon a rule that classifies the behaviour of a specific 
indicator as sending either a signal of an impending crisis or of a tranquil period. 
The underlying hypothesis is that the economy shows a different behaviour before 
the occurrence of a crisis and this is reflected by some leading indicators.
4 Enlarged to 25 small open economies in Goldstein, Kaminsky, and Reinhart (2000).
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The main findings of the signal approach used by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) 
confirm that currency and banking crises share some common patterns. The pe­
riod preceding a banking crisis is indeed characterised by slow output growth, 
high interest rates and an overvalued exchange rate that undermines the export 
capacity of a country. The M2 multiplier and the growth of domestic credit over 
GDP are among the best leading indicators.
One of the advantages of this methodology lies in its simplicity, and the fact 
that it does not impose a priori any structure on the data. Indeed, there are no 
structural forms to be estimated here but only behavioural patterns of indicators 
to be plotted around the time of a crisis. An obvious drawback of this method is 
its univariate nature that can neither discriminate between more or less reliable 
indicators nor consider their joint contribution to the occurrence of a crisis.
Kaminsky (1998) partially addresses this problem by combining leading indi­
cators into a single index. This composite index is constructed by summing up 
the signals of individual indicators and weighting them according to their relia­
bility, measured by the noise-to-signal ratio.5
This approach is useful to predict the likelihood that a country will experience 
a crisis, but it does not overcome another limitation of the leading indicators 
analysis, i.e. its scarce informative content over what causes and drives financial 
crises. Little can be said about how each single indicator affects the probability of 
observing a crisis in the immediate future. This issue motivated a second strand 
of empirical literature that focuses on the determinants of financial crises rather 
than simply aiming at detecting the incumbent ones.
5 This is defined as the ratio of the proportion of bad signals to the share of good signals.
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3.2.2 Multivariate Analysis
An increasing number of papers has made use of logit or probit analysis to esti­
mate the probability of banking crises. This approach has the major advantage 
of evaluating simultaneously the contribution of the various macroeconomic in­
dicators examined above.
Demirgiig-Kunt and Detragiache (1998a) analyse the determinants of banking 
crises by estimating a logit model using annual data over the period 1980-94. 
Their sample includes both, developing and developed economies, up to a maxi­
mum of 65 countries.6
The authors identify episodes of ‘systemic’ banking crises by imposing restrictive 
conditions on the ratio of non-performing assets over total assets of the banking 
system and by measuring the cost of rescue operations in terms of GDP loss.7 
In this way they restrict the sample of banking crises to 31 episodes out of 546 
observations.
They find that the probability of a banking crisis increases in a weak macroe­
conomic environment, characterised by slow GDP growth, high inflation and 
high real interest rates. There is weak evidence that terms-of-trade shocks or 
credit booms can significantly influence the likelihood of a banking crisis.8 Fiscal 
deficits and the rate of depreciation of the currency are not significant either. 
Debt variables are not included in their specification.
In a series of companion papers (Demirgiig-Kunt and Detragiache (1998b) and
6 However, they do not include transition economies or some of the most troubled Latin
American countries, like Argentina, Brazil and Bolivia.
7 When these two measures were not available, they looked at episodes of bank runs or large
scale nationalisation.
8 They include the share of credit to the private sector and the lagged rate of growth of 
domestic credit.
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(2000)), the same authors find that financial liberalisation increases the proba­
bility of a banking crisis, especially where the institutional environment is weak. 
Furthermore, countries with explicit deposit insurance tend to be more vulnerable 
to capital reversals, real interest rates increases, and exchange rate depreciations.
Rossi (1999) extends these results by controlling for other institutional charac­
teristics that may increase financial fragility. By focusing on a smaller sample of 
15 countries, he finds that the probability of a banking crisis in developing coun­
tries is associated with low GDP growth and fast bank expansion in a weakly 
regulated system where supervision is low, capital outflows are restricted, and 
deposits safety nets are in place.
It is worth noting that all the previous studies use mostly contemporaneous re­
gressors to explain the occurrence of banking crises.9 Their results are thus likely 
to suffer from endogeneity problems because the direction of causality between 
crises and regressors is not always unambiguous. Indeed, it may well be that a 
change in one of the explanatory variables is the result of a crisis and not one of 
its precipitating causes.
Hardy and Pazarba§ioglu (1999) address this issue by using a more general spec­
ification that includes lagged regressors up to two periods. Their annual dataset 
covers the period 1976-97 and includes a total of 50 OECD and developing coun­
tries. Following the classification in Lindgren, Garcia, and Saal (1996), they iden­
tify a total of 43 episodes of banking sector distress. Similarly to Demirgiig-Kunt 
and Detragiache (1998a), they estimate a multinomial logit model by maximum 
likelihood, but adopt a different specification of the dependent variable.10
9 In fact, domestic credit growth is the only variable that enters the regressions of Demirgiig-
Kunt and Detragiache (1998a) with a two years lag.
10 In order to distinguish between a crisis and its antecedents, they define a dummy that
can take on three values: 2 when a banking crises surfaces, 1 in the preceding period, and 0
otherwise.
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Their findings suggest that banking crises tend to be associated with a large con­
temporaneous fall in GDP; a pattern of boom and bust cycles in inflation and an 
expansion of credit to the private sector; raising interest rates; and depreciating 
real exchange rates.11 Some of these effects are magnified when regional dummies 
are included.
A critique that can be addressed to this approach is that the authors forecast 
the most recent crises in emerging markets by using the coefficients of the model 
estimated over a mix of developing and industrialised countries. There are reasons 
to believe that the same macroeconomic and financial indicators have a different 
impact on the probability of observing a banking crisis, depending on the degree 
of development and regulation of financial markets.
On these grounds Eichengreen and Rose (1998) have collected an annual dataset 
of 105 developing and emerging market economies from 1975 to 1992. The authors 
estimate a static probit model by pooling all the observations together and using 
contemporaneous domestic and external macroeconomic indicators as explana­
tory variables. Their results show a strong effect of adverse external conditions 
on the probability of observing a banking crisis, in particular high interest rates 
and low output growth in the United States.
Contrary to the previous studies, Eichengreen and Rose include debt indicators in 
the set of explanatory variables. They find that the share of short-term external 
debt is one of the few significant predictors of a crisis, but it turns up with an 
unexpected negative sign that contradicts the theoretical conclusions of Sachs, 
Tornell, and Velasco (1996). Unfortunately, none of the financial structure vari­
ables is significant when added to the baseline specification, nor is the exchange 
rate regime dummy.12
11 Note that a real appreciation is observed in the pre-crisis period.
12 Mendis (1998) finds instead that in small open economies with flexible exchange rate
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In a subsequent paper, Eichengreen and Arteta (2000) estimate probit regres­
sions of banking crises probabilities using a sample of 75 developing countries 
from 1975 up to 1997. They find that domestic credit booms and large bank 
liabilities relative to reserves are strongly associated with banking crises. They 
attribute the perverse negative sign on the budget deficit variable to the likely 
correlation with the external debt over GNP and the current account variables. 
For this reason, they eliminate the fiscal variables from the baseline specification.
When looking at the effect of global variables, especially international interest 
rates, the authors find a weaker effect than Eichengreen and Rose (1998). Given 
the longer time interval covered, they interpret this finding as evidence of a change 
in the nature of banking crises of the late nineties. Institutional variables, like 
financial liberalisation, the type of exchange rate regime and the existence of de­
posit insurance, play a smaller role.
In summary, according to Eichengreen and Rose, external forces seem to have 
driven financial sector problems in developing countries up to the early nineties.13 
Their findings contrast with those of other studies that are more in favor of ad­
verse domestic macroeconomic conditions and lending booms, showing that there 
is little consensus over the actual determinants of banking crises.
3.3 This Study
The work presented in this chapter extends the existing empirical literature on 
the origins of banking crises in several directions.
regimes, external shocks like the ones described by Eichengreen and Rose (1998) are less likely
to trigger banking problems.
13 We shall return to this point in Section 3.6.4.
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First, it adopts a new panel dataset of quarterly observations on 92 developing 
and emerging markets economies.14 The range of explanatory variables varies 
from financial, debt and macroeconomic indicators to global variables. We also 
include bank-specific indicators and dummies to control for the exchange rate 
regime and the existence of capital account restrictions. The result is a compre­
hensive dataset that, compared to other studies, would allow us to control for a 
larger set of potential determinants of banking crises.
Second, as mentioned before, the panel dimension of our data allows us to anal­
yse the full dynamics in the quarters preceding, accompanying and following an 
episode of banking crisis, without deleting any relevant observation around the 
time of a crisis. Most of the previous empirical studies on banking crises make in­
stead use of a crisis window, by deleting observations in the proximity(aftermath) 
of an episode of banking crisis. In this way, they have altered the time dimension 
of the dataset and introduced a time span between consecutive observations.
Third, and most important, we adopt a new methodology that controls for:
•  state dependence, i.e. past instances of banking crisis influencing the like­
lihood of observing another banking crisis in the future;
•  unobserved heterogeneity, i.e. time-invariant country-specific characteris­
tics that may influence the propensity of a country to experience a banking 
crisis;
•  unobserved serial correlation to account for persistent determinants of bank­
ing crises.
14 The complete list of countries is provided in Appendix A.
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3.4 The Data
Our panel dataset includes quarterly observations on 92 developing and emerging 
markets over almost three decades, from 1970 to 1997.15 Some of the countries 
appear in the sample for a restricted time span due to the poor quality of the 
data or lack of observations. The result is an unbalanced panel dataset with a 
maximum of 4350 observations.
We focus only on developing countries and emerging markets because there are 
reasons to believe that the determinants of financial fragility can be significantly 
different from those at work in more advanced and developed countries.16
First, macroeconomic imbalances in developing and emerging countries have been 
larger, on average, than in industrial countries, thus increasing the vulnerability 
of their financial systems to external shocks.
Second, financial markets in developing countries are more volatile, and thus 
banks operate in a riskier environment. This is partly the result of a lack of 
confidence about the stability of the macroeconomic conditions and is reflected 
in the investors’ reluctance to lock savings in long-term assets. Consequently, the 
average maturity of the liabilities of financial institutions in developing countries 
is generally low and this exposes banks to a higher default risk if investors refuse 
to roll-over short-term obligations and/or access to the international credit mar­
kets is limited.
Third, banks in developing countries may play a bigger role as financial inter­
15 We have included some of the transition countries in their late years, when banking problems 
were due to current lending practices and not to the stock of non-performing loans inherited
from the ex-communist regimes.
16 For an application of this argument to Latin American countries, see Rojas-Suarez and
Weisbrod (1996).
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mediaries, given the limited access to other forms of financing like domestic equity.
Fourth, the legal framework in which banks operate is often underdeveloped, 
regulation is poor and accounting practices are inadequate, making it difficult to 
monitor banks and evaluate the quality of their assets.
As a result of all these factors, banking crises in developing countries may have 
a different origin than those in more advanced industrial countries. This is what 
motivates our choice to focus exclusively on this group of countries.
3.4.1 The Dependent Variable
Dating episodes of banking crises is a problematic issue, not only because they 
are difficult to identify on the basis of a statistical index, but also because of the 
lack of relevant information. We could, in principle, select episodes of bank runs 
by looking at the rate of decrease of currency and time deposits in the banking 
system, but this is only one of the possible causes of banking crises.
The maturity and currency mismatch between assets and liabilities is another 
intrinsic source of financial systems’ vulnerability. The transmission mechanism 
is explained by Mishkin (1996). In his view, banks in developing countries are 
intrinsically vulnerable to a currency devaluation because they lend short-term 
and in domestic currency, but borrow long-term and in foreign currency.
Given this currency and maturity mismatch, a sharp devaluation of the exchange 
rate may have disruptive effects on the banks’ balance sheets because it would in­
crease the nominal value of the liabilities denominated in foreign currency. This 
is typically accompanied by a deterioration of the banks’ portfolio, due to an 
increase in the number of distressed borrowers. As the Asian crisis of 1997 has 
shown, poor lending practices may lead to the deterioration in the quality of bank 
assets and to an increase in the level of non-performing loans.
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The origin of a banking crisis can thus be rooted on the asset side of the banks’ 
balance sheets, not only on the liability side. Unfortunately, these factors are 
difficult to monitor because data on the exposure of financial intermediaries, 
non-performing loans, or firms failures are not readily available for most of the 
developing and emerging countries in our sample. Given these data limitations, 
we had to rely on historical events to date banking crises, such as bank runs, the 
closure of financial institutions, or government intervention to support troubled 
banks.
In the literature, the two main sources of information about past episodes of 
banking crises are Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) and Lindgren, Garcia, and Saal 
(1996). Caprio and Klingebiel review episodes of banks’ insolvencies occurred 
from the late 1970s to 1995 in 69 developing and OECD countries, of which 51 
are also included in our sample.17 They define a total of 87 systemic cases of 
banks’ insolvencies, i.e.: ‘where much of the capital was exhausted’. To iden­
tify these episodes, they rely on the assessment of experts or refer to published 
sources. Unfortunately, they report more detailed information about the causes 
of the crises only for a smaller sample of 26 countries.
Lindgren, Garcia, and Saal extend the previous analysis to the sample of 181 
IMF member countries, 135 of which are developing countries, over the period 
1980-96. They distinguish between crises (a total of 41 episodes in 36 countries) 
and significant problems (108 cases in total). The first are defined as: ‘cases of 
bank runs or other substantial portfolio shifts, collapses of financial firms or mas­
sive government intervention’. Significant problems are identified as ‘episodes of 
financial distress and deep bank unsoundness, short of a crisis’.
17 Caprio and Klingebiel have later revised and up-dated their earlier list to include crises up 
to 1998. Their new classification can be found in Caprio and Klingebiel (1999).
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Most of the subsequent empirical works on the determinants of banking crises 
refer back to these two key studies in order to compile a list of crisis episodes, 
occasionally imposing some restrictions on the definition.
Demirgiig-Kunt and Detragiache (1998a), for example, require for an event to 
be classified as a crisis that the ratio of non-performing assets over total assets 
of the banking system was higher than 10 per cent, or that the fiscal cost of the 
crisis exceeded 2 per cent of domestic GDP. They also count as crises instances of 
bank runs and cases where emergencies measures were taken, like deposit freezes 
or the nationalisation of troubled banks.
We adopt the list of banking crises episodes provided by Lindgren, Garcia, and 
Saal (1996), because it is the most detailed and comprehensive in terms of coun­
tries’ coverage18 and provides detailed information on the nature of the crises.
Nonetheless, we had to rely on additional sources (IMF and Economist Intel­
ligence Unit country reports) to integrate this list along the time and country 
dimension in order to cover the entire sample —from 1970 to 1997— and identify 
the exact quarters in which those episodes took place. Indeed most of the existing 
studies, including Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) and Lindgren, Garcia, and Saal 
(1996), provide information only on an annual basis.19
In this study, banking crises will be identified by the occurrence of one of the 
following events:
18 They describe events in all but one of the countries that are in our sample. Samoa is the
only country that is excluded from their sample.
19 With the exception of Goldstein, Kaminsky, and Reinhart (2000), who use monthly data
on a smaller sample of 25 industrial and developing countries, there is no other study to our 
knowledge that analyses periods of banking sector distress at a higher frequency and over a 
larger sample of emerging countries than this one.
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•  A bank run with consistent deposits’ withdrawals.
•  The license withdrawal, closure, liquidation or take over of one or more 
financial institutions.
•  The adoption of emergencies measures like a freeze on deposits or prolonged 
bank holidays.
• Governments’ intervention to reform the banking sector, recapitalise or par­
tially take-over troubled banks.
As in Demirgiig-Kunt and Detragiache (1998a), we limit our attention to episodes 
where total non-performing assets of troubled banks were at least 10 per cent of 
the total assets of the banking system, or the estimated fiscal cost of the crisis 
amounted to more than 2 per cent of domestic GDP.
Following these criteria, we identify a total of 205 quarters of systemic bank­
ing crises in 43 countries.
In order to check the sensitivity of our results to the definition of banking cri­
sis adopted, we also use a more restrictive definition that excludes episodes of 
banks’ bailout through government intervention. This second definition is there­
fore based only on the first three selection criteria described above. The total 
number of banking crises identified in this case is smaller and equal to 102.20 
Throughout the paper, we shall refer to these two definitions as bank crises with 
or without bailouts, depending on whether cases of government intervention to 
rescue troubled banks are taken into account.21
20 The complete list of episodes, together with a short description of the causes of the crises
is presented in Appendix B.
21 To ease the interpretation of the results, quarters with simultaneous government interven­
tion and either a bank run, a bank closure or the adoption of emergencies measures, have been 
deleted from the sample.
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Tab. 3.1: Distribution of Banking Crises over Time
Time Period
with bailouts 
number percentage
without
number
bailouts
percentage
Total
1970s 1 0.27% 1 0.27% 376
1980s 68 3.85% 29 1.64% 1764
1990s 136 6.15% 72 3.26% 2210
Total 205 4.71% 102 2.34% 4350
Tab. 3.2: Distribution of Banking Crises across Regions
Region
with bailouts 
number percentage
without bailouts 
number percentage
Total
Africa 68 4.58% 35 2.36% 1486
Asia 54 6.37% 25 2.95% 847
Eastern Europe 34 8.92% 17 4.46% 381
Latin America 44 3.47% 24 1.89% 1268
Middle East 5 1.36% 1 0.27% 368
Total 205 4.71% 102 2.34% 4350
Notes: Banking crises with bailouts are defined as cases of either one or more of the following: 
1) a bank run; 2) a license withdrawal or closure of one or more financial institutions; 3) the 
adoption of emergency measures like a freeze of deposits; and 4) government intervention to res­
cue troubled banks. Banking crises without bailouts exclude cases of government intervention, 
i.e. are defined according to the first three criteria only.
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Tables 3.1 and 3.2 provide summary statistics on the distribution of crises by 
time and region, as a first characterisation of the episodes of banking crises in 
our sample. Table 3.1 shows that, no matter how they are defined, episodes of 
banking crises in developing countries have more than doubled during the last 
decade, possibly due to the increased financial liberalisation enjoyed by these 
countries.22
When we look at the distribution of crises by regions, shown in Table 3.2, Africa 
has the highest absolute number of banking crises, followed by Asia and Latin 
America. The ranking changes if we take into account the total number of obser­
vations in each sub-sample. Incidentally, the high percentage of banking crises 
falling into the sub-sample of Eastern Europe is due to the fact that, besides 
Bulgaria and Russia, it also includes Turkey.
3.4.2 Explanatory Variables
We collected a large set of macroeconomic, financial and debt indicators that, 
according to the economic theory, are potential determinants of banking crises.23 
The main data sources were the IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS) for 
the macroeconomic and financial variables and the Global Development and Fi­
nance database of the World Bank for the debt variables and GDP series. Each 
series was accurately checked for missing or abnormal values and seasonally ad­
justed. Some of the variables had to be interpolated from annual data in order to 
have a complete database of quarterly observations for all the countries included
22 The low number of banking crises in the ’70s can be partially explained by the low represen­
tation in our sample. Indeed, only for few countries we could collect reliable information from 
the beginning of the decade, while in most cases the sample starts in the late 1970s. However, 
the low proportion in terms of the whole sample seems to indicate that banking crises became
a systemic problem only in the 1980s and 1990s.
23 The data used in this chapter were jointly collected with Marfa Mercedes Tudela (Bank of
England) and are further analysed in Chapter 4 of this thesis, which is a joint work with her.
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in our sample.24 We can classify the explanatory variables of our econometric 
model into the following sub-groups:
Macroeconomic Variables. This first set of variables includes real domestic GDP 
growth, real deposit interest rates, total exports and imports growth over GDP 
and a measure of real exchange rate undervaluation. The latter was obtained 
by subtracting each RER series from its corresponding Hodrick-Prescott trend 25 
Positive (negative) values of this measure indicate that the RER is undervalued 
(overvalued) with respect to its historical trend and thus less (more) likely to be 
re-aligned.
This subset of explanatory variables is meant to characterise the general do­
mestic conditions of the economy and measure the repayment capacity of each 
country. In fact, a domestic recession is likely to be associated with an increase 
in financial sector fragility. The transmission mechanism works in the following 
way. If growth is declining, there would be pressures on the government to pur­
sue more expansionary monetary and fiscal policies to boost economic activity. 
This might fuel a cycle of lending booms, accompanied by increasing assets and 
real-estate prices. Monetary policy may have to be tightened, to avoid inflation­
ary pressures, and the bubble will eventually burn. As a consequence, individual 
borrowers will find themselves unable to pay back their loans and banks will have 
increasing amounts of non performing assets.
According to this view, we should expect a negative sign in front of the coeffi­
cient of GDP growth. A slowdown in exports over GDP or an increase in imports 
over GDP would instead imply a decline in net trade revenues. The higher export 
earnings or the lower imports expenditures, the lower the probability of a liquidity
24 Appendix D contains a complete list of variables’ definitions, together with their source 
and original frequency.
25 The RER series are author’s computations based on nominal exchange rates and relative 
CPI indexes. Both series were obtained from the IFS statistics by the IMF.
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crisis. Similarly, an overvalued exchange rate would harm tradeable’ producers, 
giving rise to a period of distressed borrowing, with adverse consequences on the 
quality of the banking sector’s assets. This implies an expected negative sign for 
the real exchange rate undervaluation measure.
Monetary and Financial Variables. We also consider credit variables to con­
trol for the existence of credit booms and connected lending. In particular, we 
look at the rate of growth of total domestic credit and its sub-components, i.e. 
total credit to the private sector and net claims on the central government, all 
measured in percentages of GDP. The first variable is a typical leading indicator 
of financial crises. The higher total domestic credit, the higher the probability 
of a banking crisis. There is also evidence that banking crises are preceded by 
episodes of lending booms, accompanied by an acceleration in credit to the pri­
vate sector that has adverse effects on the quality of new loans and thus on the 
solvency of financial intermediaries. Net claims on the government should instead 
capture the Krugman’s effect, i.e. credit expansion due to the monetisation of 
fiscal deficits. Both variables, credit to the private sector and to the government, 
would therefore tend to increase the probability of banking crises.
Debt Variables. We used a number of indicators to test the influence of debt 
financing instruments on the probability of observing a banking crisis. We first 
looked at total external debt and total debt service, both as a ratio of exports or 
GDP, to measure the degree of indebtedness of developing countries. Secondly, 
we took into account the maturity and structure of the stock of external debt, 
by considering short-term debt as a ratio of total external debt or foreign re­
serves, and the share of long-term external debt that is private non-guaranteed 
or publicly-guaranteed.
These variables would allow us to test the significance of the relation between 
the structure of external debt and the stability of financial systems described by
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Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996). Their view is that countries with large stocks 
of short-term external debt denominated in foreign currency are especially prone 
to experience a currency crisis. The occurrence or anticipation of such a crisis 
can lead depositors to run banks in order to get their domestic currency deposits 
out of the domestic financial system. This, in turn, may force the government to 
increase interest rates in an attempt to stop the currency outflow, with adverse 
consequences on the quality of banks’ assets. In fact the decision to increase 
interest rates may well avoid the currency crash but at the expenses of a deteri­
oration in the banks’ loan portfolio.
Finally, we constructed two debt indicators of external vulnerability: short-term 
debt over reserves and external debt service over exports. The first is a measure 
of reserves adequacy, because it compares the amount of debt that has to be 
frequently rolled-over to the total amount of liquid assets of the central bank. 
The second is a liquidity indicator, because it measures the country’s ability to 
generate enough export revenues in hard currency to cover its debt repayment 
obligations.
Bank-specific Indicators. We included among the explanatory variables some 
banking indicators to characterise the financial systems of the countries in our 
sample. These include: central bank credit to the banking sector as a percentage 
of GDP and the growth rate of banks’ deposits over GDP and banks’ foreign 
liabilities over GDP.
We can interpret the first of these variables as an indicator of the degree of 
central bank intervention through credit injections into the banking system. The 
higher central bank credit to commercial banks, the lower the probability of a 
liquidity crisis. A sudden decrease in banks’ deposits over GDP would instead 
signal the existence of bank runs and deposits withdrawals. Finally, the amount 
of foreign liabilities over GDP would measure the degree of reliance of the bank­
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ing system on off-shore capital to fund its activities and would thus signal the 
vulnerability of the system to a sudden reversal of capital inflows.
Global Variables. This fifth group of variables should capture the role of ex­
ternal conditions and exogenous shocks in determining banking crises. We focus 
on the change in the US real interest rate and US inflation as external deter­
minants of financial crises. The first of these two variables may relate banking 
crises to a sudden capital inflows/outflows, like those experienced by develop­
ing countries during the past decades. One common view is that capitals were 
‘pushed out’ of industrial countries by a drop in international interest rates.26 As 
a result, emerging markets witnessed an impressive surge in short-term capital 
inflows, which were highly volatile and subject to the possibility of sudden re­
versals. Once confronted with capital outflows, these governments had to choose 
between defending their currency — by increasing domestic interest rates — and 
preserving the stability of their banking systems, those loan portfolio would de­
teriorate as a consequence of an increase in domestic interest rates.
Another channel of transmission from world interest rates to banking crises oper­
ates through the debt markets. An increase in the level of international interest 
rates27 would represent a negative income shock for developing and emerging 
markets because it would reduce the debt repayment capacity of governments 
and/or domestic banks’ borrowers, and thus increase the probability of observing 
solvency problems.
Finally, Moreno and Trehan (2000) argue that a deflationary shock in the United 
States can have a direct effect on economies that are exporters to this market be­
26 See Fernandez-Arias (1996) for a description of the policy debate over capital inflows to
Latin American countries.
27 In this work, a change in the US interest rates would proxy for a change in international
conditions. This assumption is motivated by the fact that most of the external debt stock of 
the countries in our sample is denominated in US dollars.
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cause it would lower their export revenues and, consequently, domestic economic 
activity. The resulting unemployment would make it more difficult for banks’ 
borrowers to pay back their loans. Therefore, disinflation in a major economy, 
like the United States, could be associated with an increase in the probability of 
observing a banking crisis.
To proxy for terms-of-trade shocks, we include in our dataset the inflation rates 
of several commodities. These are computed as follows. First, we constructed a 
number of indicator variables to identify the main exporters of fuel, metal, raw 
materials, and food and beverages.28 We then multiplied these dummies by the 
corresponding commodity inflation series. The resulting variable would allow us 
to test, for example, the effect of an increase in fuel prices only in those coun­
tries that are main exporters of fuel. Intuitively, a decrease in these prices would 
increase the probability of a crisis because it would reduce export revenues. We 
would expect this term-of-trade effect to be particularly important in those de­
veloping countries that are characterised by a low degree of export diversification.
Currency Crises Dummy. Following the mainstream empirical literature on cur­
rency crises, we devised a statistical index to identify quarters in which the ex­
change rate was under speculative pressure. For each country, we calculated the 
quarterly percentage change of the nominal bilateral exchange rate with the US 
dollar and used two criteria to qualify an episode as a currency crisis. The first 
criterion selects only exchange rate depreciations that exceed a 10 per cent cut-off 
level. The second focuses on the rate of depreciation, by requiring this same 10 
per cent depreciation to be also a 25 per cent increase in the rate of depreciation 
with respect to the previous quarter.29 The last condition was added in order to 
avoid counting as currency crises instances of systematic devaluations like those
28 These are defined as countries that depend on trade of these primary commodities for their
export earnings according to the IMF classification. See Appendix A.
29 A similar procedure is followed by Frankel and Rose (1996), but with different cut-offs for
the two criteria due to the lower frequency of their data.
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associated with a crawling peg regime or to a period of hyperinflation, like in 
Latin America during the late 1980s, when the first criterion was met quarter 
after quarter.
An alternative approach is followed by Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1995), 
who construct an Exchange Market Pressure index (EMP), by combining changes 
in exchange rates, interest rates and central bank reserves. By looking at abnor­
mal behaviours of interest rates and international reserves they not only cap­
ture currency crises, but also unsuccessful speculative attacks —i.e. speculative 
attacks that are not followed by a devaluation of the currency— under the as­
sumption that the monetary authorities would use these two instruments to deter 
an attack on the currency. Unfortunately, few emerging markets have market- 
determined short-term interest rates series for long periods of time. Moreover, 
reserves movements may sometimes be less effective against a speculative attack 
than the tightening of reserves requirements, emergency rescue packages from 
international institutions or the imposition of controls on capital outflows. For 
the above reasons, we decided to adopt a cut-off approach to identify episodes of 
currency crises rather than an EMP measure.
The currency crises dummy is used in the estimations lagged by at least one 
quarter, to control for the effect of past episodes of currency crises on the prob­
ability of observing a banking crisis one period ahead and to test the hypothesis 
that currency crises lead banking crises.
To check the sensitivity of the results to the lag structure, we also constructed an 
alternative dummy that takes the value of one if a currency crisis was recorded 
in any of the four quarters preceding a banking crisis episode. We would call 
this dummy a currency crises indicator, to distinguish it from the currency crises 
dummy lagged one quarter.30
30 Appendix C contains a list of the currency crisis episodes in our sample.
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Control Variables. Our dataset comprises a number of dummy variables to con­
trol for institutional characteristics. The first of them is an exchange rate dummy 
that takes the value of one if the exchange rate regime is classified as ‘indepen­
dently floating’ or ‘managed floating’ by the IMF Exchange Arrangements and 
Exchange Restrictions Reports. Our dummy takes the value of zero when the 
exchange rate is ‘pegged’ and in cases of ‘limited flexibility’ against a single or 
multiple currencies. Using the same IMF source, we constructed an additional 
dummy to control for the existence of capital controls.
The expected sign of the exchange rate dummy is a-priori undetermined. On 
one hand, some degree of exchange rate flexibility is needed to prevent an adverse 
external shock from having disruptive effects on the domestic financial systems. 
This is because if an external shock hits the economy and bank borrowers find 
themselves unable to pay back their loans, a nominal depreciation could prevent 
banks’ insolvency, by lowering the real value of their assets to levels that can 
actually be paid, while also reducing their liabilities. Under a fixed exchange rate 
regime depositors are instead guaranteed and the taxpayers would have to bear 
the costs of banks’ restructuring. According to this interpretation, we should 
expect a negative sign on the estimated coefficient of our exchange rate dummy 
which takes the value of one if a flexible exchange rate regime is in place.
On the other hand, a pegged exchange rate acts as a commitment device that 
‘ties policymakers’ hands’31 and makes a devaluation costly in terms of credibility 
loss. According to this view, floating exchange rates would lead to more erratic 
monetary policies and thus increase the probability of financial crises.
The same indeterminacy applies to the expected sign of the dummy that takes 
the value of one if capital account restrictions are in place. There are reasons to 
believe that capital controls would protect the banking system from the disrup-
31 This terminology is borrowed from Giavazzi and Pagano (1988).
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tive effects of highly volatile capital flows and thus decrease the probability of 
a financial crisis. At the same time, controls are more likely in countries those 
financial markets are less developed and thus more intrinsically prone to crises. 
Furthermore, the mere existence of these restrictions can induce banks to try to 
circumvent them, by opening off-shore accounts and thus increase the exposure to 
exchange rate risk. The last considerations suggest a positive correlation between 
capital account restrictions and banking crises.
Following a flourishing stream of literature that finds a positive relation between 
financial liberalisation and financial fragility32, we decided to control for the effect 
of financial liberalisation on the probability of experiencing a banking crisis. We 
thus constructed an indicator variable that takes on the value of one if domestic 
interest rates are free from controls.
3.5 The Empirical Methodology
We use panel data and simulation-based estimation techniques to estimate the 
probability of banking crises in emerging markets. In particular, we apply the 
method of maximum smoothly simulated likelihood (MSSL) to a dynamic lim­
ited dependent variable model with unobserved heterogeneity and autocorrelated 
errors. This technique would allow for:
•  time dependence among episodes of banking crisis;
•  interdependence between banking and currency crises; and
•  heterogeneity and serial correlation among unobserved determinants of bank­
ing crises.33
32 See, among others, Demirgiig-Kunt and Detragiache (1998b), Demirgiig-Kunt and Detra­
giache (2000), and Glick and Hutchison (2001).
33 This assumption differentiates our approach from most of the existing studies that use
static logit or probit models with i.i.d. errors to describe currency or banking crises.
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In our view, these factors are important because if a country experienced a cri­
sis in the past, the probability of observing another crisis may depend on that 
previous crisis occurrence. Therefore, the likelihood of financial crises should 
preferably be estimated with panel data and an appropriate econometric spec­
ification that would allow for the existence of inter-temporal linkages between 
consecutive crises.
Time or state dependence among episodes of banking crises can have two ori­
gins.34 On one hand, countries that have already experienced a banking crisis 
may behave differently from countries that have not witnessed a crisis. This is 
because the preconditions for the occurrence of another banking crisis may have 
changed as a result of that previous crisis occurrence. Past experience has in this 
case a genuine behavioural effect, in the sense that an otherwise identical country 
that did not experience the event would behave differently in the future from a 
country that experienced the event. This is what is known as true state depen­
dence and can be controlled for in the estimation by the inclusion of a lagged 
dependent variable among the regressors.
On the other hand, countries may differ in their propensity to experience a crisis. 
By relaxing the hypothesis of identically and independently distributed (i.i.d.) er­
rors, we would explicitly take into account this eventuality. First, a time-invariant 
country-specific error term would control for the existence of unobserved hetero­
geneity. This may reflect political and institutional factors that are characteristic 
of a country but are difficult to control for by using a set of standard macroe­
conomic indicators. Second, we allow for autocorrelation in the error structure, 
by means of an AR( 1) process. This second component takes into account the 
fact that countries’ differences may be correlated over time, due for example to 
the existence of persistent shocks. The error term of our dynamic probit model
34 We follow here Heckman (1981) and Borsch-Supan, Hajivassiliou, Kotlikoff, and Morris 
(1992).
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of banking crises should contain both elements to secure reliable estimates. An 
improper treatment of the structure of the errors could otherwise give rise to a 
conditional relationship between future and past experience that is termed spu­
rious state dependence, thereby past episodes of banking crises may turn out to 
be significant solely because they are a proxy for persistent and autocorrelated 
unobservables.
As explained in the methodological chapter that concludes this thesis, the main 
problem associated with the estimation by classical maximum likelihood of this 
dynamic probit model with non i.i.d. errors is the high dimensional integration 
of the associated likelihood function.35 The method of maximum smoothly sim­
ulated likelihood used in conjunction with the GHK simulator would allow us to 
overcome these computational problems and obtain estimates that are asymptot­
ically efficient.36
3.6 Estimation Results
This section reports the results of the estimations by MSSL of the dynamic pro­
bit model described above and applied to episodes of banking crises. The model 
is estimated on a quarterly basis over the whole sample of 92 developing and 
emerging countries listed in Appendix A.
The dependent variable is a dummy that takes on the value of one in corre­
spondence of episodes of systemic banking distress, as defined in Section 3.4.1. 
The results reported here are derived by using the broader definition of bank­
ing crises, with bailouts, that includes cases of government intervention to rescue 
troubled banks.37
35 See Section 5.2.1 of Chapter 5 for a formalisation of the banking crises model.
36 See Section 5.3.4 and Section 5.4.2 of Chapter 5.
37 See Table 3.8 for a comparison of the baseline results to those obtained by using a more 
restrictive definition of banking crises without bailouts.
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All the regressors employed in the estimations are lagged at least one period, to 
avoid endogeneity problems. The inclusion of contemporaneous variables could 
otherwise lead to an erroneous interpretation of the causality effects, with the 
outcome of a crisis inaccurately treated as one of its precipitating causes. The 
final specifications reported here are parsimonious versions of very general models 
that included the complete lag structure of each explanatory variable up to four 
quarters.38
One of the features that distinguishes this work from previous studies that used 
static logit/probit analysis is that we use a dynamic probit to model banking 
crises, i.e. we include the lagged dependent variable on the right hand side of 
the estimated equation. As explained in Section 3.5, this would allow us to test 
for state dependence, i.e. if past occurrences of banking crises have a significant 
effect on the probability of observing another banking crisis in the future. A 
dummy for past instances of currency crises would instead check the hypothesis 
that currency crises lead banking crises one quarter or one year ahead.
With respect to the output of a static probit model with i.i.d. errors, our es­
timation procedure involves two additional parameters. The first of these two 
coefficients, cr2, corresponds to the variance of the country-specific, time-invariant 
error term. This factor allows for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity, such 
as institutional or political characteristics that are not fully captured by our set 
of explanatory variables. The second parameter, p , allows for the existence of 
persistent country-specific effects correlated over time.
Since the estimated (3 coefficients of a probit regression are not immediately 
interpretable —being the partial derivative of the latent variable with respect to 
each of the regressors— we also report the estimated elasticities. These are the
38 The choice of dropping the insignificant terms up to the first lag that is significant does not 
affect our main results, which do not differ from those of the more general specifications.
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partial derivatives of the probability of occurrence of a banking crisis with respect 
to each of the regressors, normalised at the mean value of each variable over the 
whole sample.39 We also indicate the associated z-statistics, which test the null 
hypothesis of no effect.
3.6.1 The Baseline Specification
Our baseline model includes a set of real macroeconomic and financial variables, 
as well as some bank-specific indicators that the economic theory has identified 
as potential determinants of banking crises. We also add a number of global 
variables to control for the presence of common shocks, as a sudden increase in 
foreign interest rates or a terms-of-trade shock.
The estimation results of the baseline specification are shown in Table 3.3. The 
set of domestic macroeconomic variables is highly significant and they all appear 
with the expected sign. The likelihood of a banking crisis in emerging markets 
increases the lower domestic GDP growth, the higher real interest rates and im­
ports growth, and the more overvalued the real exchange rate. Interestingly, 
the probability of a banking crisis reacts with some delay to changes in real GDP 
and imports growth. Both variables enter the baseline specification lagged by two 
quarters. The impact of a percentage change in growth is quite remarkable. The 
estimated elasticity suggests that a one percentage increase in domestic growth 
would reduce the probability of observing a banking crisis by 9 percentage points. 
On the contrary, an increase in the ratio of total imports over GDP increases the 
probability of banking sector problems through a reduction in net trade revenues, 
that may be a primary source of debt repayment for a significant proportion of 
banks’ borrowers.
39 Additional insights on how the likelihood of a crisis reacts to changes in each of the regressors 
can be derived by assuming different criteria of normalisation.
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Tab. 3.3: The Baseline Specification
Explanatory Variables (3 coeff. z-stats. elasticities
Constant -1.802*** -17.946 -4.172
Real GDP growth, lagged 2Q -0.046*** -2.803 -0.098
Real interest rate, lagged IQ 0.001** 1.959 0.011
Growth of imports over GDP, lagged 2Q 0.005** 2.247 0.013
RER undervaluation, lagged IQ -0.005* -1.558 0.004
Growth of credit to the government over GDP, lagged 3Q -0.000 -0.115 -0.000
Growth of credit to the private sector over GDP, lagged 3Q 0.003** 2.274 0.008
Central bank credit to banks over GDP, lagged 2Q -0.006 -0.028 -0.008
Growth of banks’ deposits over GDP, lagged 3Q -0.005** -1.951 -0.016
Growth of banks’ foreign liabilities over GDP, lagged 2Q 0.001*** 2.491 0.009
Change in US interest rates, lagged IQ 0.821** 2.154 -0.007
US CPI inflation, lagged IQ -0.211*** -2.927 -0.519
Fuel inflation, lagged 4Q -0.016** -2.164 -0.023
Banking crises, lagged IQ 1.932*** 14.408 0.213
Currency crises, lagged IQ 0.091 0.535 0.010
a2 0.175*** 4.695
P -0.267*** -4.019
Notes: Dependent variable: banking crises with bailouts. Total number of banking crises: 202. 
Total number of observations: 4067. Function value at optimum: 600.980.
Given the size of our sample, the t-statistics are virtually Normal. We can therefore use the 
t-tables to assess the significance of the estimated coefficients. We use the critical values for 
the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, which are: 2.326, 1.645 and 1.282 for one-tailed test, 
and 2.576, 1.960 and 1.645 for a two-tailed test.
The symbols *, ** and *** denote the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.
The elasticities measure the effect of a unitary change in one of the regressors on the probability 
of observing a banking crisis, and are evaluated at the mean value of each variable. They should 
be multiplied by 100 to be converted into percentages.
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Similarly, the results in Table 3.3 show that an overvalued exchange rate may 
harm tradeable’ producers, with adverse consequences on the quality of the as­
sets of the banking sector. The estimated coefficient of our measure of RER 
undervaluation is significant at the 5 per cent level and has a negative sign. In­
deed, the more undervalued the RER, the less likely a financial crisis is.40
To control for the effect of lending booms and connected lending, we include 
in our model the two main sub-components of total domestic credit: total credit 
to the private sector and net credit to the government, both in percentages of 
domestic GDR The results in Table 3.3 show that an increase in credit to the pri­
vate sector increases the probability of a banking crisis, confirming that lending 
booms threaten the stability of financial systems. This result extends the findings 
of DemirguQ-Kunt and Detragiache (1998a), Hardy and Pazarba§ioglu (1999) and 
Eichengreen and Arteta (2000) to our sample of emerging and developing coun­
tries. By contrast, the growth of credit to the public sector is not significant 
in this specification. This result is not surprising, since we are analysing bank­
ing crises here. We would rather expect government deficits financing from the 
central bank to be an important determinant of currency crises, following the 
predictions of the ‘first generation models’ a la Krugman (1979).
Bank-specific indicators constitute the third group of variables included in our 
baseline specification, after the set of macroeconomic and financial regressors de­
scribed above. As shown in Table 3.3, a decrease in banks’ deposits or an increase 
in banks’ foreign liabilities tend to increase the probability of a bank collapse. As 
mentioned in Section 3.4.2, a sharp decrease in banks’ deposits could signal a loss 
in confidence in the banking system and anticipate a bank run. The high and 
positive z-statistics associated with the coefficient on banks’ foreign liabilities is
40 The corresponding elasticity is positive because it is evaluated at the variable’s mean, 
which is negative over the whole sample. This implies that, on average, real exchange rates 
were overvalued, thus increasing the probability of financial sector problems.
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instead signaling the vulnerability of financial institutions to the currency and 
maturity mismatch between assets and liabilities. Finally, central bank credit to 
banks tends to reduce the probability of a crisis, although its estimated coefficient 
is not statistically different from zero in our baseline specification.
The remaining macroeconomic variables in the baseline specification characterise 
the global environment and are thus common to all the countries in our sample. 
We first include the change in the level of foreign interest rates, proxied here 
by interest rates in the United States. As expected, the estimated coefficient 
is positive and significant at the 1 per cent level, implying that an increase in 
interest rates elsewhere increases the probability of banking sector problems ei­
ther directly, through increased external debt repayments, or indirectly through 
destabilising capital outflows.41
Another important global determinant of the probability of banking crises is the 
inflation rate in the United States. The negative sign associated with its esti­
mated coefficient in the baseline specification confirms the predictions of Moreno 
and Trehan (2000). They argue that a deflationary shock in the United States 
can have a negative income effect on exporters to this market because it would 
lower export revenues and, consequently, endanger their debt repayment capacity. 
This is another example of how unfavourable external conditions may undermine 
the stability of financial systems in developing countries.
Our results are robust to the inclusion of commodity prices inflation rates as 
a proxy of terms-of-trade shocks to exporters of these goods. The reduced speci­
fication shown in Table 3.3 includes only fuel inflation that is significant at the 5 
per cent level, although with a lag of four quarters.42 The sign of the estimated
41 The switch in the sign of the associated elasticity is due to the choice of evaluating the
elasticities at the mean value of the data.
42 Raw materials, metal, food and beverages inflation have been excluded from the baseline
specification because they were not significant.
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coefficient is negative, as expected. An increase in oil prices decreases the prob­
ability of a financial crisis in countries that are exporters of this commodity.
Having controlled for the effect of macroeconomic, financial and global variables, 
we can turn our attention to the estimated coefficients and elasticities of the 
lagged banking and currency crisis dummies. No significant leading effect is 
found from past currency crises to banking crises one quarter ahead. The results 
of the baseline model seem to exclude, thus far, the hypothesis that currency 
crises are significant leading indicators of banking crises.43
The lagged dependent variable, which controls for the existence of state depen­
dence among episodes of banking crises, is instead significant at the 1 per cent 
level and has a positive sign, pointing to a high degree of persistence among 
episodes of banking system distress.
Finally, we find that both parameters associated with the error term structure, 
a 2 and p, are significant at the 1 per cent level. The first parameter reveals the 
existence of unobserved heterogeneity, and might be capturing differences in the 
financial institutions or regulations of developing countries. The second parame­
ter, p , indicates the presence of unobserved persistent and autocorrelated causes 
of banking crises. This last result is key because it shows the importance of re­
laxing the hypothesis of i.i.d. errors and controlling for idiosyncratic differences 
among countries.
3.6.2 Controlling for Exchange and Financial Liberalisation
Table 3.4 tests the robustness of our results to the introduction of dummies to 
control for the type of exchange rate regime and the presence of restrictions on 
the capital account or domestic interest rates.
43 The causal link between currency and banking crises is further analysed in Table 3.6.
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Column 1 reports the results of the baseline specification inclusive of a dummy 
that takes the value of one for countries with a flexible exchange rate arrange­
ment, and zero otherwise. As pointed out by Eichengreen and Rose (1998) and 
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002), the fact that the estimated coefficient of 
the exchange rate dummy is not significantly different from zero might be due to 
differences between the de jure classification, provided by the IMF, and de facto 
exchange rate regimes. The exchange rate categories identified by the IMF do not 
always correspond to the de facto exchange rate policy followed by the national 
banks, as in the case of implicit pegs which are classified as flexible exchange rate 
arrangements. As a consequence, our exchange rate dummy may be a poor proxy 
to control for the effective exchange rate regime.
The same reasoning applies to the dummy that controls for capital account re­
strictions. This variable has a negative sign but it is not significant, as shown in 
column 2 of Table 3.4.
The specification reported in the third column of Table 3.4 includes a differ­
ent dummy that controls for the effect of financial liberalisation. This indicator 
variable takes the value of one if domestic interest rates are liberalised and is used 
in the estimations lagged by one period.
The results provide evidence in support of the view that financial liberalisation 
increases financial fragility, as argued by Demirgiig-Kunt and Detragiache (1998b) 
and Glick and Hutchison (2001). The estimated coefficient is indeed positive and 
significant at the 1 per cent level.
Banking Crises in Developing and Emerging Markets 128
Tab. 3.4: Introducing Further Controls
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3)
Constant —1.842***
***0000t>1 ***t"-000 0i-H1
(-17.965) (-17.943) (-18.072)
Real GDP growth -0.046*** -0.046*** -0.045***
(-2.810) (-2.804) (-2.768)
Real interest rate 0.000** 0.000** 0.000**
(1.958) (2.147) (2.027)
Growth of imports over GDP 0.005** 0.005** 0.005**
(2.268) (2.244) (2.250)
RER undervaluation -0.005* -0.005* -0.005*
(-1.570) (-1.553) (-1.554)
Growth of credit to the government over GDP -0 .0 0 0 - 0 .0 0 0 -0 .0 0 0
(-0.125) (-0.113) (-0.122)
Growth of credit to the private sector over GDP 0.003** 0.003** 0.003***
(2.301) (2.273) (2.357)
Central bank credit to banks over GDP -0.006 -0.006 -0.006
(-0.027) (-0.028) (-0.026)
Growth of banks deposits over GDP -0.005** -0.005** -0.005**
(-1.988) (-1.951) (-1.972)
Growth of banks foreign liabilities over GDP 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(2.461) (2.495) (2.556)
Change in US interest rates 0.816** 0.820** 0.804**
(2.136) (2.150) (2.114)
US CPI inflation -0.212*** -0.170*** -0.195***
(-2.819) (-2.934) (-2.685)
Fuel inflation -0.017** -0.017** -0.016**
(-2.167) (-2.167) (-2.121)
Exchange rate dummy 0.089
(1.027)
Capital account controls dummy -0.013
(-0.110)
Financial liberalisation dummy 0.249***
(2.879)
Past banking crises 1.929*** 1.931*** 1.933***
(14.280) (14.366) (14.434)
Past currency crises 0.074 0.090 0.067
(0.431) (0.527) (0.392)
( X 2 0.177*** 0.175*** 0.152***
(4.649) (4.683) (4.017)
P -0.272*** -0.266*** -0.270***
(-4.284) (-4.003) (-4.110)
Function value at optimum 600.474 600.974 596.908
Notes: The exchange rate dummy equals one for floats. Similarly, the capital account dummy 
takes the value of one if capital account restrictions are in place. The financial liberalisation 
dummy takes the value of one if domestic interest rates are liberalised.
See also notes to Table 3.3.
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Tab. 3.5: Including Debt Variables
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3)
Constant —1.865*** -1.873*** -1.898***
(-18.291) (-17.592) (-18.953)
Real GDP growth -0.043*** -0.044*** -0.044***
(-2.669) (-2.664) (-2.667)
Real interest rate 0.000** 0.000** 0.000***
(1.998) (2.027) (2.058)
Growth of imports over GDP 0.004** 0.005** 0.004**
(1.764) (2.291) (1.836)
RER undervaluation -0.005** -0.005* -0.006**
(-1.730) (-1.445) (-1.766)
Growth of credit to the government over GDP - 0 .0 0 0 - 0 .0 0 0 - 0 .0 0 0
(-0.277) (-0.140) (-0.227)
Growth of credit to the private sector over GDP 0.003*** 0.003** 0.003***
(2.406) (2.209) (2.396)
Central bank credit to banks over GDP -0.005 -0.005 -0.004
(-0.028) (-0.022) (-0.019)
Growth of banks deposits over GDP -0.005** -0.005** -0.005**
(-2.038) (-1.972) (-2.007)
Growth of banks foreign liabilities over GDP 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001***
(2.546) (2.538) (2.433)
Change in US interest rates 0.767*** 0.759** 0.808**
(2.001) (1.991) (2.084)
US CPI inflation 1 O 00 H-* # * * -0.188*** -0.177***
(-2.465) (-2.554) (-2.372)
Fuel inflation -0.016** 1 o o I—* 05 * * -0.016**
(-2.133) (-2.126) (-2.048)
Financial liberalisation dummy 0.241*** 0.235*** 0.251**
(2.751) (2.645) (2.579)
Total external debt over GDP 
Short-term debt over total ext. debt 
Private non-guaranteed debt over l.t. ext. debt 
Short-term debt over reserves 
Debt service over exports
0.156*
(1.405)
-0 .314
(-0.477)
0.768
(1.167)
0.103
0.883
0.002**
(1.717)
0.537*
(1.340)
Past banking crises 1.915*** 1.922*** 1.893***
(14.177) (14.256) (13.854)
Past currency crises 0.078 0.043 0.061
(0.453) (0.248) (0.350)
a2 0.157*** 0.151*** 0.158***
(4.056) (3.870) (4.051)
P -0.271*** -0.267*** -0.268***
(-4.090) (-4.017) (-3.975)
Function value at optimum 595.849 595.078 593.293
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3.6.3 The Impact of Debt Variables
The next step of our analysis was to introduce in the baseline specification a 
number of external debt variables with the aim of assessing the role played by 
the maturity and composition of external debt instruments in averting or trigger­
ing a banking crisis. As mentioned in Section 3.2, increasing attention has been 
paid to the causal link between debt management and financial crises, but the 
theoretical results have not found strong support in the empirical literature. The 
results shown in Table 3.5 are an attempt to further investigate this topic.
We tried different debt measures, either in levels or in growth rates, and found 
only two indicators of external vulnerability that are consistently significant and 
increase the likelihood of a banking crisis. These are shown in column 3 of Table 
3.5 and are the ratio of short-term external debt over foreign reserves and debt 
service payments over total exports.
These two indicators of debt vulnerability dominate both the total level of exter­
nal debt as a percentage of GDP and its growth rate. Total external debt over 
GDP is weakly significant when it is the only debt variable included in the model 
specification (see column 1 of Table 3.5), but it looses importance when the ratio 
of short-term external debt over foreign reserves and debt service payments over 
total exports are added to the equation.
We also look at the maturity and composition of external debt, by including 
the share of short-term external debt and the share of long term debt that is 
private non-guaranteed. The estimated coefficients are not significant though, as 
shown in column 2 of Table 3.5.
We find instead that the higher the stock of short-term external debt that is 
not covered by international reserves, the higher the probability of a banking
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crisis. This result confirms the view of Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996) on the 
origins of the Mexican crisis in 1994. According to the authors, this crisis was 
aggravated by the decision of the Mexican authorities to issue large amounts of 
short-term debt denominated in foreign currency.
The Mexican crisis erupted when the stock of external obligations largely ex­
ceeded the amount of foreign currency reserves. Confronted with the decision by 
foreign investors not to roll over the debt reaching maturity, the Mexican author­
ities had to raise interest rates to prevent a huge capital outflow. The prohibitive 
level of interest rates, coupled with a sharp recession, had adverse consequences 
on the banking system. This may well explain why in our sample, countries with 
a stock of short-term external debt far in excess of foreign reserves are more prone 
to banking crises.
What is also important in our specification is the total amount of debt service 
payments relative to exports earnings. Intuitively, the higher exports, the higher 
the hard currency revenues and the lower the probability of debt default and 
financial crises.
3.6.4 Leading Currency Crises
One of the most debated issues in the empirical literature on banking crises is 
whether currency crises are good leading indicators of banking sector problems. 
The results of our baseline specification reported in Table 3.3 do not seem to 
support this hypothesis. The coefficient on the dummy variable that takes the 
value of one in correspondence of episodes of currency crises occurred one quarter 
ahead of a banking crisis is positive but not significant.
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Tab. 3.6: Controlling for Past Financial Crises
Explanatory Variables (1) (2)
Currency crisis indicator 0.164*
(1.394)
Currency crisis indicator (1980s) 0.018
(0.091)
Currency crisis indicator (1990s) 0.229**
(1.717)
Banking crisis indicator 0.477*** 0.467***
(3.117) (3.045)
a2 0.199*** 0.203***
(4.203) (4.192)
P 0.433*** 0.436***
(5.160) (5.192)
Function value at optimum 609.451 608.968
Notes: The currency crisis indicator is a dummy taking the value of 1 if there was a currency 
crisis in at least one of the four quarters preceding the occurrence of a banking crisis, and 0 
otherwise. The banking crisis indicator is similarly defined.
The currency crisis indicator (1980s) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a currency 
crisis occurred in any of the four quarters preceding one of the banking crises of the 1980s 
and zero otherwise. A similar approach was followed to construct the banking crisis indicator 
(1990s). See also comments to Table 3.3.
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A possible explanation for this result is that it may take time before the effects 
of a currency devaluation are transmitted to the banking system. Moreover, our 
definition of banking crises tends to capture the peak of a period of banking sys­
tem distress —marked by either the bankruptcy/closure of one or more troubled 
banks or by government intervention— and not its beginning. Therefore, a lag 
structure of the currency crises dummy longer than one quarter may be more 
suitable to investigate the causal link between currency and banking crises.
To examine further the link between currency and banking crises, we re-estimated 
the model specification inclusive of debt variables by using a different lag struc­
ture in both the lagged banking dependent variable and the dummy controlling 
for past episodes of currency crises.
The lagged dependent variable in this new specification is an indicator variable 
that takes the value of one if a banking crisis occurred in any of the four quar­
ters preceding another banking crisis. Similarly, a currency crisis indicator would 
signal the occurrence of a currency crisis in any of the four quarters preceding a 
banking crisis.
The estimation results are gathered in column 1 of Table 3.6. As the signs and 
significance of the coefficients associated with the macroeconomic fundamentals 
and global variables are unchanged with respect to the baseline specification, Ta­
ble 3.6 reports only the results that are key to the analysis of the link between 
currency and banking crises.
Contrary to the baseline specification, the currency crisis dummy becomes sig­
nificant once we extend the lag structure and consider episodes occurred in the 
whole year preceding a banking crisis. This seems to suggest that the effects of 
a devaluation of the currency are transmitted to the banking system only with 
some delay. As explained by Mishkin (1996), the transmission mechanisms from
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currency to banking crises would work through the banks’ balance sheet, by in­
creasing the nominal value of the liabilities denominated in foreign currency.
The banking crisis indicator remains strongly significant, indicating the pres­
ence of generalised state dependence among episodes of banking crises.44
Turning to the estimated coefficients of the error term, it is important to note 
the switch in sign of the parameter p associated with the autocorrelated error 
term.45
To test whether the nature of financial crises has changed over time, as suggested 
by the ‘third generation’ models of currency crises which stress the increasing 
interdependence between banking and currency crises, we constructed a currency 
crisis indicator by decades. The currency crisis indicator (1980s) is defined as a 
dummy variable that takes the value of one if a currency crisis occurred in any 
of the four quarters preceding a banking crisis of the 1980s. The currency crisis 
indicator (1990s) is similarly constructed. The 1970s are taken as the decade of 
reference. The inclusion in these new indicator dummies in the estimated model 
allows us to test whether the leading effect from currency to banking crises has 
been indeed stronger than ever during the past decade.
The estimation results reported in column 2 of Table 3.6 confirm that in the 
1990s the leading effect from currency crises to banking crises was stronger than 
the one found over the whole sample period. Instead, no significant leading effect 
is associated with crisis episodes occurred in the 1980s with respect to the 1970s.
44 We interpret this as a more general form of state dependence than the one found in the 
baseline model because it tests how the probability of a banking crisis today is affected by the 
state of the system in any of the four preceding quarters.
45 A positive sign is more intuitive and eases the interpretation of the results, indicating that 
this specification fits better the data than the baseline model
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In summary, the results in Table 3.6 show that the choice of the lag structure is 
crucial when assessing the significance of the causal link from currency to bank­
ing crises. A leading effect from currency to banking crises is found only after 
controlling for episodes of devaluation occurred in the whole year preceding a 
banking crisis. The effect is even stronger when we distinguish between crises 
occurred during the 1980s and the 1990s with respect to those of the 1970s.
These results may well explain why previous studies that use different crises 
windows have not found a significant leading effect from currency to banking 
crises.
3.6.5 Panel versus Pooled Data
After checking the robustness of our results to changes in the model specification, 
we performed a sensitivity test over the structure of the error term. While most 
of the existing studies on currency and banking crises make use of probit or logit 
models with identically and independently distributed errors, the estimates pre­
sented in this chapter have been obtained by assuming a composite error term 
that includes a time-invariant country-specific component and an autocorrelated 
error term.
Table 3.7 reports the results of our baseline specification, estimated with the 
currency crisis indicator variables, and compares them to those obtained by es­
timating a simple random effect model without the autocorrelated error term. 
This second set of results is reported in column 2 of Table 3.7, and clearly suffers 
from spurious state dependence. The omission of the autocorrelated structure in 
the error term artificially inflates the z-statistic associated with the banking crisis 
indicator, which is partially capturing the effect of the omitted error term.
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Tab. 3.7: Panel versus Pooled Data
Explanatory Variables panel data random effects pooled data
Constant -1.886*** -1.998*** -1.938***
(-20.534) (-32.697) (-15.898)
Real GDP growth -0.041*** -0.045*** -0.043***
(-2.556) (-2.798) (-2.766)
Real interest rate 0.001 0.000** 0.000**
(1.239) (1.966) (1.984)
Growth of imports over GDP 0.006** 0.005** 0.005**
(2.554) (2.200) (2.217)
RER undervaluation -0.008** -0.007** -0.006**
(-1.937) (-1.861) (-1.712)
Growth of net credit to the gov.t over GDP - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000
(-0.129) (-0.173) (-0.167)
Growth of credit to the private sector over GDP 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(2.374) (2.619) (2.516)
Central bank credit to banks over GDP -0.003 -0.002 - 0.000
(-0.068) (-0.073) (-0.354)
Growth of banks deposits over GDP -0.005** -0.005** -0.005**
(-2.009) (-1.889) (-1.824)
Growth of banks foreign liabilities over GDP 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(2.514) (2.526) (2.552)
Share of short-term debt over reserves 0.003** 0.003** 0.003**
(1.935) (1.882) (1.858)
Debt service over exports 0.738* 0.774** 0.802**
(1.548) (1.857) (1.992)
Domestic financial liberalisation 0.313*** 0.305*** 0.294***
(2.733) (3.016) (3.284)
Change in the US interest rates 0.851** 1.039*** 0.940***
(2.052) (2.628) (2.442)
US CPI inflation -0.192*** -0.168** -0.164***
(-2.373) (-2.210) (-2.244)
Fuel inflation -0.014** -0.016** -0.015**
(-1.867) (-2.054) (-2.059)
Banking crisis indicator 0.477*** 0.949*** 1.019***
(3.117) (10.471) (12.448)
Currency crisis indicator 0.164* 0.138 0.120
(1.393) (1.275) (1.150)
a 2 0.199***
(4.203)
0.195***
(4.879)
P 0.434***
(5.160)
Function value at optimum 609.451 630.475 640.808
Notes: See comments to Tables 3.3 and 3.6.
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The importance of modelling a panel data structure and estimating the probabil­
ity of banking crises with the right techniques becomes clearer when comparing 
the results of our baseline specification with those of a standard probit model 
in column 3 of Table 3.7 that assumes an i.i.d. error structure and pools all 
the observations together, thus ignoring the panel dimension of the data. Two 
effects are worth noting. First, the presence of spurious state dependence, which 
is stronger then the one found when estimating a simple random effect model.46 
Second, the lower z-statistic associated with the currency crisis indicator. This 
indicator may be capturing the effect of the omitted cr2, which controlled for 
time-invariant, country-specific differences.
In brief, the comparison of the z-statistics in column 1 and column 3 of Table 
3.7 suggests that the use of standard static probit models to analyse the deter­
minants of banking crises may generate biased results because of the omission of 
the panel structure.
3.6.6 Excluding Banks’ Bailouts
To check the sensitivity of our results to the definition of banking crises, we re- 
estimated the baseline specification by using an alternative concept of crisis that 
excludes episodes of government intervention to bailout banks. Crises are thus 
identified by applying only the first three criteria listed in Section 3.4.1, i.e. the 
occurrence of either a bank run or a license withdrawal, bankruptcy, or closure 
of one or more financial institutions.
The estimation results obtained using the definition of banking crises with and 
without bailouts are reported in columns 1 and column 2 of Table 3.8, respectively. 
The comparison of the two columns shows that there are no major differences in 
the signs and magnitude of the estimated coefficients associated with the domestic 
and global explanatory variables.
46 See column 2 of Table 3.7.
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Tab. 3.8: Excluding Banks’ Bailouts
Dependent Variable: with without
Constant —1.886*** -2.065***
(-20.534) (-13.246)
Real GDP growth -0.040*** -0.032**
(-2.556) (-1.791)
Real interest rate 0.001 0.001*
(1.240) (1.512)
Growth of imports over GDP 0.005*** 0.006**
(2.554) (2.313)
RER undervaluation -0.008** -0.009**
(-1.937) (-1.844)
Growth of net credit to the gov.t over GDP -0.000 -0.000
(-0.129) (-0.001)
Growth of credit to the private sector over GDP 0.003*** 0.004***
(2.375) (3.609)
Central bank credit to banks over GDP -0.003 -0.036
(-0.020) (-0.108)
Growth of banks deposits over GDP -0.005** -0.005**
(-2.009) (-1.851)
Growth of banks foreign liabilities over GDP 0.001*** 0.001***
(2.514) (2.458)
Share of short-term debt over reserves 0.003** 0.003**
(1.935) (2.182)
Debt service over exports 0.738* 0.322
(1.548) (0.491)
Domestic financial liberalisation 0.313*** 0.290**
(2.733) (1.988)
Change in the US interest rates 0.851** 1.153**
(2.052) (2.242)
US CPI inflation -0.191*** -0.169*
(-2.373) (-1.644)
Fuel inflation -0.014** -0.016**
(-1.867) (-1.799)
Banking crisis indicator 0.478*** -0.112
(3.117) (-0.595)
Currency crisis indicator 0.164* 0.313**
(1.393) (2.150)
(T2 0.199*** 0.000
(4.203) (0.053)
P 0.434*** 0.602***
(5.160) (5.895)
Function value at optimum 609.451 331.587
Notes: Banking crises without bailouts are defined as cases of either a bank run, or a license 
withdrawal, closure of one or more financial institutions, or the adoption of emergency measures 
like a freeze of deposits. Banking crises with bailouts include government’s rescue packages. 
See also comments to Tables 3.3 and 3.6.
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The probability of a banking crisis without bailouts increases the lower GDP 
growth, and the higher real interest rates and imports growth.
What is outright different is the effect of past currency and banking crises, as 
shown by the z-statistics associated with the currency and banking crisis indica­
tors in column 2 of Table 3.8. First, the occurrence of a currency crisis strongly 
increases the probability of observing a banking crisis without bailouts in any of 
the four quarters ahead. The coefficient associated with the currency crisis indi­
cator is now significant at the 5 per cent confidence level. A possible explanation 
for this result lies in the nature of the banking crises considered here. As already 
mentioned, this alternative definition of banking crises does not allow for govern­
ment rescue operations. If this is the case, a devaluation of the currency might 
inevitably lead to the collapse of the banking system, as explained by Mishkin 
(1996).
Second, after having experienced either a bank run or the closure of one or more 
financial institutions in the past, countries seem less prone to experience another 
banking crisis in the near future. The estimated coefficient associated with the 
banking crisis indicator is now negative, although not statistically significant.
Finally, the unobserved heterogeneity in our sample vanishes once we adopt the 
banking crises definition without bailouts, as shown by the z-statistics associated 
with the parameter a 2 in column 2 of Table 3.8.
3.7 Conclusions
This chapter has focused on episodes of banking crises in a sample of 92 develop­
ing and emerging market economies from the beginning of the 1970s to the end 
of 1997, when the Asian crisis erupted.
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We used quarterly observations for a large number of macroeconomic funda­
mentals, debt and bank-specific variables to estimate a dynamic probit model 
of banking crises by maximum smoothly simulated likelihood. The inclusion of 
the lagged dependent variable among the regressors required the explicit consid­
eration of unobserved heterogeneity and temporal serial correlation in the error 
structure.
We focused our attention on three main objectives. First, the identification of a 
set of domestic and global variables that significantly affect the probability of a 
banking crisis. In particular, we looked at the role played by debt variables in 
triggering or averting the occurrence of such crises by adding a number of debt in­
dicators to the baseline specification. Second, we tested for the presence of leading 
effects from currency to banking crises. Third, we introduced dynamic elements 
into the probit model to account for the existence of intertemporal linkages be­
tween consecutive crises. The lagged dependent variable and the autocorrelated 
error term served this purpose.
Our main results can be summarised as follows:
•  Macroeconomic fundamentals are important determinants of episodes of 
financial system distress in developing and emerging markets. Low domes­
tic GDP growth, higher imports expenditures, high interest rates and an 
overvalued RER significantly increase the probability of observing a bank­
ing crisis. Lending booms have also a negative effect on the stability of 
financial systems.
•  Debt variables are also key determinants of the probability of banking crises. 
The two indicators that are robust to changes in the model specification are 
short-term debt over reserves and the financing gap between debt service 
payments and exports revenues.
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•  Developing countries are very sensitive to changes in global macroeconomic 
conditions. An increase in the level of international interest rates or a world­
wide deflation considerably increase the probability of a domestic financial 
crisis. Equally, negative terms-of-trade shocks —proxied by fuel inflation— 
are harmful to the stability of financial systems in countries that rely on 
exports of primary commodities.
•  Bank-specific indicators can help detect financial problems. A bank run on 
deposits and an increase in the amount of foreign liabilities undermine the 
stability of financial systems.
•  Countries that have experienced a banking crisis in the past are more prone 
to experience another crisis, while there is mixed evidence that currency 
crises lead to banking crises. The coefficient associated with the dummy for 
past currency crises becomes significant once we extend the time interval 
between currency and banking crises to one year. This result is important 
because it confirms the basic finding by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) — 
that currency crises tend to precede the peak of a banking crisis — but in 
a multivariate framework, which takes into account the concomitant effect 
of other potential determinants of banking crises.47 Moreover, our analysis 
over the incidence of crises by decades shows a distinct leading effect of 
currency crises on banking crises occurred during the 1990s with respect to 
those occurred earlier in the 1970s. This finding gives support to the view 
that the nature of financial crises has changed over time.
•  After controlling for this large number of potential explanatory variables, 
we find evidence of unobserved heterogeneity and autocorrelation in the 
error term structure, that may be capturing country-specific institutional 
differences that are persistent over time.
47 Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) use instead univariate analysis and apply a longer time 
window between currency and banking crises.
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This final result highlights the importance of exploiting the full information con­
tent of a panel dataset, by using the appropriate panel estimations techniques 
and relaxing the hypothesis of i.i.d. errors. As shown in Table 3.7, the omission 
of the autocorrelated error component introduces spurious state dependence in 
the estimates of the lagged dependent variable. This finding is important because 
it may explain the different conclusions reached by some of the previous studies 
that use static probit/logit models to estimate the likelihood of banking crises.
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Appendix A 
The Sample Composition
The 92 emerging and developing countries included in our sample are:
Argentina, Armenia, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo Republic, Costa Rica,
Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, Czech Republic, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, 
Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Hungary, Indonesia, Jamaica, 
Jordan, Kenya, Korea Republic, Lao PDR, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Mace­
donia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mex­
ico, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, 
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Rwanda, Samoa, Senegal, 
Seychelles, Slovakia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad 
and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela 
and Zimbabwe.
The dummy for countries depending on a single primary commodity for export 
earnings has been constructed following the IMF classification in Table 1 of Fi­
nance Sz Development (September 1999). The countries included in each category 
are:
Fuel exporters : Colombia, Congo Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea,
Gabon, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Russia, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela.
Metal exporters : Chile, Mauritania, Mongolia and Peru.
Food Exporters : Belize, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras and Mauritius.
Raw materials exporters : Benin, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Central African Re­
public, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Indonesia, Lao PDR,
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Latvia, Lebanon, Malawi, Mali, Myanmar, Paraguay, Peru and Zimbabwe.
Beverages exporters : Burundi, Cameroon, Colombia, Cote d’Ivoire, El Salvador, 
Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, Kenya, Nicaragua, Rwanda and Uganda.
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Appendix B
Tab. 3.9: Banking Crises with and without bailout
Crisis Date with without Description
Argentina: 1991:2-1997:4
1994:4 1 1 The Mexican devaluation led to bank runs which resulted 
in a 18% decline in deposits between Dec. 1994 and May 
1995.
1995:1 1 1 About 45/205 institutions were closed/merged through 
Sept. 1995.
1995:2 1 1
1995:3 1 1
Armenia: 1994:2-1997:4
1995:3 1 1 Sept. 1995: the banking crisis peaked, after the central bank 
had closed half of the active banks since Aug. 1994.
1996:1 1 0 A bank rehabilitation programme was launched in early 
1996, when most of Armenia’s 35 commercial banks were 
insolvent according to international accounting standards. 
Three of the largest problem banks were restructured.
Bangladesh: 1975:3-1997:4
1990:3 1 0 Reform of the banking system. The IDA agreed to provide
a credit of US$175m to enable commercial banks to operate 
more efficiently.
1990:4
1991:1 Debt recovery, especially by the nationalised commercial
banks, was very poor in 1991.
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1991:2 1 0
1991:3 1 0 Overdue repayments to 2 development institutions 
(Bangladesh Shilpa Bank and Bangladesh Shilpa Rin Sen- 
gutha) amounted to US$444m.
1992:2 1 1 End of Apr. 1992: the government and the CB suspended 
the operations of the Bangladesh Commerce and Invest­
ment (BCI) company, and investment group which was act­
ing as a deposit taker. As a result, there was a run against 
the National Credit LTD.
1997:2 1 0 Apr. 1997: following the stock market crash in Oct. /Nov. 
1996, the government announced a liquidity injection of 
US$366m into the banking system to avoid a major crisis 
of confidence.
Barbados: 1972:1-1994:1
Belarus: 1996:1-1997:4
1996:1 1 1 Sept. 1995: Belarus Bank was merged by Presidential de­
cree with state-owned Sberbank.
Belize: 1986:1-1997:4
Benin: 1993:2-1997:4
Bolivia: 1986:2-1997:4
1987:3 1 1 Oct. 1987: the CB liquidated 2 of 12 commercial banks; 7 
more reported large losses. Non-performing loans (NPL) 
reached 30% of banking assets.
1994:4 1 1 Nov. 1994: 2 banks with 11% of assets were closed. There 
were also deposit runs on other 3 banks.
1997:1 1 1 Feb. 1997: one bank was run and fully taken over by the 
government.
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Brazil: 1993:3-1997:4
1994:3 1 1 July 1994: 17 small banks were liquidated, 3 private banks 
intervened and 5 state banks placed under special adminis­
tration.
1994:4 1 0 Dec. 1994: the CB intervened in Banespa. Losses exceeded 
US$25bn.
Bulgaria: 1993:1-1997:4
1993:4 1 0 Dec. 1993: the recapitalisation law passed in Dec. and 1. t. 
ZUNK bonds issued to replace on the asset side of banks’ 
balance sheet pre-1991 NPL to enterprises.
1994:3 1 0 Aug. 1994: the BNB intervened in one of the two major 
ailing banks.
1994:4 1 0 Late 1994: under a new bad loans law the authorities de­
signed a program for restructuring the 2 major ailing banks.
1996:1 1 1 Between Jan. and May 1996 there have been intermittent 
runs on banks, including a drawdown of FX deposits from 
US$2.2bn to US$1.7bn. Liquidation procedures were initi­
ated against 2 medium sized banks and 4 small banks.
Burkina Faso: 1984:1- 1997:4
1991:1 1 0 Early 1991: the banking system underwent significant re­
structuring. The National Development Bank was put un­
der a government-controlled administration and received 
an injection of about CFAF15bn. 3 other banks (BFCI- 
B, UREBA and the investment bank CAI) were also put 
under temporary receivership and their NPL transferred to 
the government.
1993:4 1 1 Nov. 1993: the government liquidated the Development 
Bank and privatised other financial institutions.
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1994:4 1 0 Nov. 1994: another series of operations was carried out to 
restructure the balance sheets of the banks in difficulties. 
Additional NPL were transferred from 3 commercial banks 
to the government in exchange of 15 years maturity bonds. 
The total cost was estimated at CFAF48bn (equal to 4.7 
per cent of GDP in 1994).
Burundi: 1987:1-1997:4
1995:2 1 1 May 1995: the Meridian bank was closed.
1995:3 1 1 Sept. 1995: Meridian bank was liquidated.
Cambodia: 1996:1-1997:4
Cameroon: 1975:1-1997:4
1989:3 1 1 Liquidation of SCB in Jul. 1989; BCD and CAMBANK in 
Aug. 1989; PARIBAS in Sept. 1989.
1991:2 1 1 Apr. 1991: liquidation of the BIAOC.
1994:3 1 1 BNP closed down and handed over its 34 per cent share­
holding in the country’s largest network (BICIC) to the 
government for the price of one symbolic franc.
1995:3 1 0 Sept. 1995: the government appointed a monitor com­
mittee which took under forced administration the BIAO- 
Meridien Banque du Cameroon, after the liquidation of 
its main shareholder, the Bahamas-based Meridien Inter­
national Bank Limited.
1996:3 1 1 Sept. 1996: the Commission Bancaire de l’Afrique Cen- 
trale announced that Banque Meridien BIAO Cameroon 
had been placed into liquidation.
1996:4 1 1 Oct. 1996: the Credit Agricole du Cameroon was hit by a 
confidence crisis and faced large scale witdrawals.
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1997:1 1 1 March 1997: closure of BICIC, Cameroon’s leading com­
mercial bank.
Cape Verde: 1994:4-1997:4
Central African Republic: 1981:2-1997:4
1990:4 1 0 Meridien Bank negotiated to take over most of the 
African network of the troubled Banque Internationale pour 
l’Afrique Occidentale (BIAO).
1995:1 1 1 March 1995: the financial crisis of the Meridien-BIAO bank 
led to a depositors’ run on the commercial bank and a write­
off a CFAF2.1bn claim on its failing parent bank in Lux­
emburg.
Chad: 1993:4-1997:4
Chile: 1980:2-1997:4
1981:4 1 0 Nov. 1981: following bank runs the government intervened 
in 4 banks and 4 financieras (non-bank financial institu­
tions with 33 per cent of outstanding loans) that lately 
failed.
1982:2 1 0 June 1982: almost all banks became insolvent and the CB 
offered to all domestic banks a 1. t. repurchase agreement 
of bad loan portfolios.
1983:1 1 1 Jan. 1983: the authorities decided to take over 5 private 
banks and liquidate 3 other. The 5 banks included the 
2 largest business groups which had expanded rapidly be­
tween 1975-81.
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1985:1 1 0 Jan. 1985: recapitalisation programme. Assets of inter­
vened banks were transferred to a publicly owned holding 
company and the banks subsequently recapitalised. Shares 
of the recapitalised banks were then sold to the public at fa­
vorable prices. The quasi-fiscal losses of the CB amounted 
to 18 per cent of GDP in 1985.
China: 1987:1-1997:4
1988:4 1 1 Financial institutions faced large withdrawals following po­
litical uncertainty.
1989:1 1 1 The governor of the People’s Bank of China ordered the 
closure of all s. t. finance companies. Insurance firms and 
rural and urban credit cooperatives were investigated.
1990:4 1 0 The government launched a big drive to clear up triangular 
debts, releasing Rmb60bn and liquidating 60 per cent of 
the outstanding defaults.
Colombia: 1972:1-1997:4
1982:3 1 0 Jul. 1982: the authorities had to assist a number of banks. 
Banco Nacional became the first of 6 major banks and 8 
finance companies to be intervened. 4 of them were nation­
alised.
1997:1 1 0 Early 1997: a bank consolidation programme involved 
mainly commercial finance companies. The number of 
deposit-taking institutions declined as a consequence of 9 
mergers, 3 interventions and 1 voluntary liquidation.
Congo Republic: 1980:1-1997:4
1994:3 1 1 July 1994: the Banque Nationale pour le Developpement du
Congo experienced a CFA Afr.lObn flight after its problems 
were revealed.
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1994:4 1 1 Oct. 1994: the Banque Commerciale Congolaise is put 
into liquidation. Dec. 1994: Regulators approved the liq­
uidation of the Banque Nationale pour le Developpment du 
Congo.
1995:1 1 0 Feb. 1995: the government and the World Bank reached an 
agreement to reform Congo’s troubled banking sector.
Costa Rica: 1980:4-1995:2
1994:4 1 1 Dec. 1994: the government closed one of the largest state- 
owned banks.
Cote I’voire: 1980:1-1997:4
1990:1 1 1 The crisis of the financial sector worsened in the first half 
of 1990. 4 main banks have been liquidated or closed down.
1990:2 1 1 June 1990: the holding company of the BIAO was liqui­
dated. BNP handed over its shares to the Ivorian gov­
ernment on payment of one symbolic franc. A financial 
stabilisation plan was drafted by the BCEAO governor.
1991:3 1 1 Sept. 1991: The Banque Nationale pour le Developpement 
Agricole failed in Sept. , having failed to recoup more than 
US$ 201 mil. in bad debts and to rise capital. The govern­
ment authorised its liquidation on Sept. 25.
Croatia: 1995:3--1997:4
1995:4 1 0 Nov. 1995: The 5th largest bank entered rehabilitation.
1996:3 1 1 July 1996: Privredna, the largest Croatian bank, was taken 
over by the Rehabilitation Agency.
Czech Republic: 1994:2-1997:4
1994:2 1 1 June 1994: liquidation of Kreditni and Prumyslova Banka.
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1995:3 1 0 Aug. 1995: liquidation of AB Banka and Ceska Banka. The 
CNB produced a comprehensive programme for consolidat­
ing small banks in order to prevent a domino effect in this 
sector. 15/18 banks were included in the programme with 
radical solutions adopted for 9 of them.
Dominica: 1990:1-1997:4
Dominican Republic: 1992:2-1997:4
1996:2 1 0 April 1996: the Monetary Board intervened in the third 
largest bank, which represented 7 per cent of the total assets 
of the banking system.
Ecuador: 1991:2-1997:4
Egypt: 1972:-1997:4
1993:4 1 0 Late 1993: the authorities developed a plan for selling the 
public sectors’ holding in joint venture banks and for pri­
vatising one of the four large public sector banks.
El Salvador: 1978:1-1994:2
1990:4 1 0 Nov. 1990: a new legislation was enacted to restructure and 
privatise the financial system. The Fondo de Sanamiento 
was created to support the process.
Equatorial Guinea: 1990:1-1997:4
Estonia: 1994:1-1997:4
1994:3 1 0 Aug. -Sept. 1994: the BOE lent the equivalent of 6 per cent 
of base money to the troubled Social Bank to meet large 
deposit withdrawals. The activities of the bank were sus­
pended in mid-August and then re-opened, with a liquidity 
intervention of EEK231m.
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1994:4 1 0 Oct. 1994: the BOE merged the Social Bank with another 
insolvent bank, the Development Bank.
1995:1 1 0 March 1995: the BOE concluded agreements to sell parts
of Social Bank and convert the reminder to a loan recovery 
agency. All the depositors accounts were transferred to 
-other hanks.----------------------------------------------------------------
Gabon:1987:4-1996:4
Gambia: 1980:1-1991:4
1985:1 1 0 1985: restructuring of the most important commercial 
bank, the Gambian Commercial and Development Bank.
1989:1 1 1 1989: liquidation of the Agricultural Development Bank.
1991:3 1 0 July 1991: offering for sale of the Gambian Commercial and 
Development Bank.
Ghana: 1980:1- 1991:4
1989:3 1 0 July 1989: adoption of a comprehensive restructuring plan 
for banks to take over NP assets from the banks’ balance 
sheets.
1990:2 1 0 May 1990: replacement of banks NPL with government 
bonds. The total cost of the intervention reached 6 per 
cent of GDP.
1990:4 1 0 Dec. 1990: replacement of NP claims on state-owned en­
terprises by the financially distressed banks with Bank of 
Ghana bonds.
1991:1 1 0 March 1991: replacement of banks’ NPL with government 
bonds.
Grenada: 1988:4-1997:4
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Guatemala: 1978:2-1997:4 
Guinea-Bissau: 1991:2-1995:4 
Honduras: 1984:2-1997:4
Hungary: 1989:1-1997:4
1991:4 1 0 End 1991: the state granted commercial banks guarantees 
for doubtful loans worth lObn forints.
1993:1 1 0 March 1993: a loan consolidation programme was carried 
out. Banks with a capital adequacy ratio lower than 7^ per 
cent sold to the government claims on domestic enterprises 
that had been classified as ‘bad’. In exchange they received 
credit consolidations bonds. The total cost of the operation 
was 4.2 per cent of 1992 GDP.
1993:4 1 0 End of 1993: the government purchased a significant share 
of banks claims against a selected group of large-state en­
terprises and transferred these loans to 2 state asset man­
agement companies. 8 banks received a capital injection of 
FT114bn.
1994:2 1 0 May 1994: the 3 largest banks received a capital injection 
sufficient to rise their capital asset ratio to 4 per cent.
1994:4 1 0 End 1994: the state proceeded with the third and final stage 
of the recapitalisation of the 3 largest banks to achieve the 
8 per cent capital asset ratio.
1997:1 1 1 March 1997: bank run on Postbank. As a result, in the 5 
months of 1997, real non-cash M3 declined by 6 per cent.
Indonesia: 1982:2-1997:4
1990:3 1 1 Sept. 1990: failure of PT Bank Duta.
1992:4 1 1 Nov. 1992: a large bank (Bank Summa) collapsed and trig­
gered runs on 3 smaller banks.
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1997:4 1 1 31 Oct. 1997: 16 commercial banks were closed. Mid Dec. 
’97: deposit runs on banks accounting for 1/2 of the bank­
ing system.
Jamaica: 1982:2-1991:1 
Kenya: 1977:1-1997:4
1988:1 1 0 Early 1988: start of a major restructuring programme of 
the financial sector.
1993:1 1 1 By early 1993 about 1/3 of banks (accounting for about 
63 per cent of total bank assets) had been identified as 
distressed.
1993:2 1 0 The stability of the financial sector was restored through 
a rehabilitation programme launched in April 1993. This 
involved the closure of 4 commercial banks, the replacement 
of the management of 2 other banks and the liquidation of 
8 non-bank financial institutions.
1993:4 1 0 Oct. 1993-Sept. 1994: a new one-year economic programme 
included further measures to ensure a sound banking sys­
tem and restructure the National Bank of Kenya, the 
largest state bank.
1994:1 1 0
1994:2 1 0
1994:3 1 0
1995:2 1 1 June 1995: the state participation into the National Bank of 
Kenya was reduced below 50 per cent. The local subsidiary 
of Merdien BIAO was closed.
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Korea Republic: 1977:2-1997:4
1997:4 1 1
Lao PDR: 1995:2-1997:4 
Latvia: 1994:4-1997:4
Dec. 1997: 14 banks are suspended, 2 large commercial 
banks taken over by the government.
1995:1 1 1
1995:2 1 1 
Lebanon: 1991:1-1997:4 
Lithuania: 1994:2-1997:4
15 licences were revoked in the first 7 months of 1995. The 
subsequent closure of one of the largest bank (accounting 
for about 30 per cent of deposits) and two other banks 
triggered a bank crisis in the spring of 1995.
1995:4 1 1 
Macedonia: 1995:2-1997:4
Dec. 1995: the 4th largest bank was closed, 12 small banks 
were liquidated. Large deposit withdrawals took place at 
the end of 1995.
1997:1 1 1 
Madagascar: 1976:1-1997:4
March 1997: failure of the largest saving house, TAT, which 
was found to have about DMIOOm in unreported deposits.
1995:4 1 0 
Malawi: 1995:1-1997:4
End 1995: expatriated administrators were appointed to 
take over the management of both public banks (the Na­
tional Bank for Rural Development and the National Bank 
of Commerce) that accumulated losses of FMG114bn (13 
per cent of their credit portfolios).
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Mali: 1988:4-1994:2
1988:4 1 0 In 1988-89 steps were taken to restructure the Banque 
du Developpement du Mali, including financial restructur­
ing involving CFAF62.5bn worth of NPL. As a result, the 
BDM-SA was stablished on June 30, 1989 as a mixed capi­
tal company in which the Government holds 20 per cent of 
the shares.
1989:1 1 0
1989:2 1 0
Mauritania: 1986:4-1997:4
hline 1993:2 1 1 June 1993: the Development Bank was closed.
1993:3 1 0 Late 1993: 3 banks were recapitalised on the basis of exter­
nal audits. The budgetary impact of the programme was 
of 7.5 per cent of GDP.
1993:4 1 0
1994:3 1 1 July 1994: the Loan Recovery Agency took over the loan 
portfolio of the Union des Banques de Developpement and 
the Banque Nationale de Mauritaine.
Mauritius: 1991:2-1997:4
Mexico: 1980:2- 1997:4
1982:3 1 1 Sept. 1982: the government took over the troubled banking 
system, nationalising private banks by Presidential Decree.
1994:3 1 0 Sept. 1994: the authorities intervened in 2 banks.
1995:1 1 0 Jan. 9, 1995: the authorities announced a scheme to re­
capitalise banks with capital ratio below the 8 per cent 
minimum. At the end of March, 8 banks had obtained 
assistance from the deposit-guarantee fund (FOBAPROA) 
under the temporary capitalisation programme.
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Moldova: 1997:1-1997:4
Mongolia: 1994:1-1997:4
1996:4 1 0 Dec. 1996: the Mongolian financial system underwent ma­
jor restructuring. 2 large insolvent banks, which together 
accounted for almost 50 per cent of the banking system 
assets, were closed. A debt recovery agency was also estab­
lished.
Myanmar: 1992:2-1997:4
Nepal: 1978:2-1997:4
1988:1 1 0 Early 1988: the reported arrears of 3 banks (95 per cent of 
the financial system) averaged 29 per cent of all assets.
Nicaragua: 1994:1-1997:4
Niger: 1978:3-1997:4
1988:2 1 1 In the late 1980’s, the Niger’s banking system faced a severe 
solvency crisis. The Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole 
was liquidated on June 1988.
1990:3 1 1 Sept. 1990: the decision was taken to liquidate the Banque 
du Developpement de la Republique du Niger.
1994:3 1 1 July 1,1994: closure and complete liquidation of the Caisse 
Nationale de Credit Agricole. The unrecovered portion of 
its portfolio was transferred to the Treasury.
1994:4 1 0 Second-half of 1994: the Meridien BIAO was required to 
consolidate its own resource base via a capital increase.
Nigeria: 1994:1-1997:1
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1994:4 1 1 By the end of 1994 the number of technically insolvent 
commercial and merchant banks had risen to 34 and an 
additional 8 banks were deemed illiquid. Combined, they 
accounted for 10 per cent of the deposits liabilities of the 
banking system.
Panama: 1979:1-1997:4
1988:1 1 1 A bank holiday started in March 1988 and lasted for 9 
weeks. As a result of uncertainty and loss of confidence 
caused by a political crisis, public banks were particularly 
affected by a loss of deposits and a rapid deterioration in 
their loan portfolios. 15 banks ceased operations.
1988:2 1 1
Paraguay: 1978:4-1995:3
1995:2 1 0 A banking crisis erupted in May 1995 following a highly 
publicised accounting discrepancy in the value of local cur­
rency held in the CBP’s vaults. This event shook pub­
lic confidence. The 3rd and 4th largest commercial banks 
(Banco General and Bancopar) were unable to meet their 
obligations and were intervened by the CBP. Following the 
first intervention, there was a massive withdrawal of de­
posits from private domestic banks. In June, Bancosur and 
another finance company were intervened.
1995:3 1 0 In July a small commercial bank, Banco Mercantil, 2 fi­
nance companies and a saving and loans association were 
intervened. All together these banks amounted to over 15 
per cent of the financial system’s deposits. Government in­
tervention had been estimated to amount to 4 per cent of 
GDP by the end of 1995.
Peru: 1990:4-1995:2
Philippines: 1978:2-1997:4
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1981:1 1 1 Jan-Dee. 1981: a crisis of confidence began when fraud in 
the commercial paper market resulted in large-scale de­
faults by borrowers in this market and in bankruptcies 
among a number of non-financial intermediaries and their 
holding companies.
1981:2 1 1
1981:3 1 1
1981:4 1 1
1982:1 1 0 Jan. 1982-Sept. 1983: intensification of government inter­
vention to non-financial and financial institutions. The gov­
ernment increased its emergency lending and equity contri­
butions, arranged the takeover of troubled private banks by 
public financial institutions.
1982:2 1 0
1982:3 1 0
1982:4 1 0
1983:1 1 0
1983:2 1 0
1983:3 1 0
1983:4 1 1 Oct. 1983: financial panic was provoked by the authorities 
announcement of a moratorium of their external debt pay­
ments to foreign commercial banks, resulting in a series of 
runs on the banks.
1986:4 1 0 Nov. 1986: a further contraction of banking system credit 
occurred when some 30 per cent of the banking system’s 
total assets, representing the NPL of 2 government-owned 
banks (the Development Bank of the Philippines and the 
Philippines National Bank), were transferred to a govern­
ment agency.
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1992:4 1 0 Dec. 1992: a comprehensive commercial bank debt restruc­
turing programme was launched.
Poland: 1987:2-1997:4
1991:4 1 0 In late 1991, 1 bank was privatised and 7 out of 9 treasury 
owned banks (with 90 per cent share of total credit market) 
were recapitalised.
1993:3 1 0 A law on Financial Restructuring of Enterprises and Banks 
became effective in March 1993 and established the basis 
to recapitalise banks by transferring treasury bonds to 7 
of them in Sept. 1993. This recapitalisation amounted to 
ZLlltn.
1993:4 1 0 Dec. 1993: the PKO-SA, which deals with consumer foreign 
deposits and transactions and the Bank for Food Economy 
(BGZ) were provided with Treasury issued recapitalisation 
bonds.
1995:1 1 0 Since its inception in Feb. 1995, the Bank Guarantee Fund 
assisted 3 commercial banks and 88 cooperative banks in 
their bankruptcy procedures.
Russia: 1995:2-1997:4
1995:2 1 1 A total of 110 banks in 1994 and 96 banks in the first 8 
months of 1995 were closed.
1995:3 1 1 The interbank crisis in Aug. 1995 demonstrated the liquid­
ity problems of Russian banks.
Rwanda: 1978:1-1997:4
Samoa: 1980:1-1995:4
Senegal: 1976:1-1995:4
1989:2 1 0 June 1989: start of a restructuring plan for the Union Sene- 
galaise de Banques (USB), which was completed in the fol­
lowing quarter.
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1989:3 1 0
1989:4 1 0 Oct. 1989: plans to recapitalise 4 state banks were an­
nounced.
1990:3 1 1 Sept. 1990: the Banque Senegalo-Kouweitienne (BSK) had 
its operating licence revoked by the regional CB. The bank 
closed after 1 year of suspension.
1991:3 1 1 July 1991: the Bank of Credit and Commerce International 
Senegal (CBCCI) was closed.
Seychelles: 1982:2-1996:3
Slovakia: 1994:2-1997:4
1997:4 1 1 Dec. 1997: the 3th largest bank, (IRB or Investment and 
Development Bank) was taken under forced administration 
by the NBS. Credit was provided to the bank to enable it 
to pay its depositors.
South Africa: 1996:1-1997:4
Sri Lanka: 1977:1-1997:4
1993:1 1 0 March 1993: bonds equivalent to 4.8 per cent of GDP were 
issued to recapitalise 2 state-owned commercial banks with 
NPL equal to 35 per cent of their portfolios.
1996:4 1 0 As the guaranteed lending turned NP, the government was 
forced in 1996 to place bonds in the state banks equivalent 
to 1.8 per cent of GDP.
1997:1 1 0 March 1997: the first two-year Treasury bond was launched 
by the CB. These securities were issued primarily to state- 
owned saving institutions such as the National Saving Bank 
and the Employees Prevident Fund.
Tanzania: 1978:1-1997:4
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1992:1 1 0 Early 1992: following a comprehensive audit of the Na­
tional Bank of Commerce —the dominant state bank— 
and the Cooperative and Rural Development Bank, a large 
amount of their NPL was transferred to the new Loans and 
Advances Realisation Trust and replaced by government 
bonds.
1994:1 1 0 Beginning of 1994: the authorities began the restructuring 
of the 3 existing state commercial banks, beginning with 
the NBC, to be followed by the CRDB and the People’s 
Bank of Zanzibar.
1995:2 1 1 Mid 1995: the Tanzania Housing Bank was closed.
1997:3 1 0 July 1997: the government decided to split the National 
Bank of Commerce into 2 banks, the NBC (1997) and the 
NMB and to create a holding company to manage the resid­
ual assets and liabilities of the former NBC.
Thailand: 1977:2-1997:4
1979:1 1 0 Early 1979: following the stock market crash, one of the 
largest finance companies failed and the bail-out of the fi­
nancial sector began.
1983:4 1 0 Oct. 1983: large losses in a finance company led to runs 
and government intervention.
1984:1 1 0 Between the end of 1983 and 1985 19 finance companies 
were closed, accompanied by runs. Throughout the period 
1984-87, weakness in the financial sector resulted in reg­
ulatory intervention or in the CB take over, soft lending, 
recapitalisation and other support arrangements involving 
5 banks that accounted for about 25 per cent of total assets 
of the system.
1984:2 1 0
1984:3 1 0
1984:4 1 0
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1985:1 1 0
1985:2 1 0
1985:3 1 0
1985:4 1 0
1986:1 1 0
1986:2 1 0
1986:3 1 0
1986:4 1 0
1987:1 1 0
1987:1 1 0 March to June, 1987: 97 finance companies received liquid­
ity support from the CB.
1997:2 1 1 June 1997: the CB suspended the activity of 16 finance 
companies.
1997:3 1 1 July 1997: the currency devaluation was accompanied by a 
bank run.
1997:4 1 1 Dec. 1997: closure of 56 previously suspended finance com­
panies.
Togo: 1977:3-1995:3
1988:1 1 0 Jan. 1988: a first programme for restructuring the Banque 
Togolaise de Developpement was launched. CFAFlbn came 
from the government.
1990:3 1 1 Sept. 1990: the government liquidated the Caisse Nationale 
de Credit Agricole.
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1991:2 1 0 April 1991: a second tranche disbursed by the government 
to recapitalise BTD.
1992:4 1 1 Nov. 1992: most banks were closed for more than 6 months, 
until the summer of 1993, during which time the quality of 
the assets deteriorated substantially and liquidity in the 
system was reduced by almost one half.
1993:1 1 1
1993:2 1 1
Trinidad & Tobago:1985:2-1997:4
Tunisia: 1988:4--1997:4
1991:4 1 0 End 1991: comprehensive prudential regulation introduced 
strict standards for loan classification and provisioning. As 
a result most of the commercial banks were undercapi­
talised.
1993:3 1 0 Mid 1993: the CB set detailed terms of reference for exter­
nal audits and off-site reporting requirements. Intervention 
in favor of a private commercial bank which had lost a sig­
nificant proportion of its deposits from public enterprises 
over a few days.
1996:4 1 0 End of 1996: the CB took over a stock of NPL from the 
Agricolture Bank (BNA), the largest public sector bank, 
to 2 public enterprises in charge of marketing subsidised 
foodstuffs.
Turkey: 1987:3-1997:4
1991:1 1 1 Jan. 1991: the start of the Persian war led to massive with­
drawals and a run on banks prompting the government to 
guarantee all deposits.
1994:2 1 1 Deposit runs in the spring of 1994 resulted in the closure 
of 3 medium-sized banks. The government introduced full 
deposit insurance in May 1994.
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Uganda: 1984:1-1997:4
1993:1 l  1 Early 1993: a small bank failed. Several other banks were 
in difficulties or insolvent, including state-owned banks ac­
counting for more than 40 per cent of the banking system 
total assets.
1995:1 1 0 First half of 1995: a credit recovery agency, the Non- 
Performing Assets Recovery Trust, was established to take 
over the UCB’s NPL as part of the restructuring operations 
of the UCB.
1995:2 1 0
Ukraine: 1996:2--1997:4
Uruguay: 1982:1-1997:4
1982:1 1 0 Early 1982: the Banco Hipotecario received substantial fi­
nancial assistance from the government.
1982:4 1 0 From late 1982 to early 1984 the CBU purchased com­
mercial banks’ NPL with dollar denominated bonds and 
promissory notes under the Portfolio Purchase Scheme 
linked to bank intervention.
1983:1 1 0
1983:2 1 0
1983:1 1 0
1983:4 1 0
1984:1 1 1 Beginning 1984: the Banco de Plata was liquidated with 
deposit being reimbursed.
1984:2 1 0 Apr. 1984: the National Office of Asset Recovery was cre­
ated to try to recover the banks’ portfolios of NP assets.
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Tab. 3.9: continued
Crisis Date with without Description
1985:2 1 1 May 1985: Banco de Italia, one of the 3 largest private 
banks, was taken over. The CBU ordered the interven­
tion and the Banco de la Republica Oriental del Uruguay 
(BROU) assumed the majority of the equity.
1985:3 1 1 July 1985: the Banco Pan de Azucar was taken over after 
it became insolvent.
1987:1 1 0 March 1987: Banco Comercial was recapitalised by the 
BROU. At the end of the operation roughly 90 per cent 
of its capital was held by BROU. This and the previous in­
terventions led to a de facto nationalisation of the banking 
sector.
1989:2 1 0 June 1989: the government launched and extensive reform 
of the financial sector. The main objective have been the re­
habilitation of 3 of the failed banks absorbed by the BROU.
Vanuatu: 1996:1-1997:4
Venezuela: 1973:2-1997:4
1982:4 1 1 The Banco de los Trabajadores had to be taken over by the 
government in late 1982.
1993:4 1 1 Oct. 1993: rumors spread about the distressed financial sit­
uation of Banco Latino, the second largest bank in terms 
of deposits. The bank had to meet major deposit with­
drawals through large-scale asset sales and borrowing from 
the CBV.
1994:1 1 1 Jan. 1994: Banco Latino was closed.
1994:2 1 0 Early June 1994: 8 distressed financial institutions, with 
about 21 per cent of total deposits, had to be intervened. 
By that date a total of 6 per cent of 1994 GDP had already 
been injected into those banks.
1994:3 1 1 Jul-Aug. 1994: rumors about the financial situation of 2 
large banks, Banco Consolidado and Banco de Venezuela, 
led to deposit runs.
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Tab. 3.9: continued
Crisis Date with without Description
1994:4 1 1 Dec. 1994: the government decided to close Banco del Pro­
greso.
1995:1 1 1 Feb. 1995: 3 other banks had to be closed and their deposits
migrated to the banks nationalised during the crisis.
Zimbabwe: 1981:1-1997:4
Notes: banking crises without bailout are defined as cases of either a bank run, or a license 
withdrawal, closure of one or more financial institutions, or the adoption of emergency 
measures like a freeze of deposits. Banking crises with bailouts include government’s 
rescue packages. References: Balino and Sundararajan (1990); Doe (1995); Ebrill (1994); 
Economist (various issues); Galbis (1995); Garci'a-Herrero (1997); IMF (Various issues); 
Lindgren, Garcia, and Saal (1996); Moser, Rogers, and van Till (1997); Nascimento (1990); 
Perez-Campanero and Leone (1991); Turtelboom (1991); Valdes (1994).
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Appendix C 
Tab. 3.10: Episodes of Currency Crises
Country Sample size Crisis date 10% cut-off 15% cut-off
Argentina 1991:2-1997:4
Armenia 1994:2-1997:4 1994:4 1 1
Bangladesh 1975:3-1997:4
Barbados 1972:1-1994:1
Belarus 1996:1-1997:4 1996:3 1 1
1997:1 1 1
Belize 1986:1-1997:4
Benin 1993:2-1997:4 1994:1 1 1
Bolivia 1986:2-1997:4
Brazil 1993:3-1997:4
Bulgaria 1993:1-1997:4 1993:4 1 0
1994:1 1 1
1994:4 1 0
1996:2 1 1
1996:3 1 1
1997:1 1 1
1997:3 1 0
Burkina Faso 1984:1-1997:4 1991:2 1 0
1994:1 1 1
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Tab. 3.10: continued
Country Sample size Crisis date 10% cut-off 15% cut-off
Burundi 1987:1-1997:4 1988:2 1 0
1991:3 1 0
Cambodia 1996:1-1997:4 1997:4 1 0
Cameroon 1975:-1997:4 1982:3 1 0
1991:2 1 0
1994:1 1 1
Cape Verde 1994:4-1997:4
Central African Rep. 1981:2-1997:4 1982:3 1 0
1991:2 1 0
1994:1 1 1
Chad 1993:4-1997:4 1994:1 1 1
Chile 1980:2-1997:4 1982:3 1 1
1984:4 1 1
China 1987:1-1997:4 1990:1 1 1
1994:1 1 1
Colombia 1972:1-1997:4 1985:2 1 0
1997:4 1 0
Congo Rep. 1980:1-1997:4 1982:3 1 0
1991:2 1 0
1994:1 1 1
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Tab. 3.10: continued
Country Sample size Crisis date 10% cut-off 15% cut-off
Costa Rica 1980:4-1995:2 1981:4 1 1
Cote D ’Ivoire 1980:1-1997:4 1982:3 1 0
1991:2 1 0
1994:1 1 1
Croatia 1995:3-1997:4
Czech Rep. 1994:2-1997:4
Dominica 1990:1-1997:4
Dominican Rep. 1992:2-1997:4
Ecuador 1991:2-1994:4 1992:3 1 0
1992:4 1 0
Egypt 1972:1-1997:4
El Salvador 1978:1-1994:2
Equatorial Guinea 1990:1-1997:4 1991:2 1 0
1994:1 1 1
Estonia 1994:1-1997:4
Fiji 1981:1-1986:4
Gabon 1987:4-1996:4 1991:2 1 0
1994:1 1 1
Gambia 1980:1-1991:4 1981:2 1 0
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Tab. 3.10: continued
Country Sample size Crisis date 10% cut-off 15% cut-off
1984:2
1991:2
1 1
Ghana 1984:3-1997:4 1984:4 1 1
- 1986:1 1 1
1988:3 1 1
1992:4 1 0
1993:3 1 0
1994:1 1 1
Grenada
1995:4
1978:2-1997:4
1 0
Guatemala 1978:2-1997:4 1986:3 1 1
1989:4 1 0
1990:1 1 1
Guinea-Bissau 1991:2-1995:4 1991:4 1 1
1992:3 1 1
1993:3 1 0
1994:4 1 0
1995:3 1 0
Honduras 1984:2-1997:4 1990:2 1 1
1990:4 1 1
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Tab. 3.10: continued
Country Sample size Crisis date 10% cut-off 15% cut-off
1993:3 1 0
Hungary 1989:1-1997:4 1989:2 1 0
Indonesia 1982:2-1997:4 1983:2 1 1
1986:4 1 1
1997:3 1 0
1997:4 1 1
Jamaica 1982:2-1991:1 1984:4 1 0
1989:4 1 1
1990:4 1 1
Kenya 1977:1-1997:4 1981:4 1 0
1983:1 1 0
1991:2 1 0
1993:2 1 1
1995:2 1 0
Korea Republic 1977:2-1997:4 1997:4 1 1
Lao PDR 1995:2-1997:4 1995:3 1 0
1997:3 1 1
1997:4 1 1
Latvia 1994:4-1997:4
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Tab. 3.10: continued
Country Sample size Crisis date 10% cut-off 15% cut-off
Lebanon 1991:1-1997:4 1992:2 1 1
Lithuania 1994:2-1997:4
Macedonia 1995:2-1997:4 1997:3 1 1
Madagascar 1976:1-1997:4 1982:2 1 0
1983:4 1 0
1984:2 1 0
1987:3 1 1
1988:3 1 0
1994:2 1 1
1997:1 1 0
Malawi 1995:1-1997:4
Mali 1988:4-1994:2 1991:2 1 0
1994:1 1 1
Malaysia 1976:1-1997:4 1997:3 1 0
1997:4 1 1
Malta 1973:1-1997:4
Mauritania 1986:4-1997:4
Mauritius 1991:2-1997:4 1991:2 1 0
Mexico 1980:2-1997:4 1982:1 1 1
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Tab. 3.10: continued
Country Sample size Crisis date 10% cut-off 15% cut-off
1982:3 1 1
1983:1 1 1
1985:3 1 1
1995:1 1 1
1995:4 1 1
Moldova 1997:1-1997:4
Mongolia 1994:1-1997:4 1996:4 1 1
Morocco 1977:1-1997:4 1983:1 1 0
1991:2 1 0 .
Myanmar 1992:2-1997:4
Nepal 1978:2-1997:4 1986:1 1 0
1991:3 1 1
Nicaragua 1994:1-1997:4
Niger 1978:3-1997:4 1982:3 1 0
1991:2 1 0
1994:1 1 1
Nigeria 1994:1-1997:4
Panama 1979:1-1997:4
continued on the next page
Chapter 3: Appendix C 176
Tab. 3.10: continued
Country Sample size Crisis date 10% cut-off 15% cut-off
Paraguay 1978:4-1995:3 1984:2 1 1
1985:2 1 1
1987:1 1 1
1989:2 1 1
Peru 1990:4-1995:2 1991:2 1 1
1991:4 1 1
Philippines 1978:2-1997:4 1983:4 1 1
1984:3 1 1
1990:4 1 0
1997:3 1 0
1997:4 1 1
Poland 1987:2-1997:4 1988:1 1 1
1989:2 1 1
1989:4 1 1
1992:2 1 0
1993:3 1 0
Russia 1995:2-1997:4
Rwanda 1978:1-1997:4 1994:1 1 1
1995:2 1 1
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Tab. 3.10: continued
Country Sample size Crisis date 10% cut-off 15% cut-off
Samoa 1980:1-1995:4 1983:2 1 0
1984:3 1 1
Senegal 1976:1-1995:4 1982:3 1 0
1991:2 1 0
1994:1 1 1
Seychelles 1982:2-1996:3
Slovakia 1994:2-1997:4
South Africa 1996:1-1997:4 1996:2 1 0
Sri Lanka 1977:1-1997:4 1977:4 1 1
Tanzania 1978:1-1997:4 1982:2 1 0
1983:3 1 1
1984:3 1 1
1986:3 1 1
1988:1 1 1
1988:4 1 1
1989:4 1 0
1990:1 1 1
1991:2 1 0
1992:2 1 1
1993:3 1 1
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Tab. 3.10: continued
Country Country Sample size Crisis date 10% cut-off 15% cut-off
Thailand Thailand 1977:2-1997:4 1997:3 1 1
Togo Togo 1977:3-1995:3 1982:3 1 0
1991:2 1 0
1994:1 1 1
Trinidad Trinidad &: Tobago 1985:2-1997:4 1986:1 1 1
Tunisia Tunisia 1988:4-1997:4 1991:2 1 0
1993:1 1 0
Turkey Turkey 1987:3-1997:4 1988:1 1 1
1991:1 1 1
1991:2 1 1
1992:1 1 0
1992:4 1 0
1993:3 1 1
1994:1 1 1
1994:2 1 1
1995:4 1 0
1996:1 1 1
1996:4 1 1
Uganda Uganda 1984:1-1997:4 1984:3 1 1
1984:4 1 1
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Tab. 3.10: continued
Country Sample size Crisis date 10% cut-off 15% cut-off
1985:4 1 1
1989:1 1 0
1990:3 1 1
1991:3 1 1
1992:2 1 1
Ukraine 1996:2-1997:4
Uruguay 1982:1-1997:4 1982:4 1 1
1983:1 1 1
1983:4 1
1984:1 1 1
1984:4 1 1
1984:4 1 1
1985:1 1 1
1989:4 1 1
1990:2 1 1
Vanuatu 1996:1-1997:4
Venezuela 1973:2-1997:4 1987:1 1 1
1989:2 1 1
1992:4 1 0
1994:2 1 1
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Tab. 3.10: continued
Country Sample size Crisis date 10% cut-off 15% cut-off
1996:1 1 1
Zimbabwe 1981:1-1997:4 1983:1 1 1
1984:3 1 0
1991:2 1 0
1991:3 1 1
1991:4 1 1
1993:1 1 1
1994:1 1 1
1997:4 1 1
Chapter 3: Appendix D
Appendix D
Tab. 3.11: Data Sources and Definitions
Variable Name Data Sources and Definitions Frequency
Macroeconomic Variables
Real GDP Growth
World Bank, World Development Indica­
tors (WDI). GDP at constant 1990 prices, 
in national currency (n.c.). Growth rates.
Interpolated from 
annual data by 
applying cubic 
spline techniques.
Inflation International Monetary Fund - Interna­
tional Financial Statistics (IFS). Growth 
rate of the Consumer Price Index (CPI). 
IFS line 64.
Quarterly.
Real deposit interest rate IMF. Deposit interest rate (IFS line 601) 
minus CPI inflation (IFS line 64).
Quarterly. We 
stretched back 
some of the series 
by applying the 
growth rate of the 
discount interest 
rate when deposit 
rates were not 
available.
Growth of total exports 
of goods and services over 
GDP
IMF. Total exports in US$ (IFS lines 
7aad +  78add), divided by GDP at cur­
rent prices in US$ from the WDI series. 
Growth rates.
Quarterly where 
available, other­
wise interpolated 
from the corre­
spondent annual 
series by applying 
a linear technique.
Growth of total imports 
of goods and services over 
GDP
IMF. Total imports in US$ (IFS lines 
78abd+78aed), divided by GDP at current 
prices in US$ from WDI. Growth rates.
Quarterly where 
available, other­
wise interpolated 
from the corre­
spondent annual 
series by applying 
a linear technique.
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Tab. 3.11: continued
Variable Name Data Sources and Definitions Frequency
Real exchange rate Authors’ calculations. We used the nom­
inal bilateral exchange rate against the 
US$ (IFS line rf). We converted these se­
ries into real exchange rates using the CPI 
(IFS line 64). To construct the under­
valuation/overvaluation measure we first 
calculated the Hodrick-Prescot trend and 
then used the deviations from it. A de­
crease in this indicator indicates an in­
creasing overvaluation of the real exchange 
rate.
Monetary Variables
Quarterly.
Foreign exchange reserves 
over total imports
IMF. Reserves of the Central Bank (IFS 
line ld.d), divided by total imports (IFS 
lines 78abd +  78aed). In US$
Quarterly.
Growth of total domestic 
credit
IMF. Total domestic credit (IFS line 32), 
divided by GDP at current prices. In n.c. 
and growth rates.
Quarterly.
Growth of credit to the 
private sector over GDP
IMF. Claims on the private sector (IFS 
line 32d), divided by GDP at current 
prices. In n.c. and growth rates.
Quarterly.
Growth of credit to the 
government over GDP
IMF. Net claims on the central govern­
ment (IFS line 32an), divided by GDP at 
current prices. In n.c. and growth rates.
Dummy Variables
Quarterly.
Exchange rate regime IMF. Exchange Rate Arrangements and
Restrictions Reports. Dummy=l if the 
exchange rate regime is classified as inde­
pendently or managed floating, 0 other­
wise.
Quarterly. We 
could identify the 
exact quarter of 
a regime change 
from the informa­
tion provided by 
the annual IMF 
reports.
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Tab. 3.11: continued
Variable Name Data Sources and Definitions Frequency
Capital account restric­
tions dummy
Dummy variable =  1 if there are restric­
tions on the capital account. Dummy =  0 
if there are no restrictions on the capital 
account.
Quarterly.
Financial liberalisation Dummy variable =  1 if domestic interest 
rates are liberalised. Dummy =  0 if do­
mestic interest rates are not liberalised or 
information on the process of financial lib­
eralisation was not found.
Global Variables
Quarterly.
Change in the US interest 
rate
IMF. IFS line 60b. Quarterly.
US growth IMF. US nominal GDP (IFS line 99b). 
Growth rates.
Quarterly.
US inflation IMF. Based on the US CPI index (IFS line 
64).
Quarterly.
Change in the world inter­
est rate
Author’s computations. The world inter­
est rate is obtained as a weighted average 
of the interest rates of France, Germany, 
Japan, Switzerland, the UK and the US. 
IFS line 60b. The weights correspond to 
the shares of total external debt denomi­
nated in these currencies.
Quarterly.
Fuel inflation IMF. Commodity price index (1990 =  
100) of fuel (petroleum). IFS line 
001.76aad. Growth rates.
Quarterly.
Metals inflation Commodity price index (1990 =  100) 
of metals (aluminum, copper, iron, lead, 
nickel, tin and zinc). IFS line 001.76ayd. 
Growth rates.
Quarterly.
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Tab. 3.11: continued
Variable Name Data Sources and Definitions Frequency
Food inflation Commodity price index (1990 =  100) of 
food (bananas, cereals, meat, vegetable 
oils and sugar). IFS line 001.76exd. 
Growth rates.
Quarterly.
Raw materials inflation Commodity price index (1990 =  100) 
of raw materials (cotton, hides, rubber, 
timber, tobacco and wool). IFS line 
001.76bxd. Growth rates.
Quarterly.
Beverages inflation Commodity price index (1990 =  100) of 
beverages (coffee, cocoa and tea). IFS line 
001.76dwd. Growth rates.
Debt Variables
Quarterly.
Total external debt over 
total exports
WDI. Total external debt in current US$, 
over total exports of good and services.
Annual series. 
Linear interpola­
tion.
Total external debt over 
GDP
WDI. Total external debt in current US$, 
over GDP in current prices and expressed 
in US$.
Annual series. 
Linear interpola­
tion.
Total external debt over 
reserves
WDI. Total external debt in current US$, 
over reserves excluding gold (IFS line 
ld.d)
Annual series. 
Linear interpola­
tion.
Total debt service pay­
ments over GDP
WDI. Total debt service paid in US$ over 
GDP in current prices and in US$.
Annual series. 
Linear interpola­
tion.
Short-term debt over re­
serves
WDI. Short-term external debt over total 
reserves minus gold (IFS line ld.d), in US$
Annual series. 
Linear interpola­
tion.
Private non-guaranteed WDI. Private external non-guaranteed Annual series,
debt over long-term debt debt over total external long-term debt, Linear interpola-
in US$. tion.
4. WHAT DO TWINS SHARE? A JOINT PROBIT 
ESTIMATION OF BANKING AND CURRENCY CRISES
4.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to investigate further the determinants of financial 
crises and the causal link between currency and banking crises. Indeed, what 
seems to be distinctive about the most recent episodes of financial system dis­
tress across the world is the increasing coincidence of banking and currency crises 
and the severity of their effects.
According to the economic theory, the transmission mechanism between banking 
and currency crises can run in either direction. Banking crises can lead to a 
devaluation of the domestic currency if speculators anticipate the inconsistency 
between a fixed exchange rate and an expansion in monetary policy caused by 
the bailout of the banking system.1
Conversely, currency crises can exacerbate banking sector problems by induc­
ing a deterioration of the banks’ balance sheet. This may be either due to the 
devaluation of the currency itself, or to the decision to increase domestic inter­
est rates in order to prevent a speculative attack. While a devaluation would 
increase the nominal value of banks’ liabilities denominated in foreign currency, 
high interest rates would negatively impact the quality of the banks’ assets by 
increasing the number of distressed borrowers and thus the amount of bad loans.
1 This transmission mechanism can be found in Calvo (1997), Miller (1999), Obstfeld (1994), 
and Velasco (1987).
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Finally, twin crises, i.e. the joint occurrence of banking and currency crises, can 
be due to common causes. McKinnon and Pill (1994) relate overborrowing cycles 
to the distortions of the economic environment in which banks operate, where im­
plicit deposit insurance guarantees are in place and supervision is not adequate. 
In such a context, banks may fail to take into account the downside risks of their 
lending activity, increasing their vulnerability to a speculative attack.
Chang and Velasco (1999) ascribe twin crises to a shortage of liquidity that might 
occur if the level of international reserves of a country is far below the level of 
its short-term liabilities. A sudden change in market sentiments, with deposits 
withdrawals and capital outflows, could then exert pressures on both the currency 
and the banking system, eventually leading to their joint collapse.
Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2000) suggest a theoretical explanation of 
twin crises which includes both bad economic policies and self-fulfilling beliefs. 
They show that if the government offers a full guarantee to domestic banks’ for­
eign creditors, banks would expose themselves to exchange rate risk and declare 
bankruptcy when a devaluation occurs. The presence of these guarantees thus 
creates the possibility of self-fulfilling crises. When the market participants be­
lieve that a devaluation is imminent and the government will bail-out the banking 
system, they will exchange domestic currency for foreign currency to the point 
of triggering a devaluation. The result of these expectations is a currency crisis 
and a banking crisis. In this model fundamentals, or government guarantees, de­
termine whether a crisis will occur, while self-fulfilling beliefs influence the timing.
Despite the large number of theoretical explanations, very few empirical papers 
have studied the relationship between banking and currency crises since the pi­
oneering work of Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). The analysis in this chapter 
tries to fill this gap in the empirical literature by looking at episodes of banking 
and currency crises occurred from 1970 to 1997 in the sample of developing and
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emerging markets described in Chapter 3.2
We focus on two main objectives. First, we investigate the determinants of 
banking and currency crises and try to detect what characterises each type of 
crisis above and beyond a set of common factors. As in the previous chapters 
of this thesis, we are especially interested in the effect of debt variables on the 
probability of twin crises. Second, we test empirically the different transmission 
mechanisms identified by the theory and investigate the direction of causality 
between banking and currency crises.
Technically, we use the method of maximum smoothly simulated likelihood (MSSL) 
in combination with the Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane (GHK) simulator described 
in Chapter 5, to estimate a system of two dynamic probit equations, one for 
banking crises and another for currency crises. This approach would allow us to:
•  Jointly estimate the probability of banking and currency crises;
•  Endogenise banking crises;3
•  Test the interaction between banking and currency crises by introducing 
lagged and contemporaneous links within and between the two equations 
of the system.
The remaining of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 presents a 
short overview of the empirical literature on twin crises. Section 4.3 explains 
the econometric model used to jointly estimate banking and currency crises.4 
Summary statistics are presented in Section 4.4, while the main estimation results 
are gathered in Section 4.5. Finally, Section 4.6 concludes.
2 For the description of the sample composition and explanatory variables we refer the reader 
to Chapter 3, Section 3.4 and Appendices A-D.
3 The system estimation thus overcomes one limitation of the single-equation approach 
adopted in Chapter 3, which considers past currency crises as exogenously given.
4 A more detailed explanation of the model specification and estimation technique can be 
found in Chapter 5.
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4.2 Review of the Literature
The anatomy of twins was originally described by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) 
in a seminal paper on the causes of banking and balance-of-payments problems. 
The authors identify banking and currency crises in a restricted sample of 20 in­
dustrial and developing countries from the 1970s to 1995. They define twin crises 
as ‘episodes in which the beginning of a banking crisis is followed by a balance- 
of-payments crisis within 48 months’. The aim of their paper is to empirically 
investigate the causal linkages between crises and identify distinctive patterns 
in the behavior of macroeconomic fundamentals during the period surrounding 
those crises.5
The main results of Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) point the existence of a two- 
way causality between banking and currency crises. A vicious cycle seems to 
exist, thereby banking sector problems lead currency crises and these, in turn, 
have a negative feedback on banks. Ultimately, they show that twins share some 
common determinants. The period preceding a twin crisis is characterised by 
slow output growth, high interest rates and an overvalued exchange rate.
The work by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) represented a starting point for a 
series of subsequent papers that analyse twin crises using a multivariate approach.
In their probit analysis of the determinants of banking crises in emerging markets, 
Eichengreen and Rose (1998) use a dummy variable to control for episodes of ex­
change rate crash, defined as ‘nominal depreciations of at least 25 per cent that 
are also at least a ten per cent increase in the rate of depreciation over the pre­
vious year’. Their results do not show any significant effect of the currency crisis 
dummy on the probability of observing a banking crisis. To check the hypothesis
5 The authors restrict their analysis to a window of 24 months prior to the occurrence of a 
balance-of-payments crisis, while the banking crisis window is symmetric around the beginning 
of a crisis and lasts 12 months.
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that banks may react slowly to currency depreciations they lag the currency crisis 
dummy Nonetheless, their final results do not improve.
The paper by Eichengreen and Rose (1998) suffers from the limitation of as­
suming a unidirectional causation between crises that runs from currency crises 
to banking crises. Rossi (1999) takes also into account the opposite causal effect, 
from banking to currency crises, by estimating separately two equations: one for 
episodes of currency crises and another for banking crises. To control for the 
effect of past occurrences of banking crises on the probability of observing a cur­
rency crisis, he introduces among the regressors of the currency crises equation 
a lagged banking crisis dummy. Similarly, he uses lagged values of the currency 
crisis dummy in the banking crisis equation. Due to data limitations, he restricts 
his analysis to a sample of 15 developing countries from 1990 to 1997. He finds 
that the lagged dummy variable for currency crises is not significant when added 
to the probit equation for banking crises, whereas past banking crises help to 
predict currency crises.
Glick and Hutchison (2001) find analogous results on a larger sample of annual 
observations for 90 developed and developing countries over the period 1975- 
97. Contrary to Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), who consider a time span of 
four years, they restrict the definition of twin crises to ‘...instances in which a 
bank crisis is accompanied by a currency crisis in either the previous, current, 
or following year.’. Similarly to Rossi (1999), they estimate two static probit 
equations —one for each type of crisis— and test empirically the causal link be­
tween crises by means of a contemporaneous and a lagged crisis dummy variables.
Their results seem to suggest that twin crises are a significant phenomenon only in 
emerging countries. The authors find evidence of a contemporaneous and lagged 
effect of banking crises on the probability of observing a currency crisis, but only 
when they restrict their analysis to a sub-sample of emerging markets. Inter­
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estingly, they also find a significant contemporaneous effect of currency crises in 
the banking crises equation. The same results hold true when the two equations 
are estimated simultaneously,6 but only when they restrict the sample to emerg­
ing markets. On a larger sample, which includes also industrialised countries, 
there is no clear evidence of a significant causal relationship between banking 
and currency crises.
4.3 A System Estimation Approach to Twin Crises
We jointly estimate the probability of banking and currency crises in developing 
and emerging markets by using a system of two dynamic probit equations of the 
type described in Chapter 3, with unobserved heterogeneity and autocorrelated 
errors. The first equation describes banking crises and their determinants. The 
dependent variable is a dummy that equals one if a banking crisis is observed in 
country i at period t, zero otherwise. The second equation of the system explains 
the likelihood of currency crises, which are identified by a second dummy variable 
that distinguishes a currency crisis regime from a tranquil period.
The set of explanatory variables in the banking crisis equation, includes, among 
other regressors, lagged values of both the banking and currency crisis dummy 
variables. The lagged dependent variable would test whether past instances of 
banking crises have an influence on the probability of observing another banking 
crisis in the future. As explained in the previous chapter, this conditional rela­
tionship is known as state dependence, to suggest that if a country experienced 
a banking crisis in the past, the probability of observing another banking crisis 
might depend on that previous crisis occurrence.
6 Following Maddala (1983), they use a two-step approach in the estimation. In the first step, 
fitted values of the endogenous variables are obtained from the estimation of the reduced forms 
of the two probit equations. The fitted values are then used in the second step as independent 
variables in the two structural probit equations. Maddala (1983) shows that the estimates 
obtained with this procedure are consistent but not efficient.
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The lagged values of the currency crises dummy would control for a possible lead­
ing effect from currency crises to banking crises. As in Chapter 3, we would test 
the sensitivity of the results to the choice of the lag structure by using alterna­
tively the currency crisis dummy lagged by one quarter and an indicator variable 
that takes the value of one if a currency crisis occurred in any of the four quarters 
preceding a banking crisis.
Similarly to the banking crisis equation, the set of explanatory variables in the 
currency crisis equation includes the lagged dependent variable to test for state 
dependence among episodes of currency crises. Past instances of banking crises 
would test the hypothesis that banking crises lead currency crises.
Unlike the banking equation, the currency crisis equation includes among the 
regressors a dummy variable that signals the occurrence of a simultaneous bank­
ing crisis. This term identifies twin crises by controlling for the effect of cases 
of systemic banks’ distress on the probability of observing a coincident currency 
crisis.
The error terms of both equations axe similar and combine a country-specific 
time-invariant error term and an AR(1) autocorrelated element. This structure 
is meant to capture the fact that countries may differ in their propensity to ex­
perience a banking or currency crisis.
A different predisposition to crises may be either due to the existence of un­
observed heterogeneity —i.e. country-specific attributes that are time-invariant 
and may reflect political, institutional and historical differences— or to some un­
observed persistent factors.
It is important to stress that the omission of this error structure might give rise 
to spurious state dependence, i.e. cases in which the lagged dependent variable
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associated with past episodes of financial crises would turn to be significant solely 
because it would proxy for the omitted persistent and autocorrelated unobserv­
ables. The consideration of both error term components, i.e. the country-specific 
effect and the AR(1) term, is thus required to avoid biases in the estimation of 
the lagged dependent variable coefficients.
Finally, we allow for a contemporaneous correlation between the error terms of 
the banking and currency crisis equation, to capture common causes to banking 
and currency crises that we fail to explain with the economic variables included 
as regressors in our two-equation system.
To summarise, the simultaneous estimation of these two dynamic probit equations 
as a system would allow us to endogenise the occurrence of banking crises and 
capture any leading and simultaneous effect between banking and currency crises.
As mentioned in Chapter 3 and further explained in the methodological chap­
ter that follows this one, the intertemporal correlations in our model imply the 
calculation of probabilities given by high-dimensional integrals that are compu­
tationally intractable and require the use of simulation estimation methods. We 
apply the method of maximum smoothly simulated likelihood in combination 
with the GHK simulator that are described in Chapter 5.
4.4 Summary Statistics
We can characterise the episodes of twin crises in our sample by first looking 
at their frequency and temporal distribution and computing some descriptive 
summary statistics.
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Tab. 4.1: Simultaneous Banking and Currency Crises
Definition of currency crises 10% cut-off 15% cut-off
Total number 22 15
Percentage of currency crises 11.22% 12.10%
Percentage of banking crises 10.73% 7.32%
Notes: Banking crises with bailout include episodes of government intervention to rescue 
troubled banks and are defined in Section 3.4.1 of Chapter 3.
The 10% cut-off currency crises are identified as quarterly devaluations of the nominal 
exchange rate greater or equal to 10 per cent , which are also at least a 25 per cent increase in 
the rate of devaluation with respect to the previous quarter.
Similarly, a 15% cut-off currency crisis corresponds to a 15 per cent devaluation, which is also 
20 per cent higher than the devaluation in the previous quarter.
The episodes of banking and currency crises in our sample are listed in Chapter 3, 
Appendices B and C, respectively.
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Tab. 4.2: Banking Crises Preceding Currency Crises
10% cut-off 15% cut-off
Within One Quarter
total number
percentage of currency crises
Within Two Quarters
16
8.16%
14
11.29%
total number
percentage of currency crises
Within Three Quarters
24
12.24%
21
16.94%
total number
percentage of currency crises
Within Four Quarters
35
17.86%
27
21.77%
total number
percentage of currency crises
41
20.92%
31
25.00%
Tab. 4.3: Currency Crises Preceding Banking Crises
10% cut-off 15% cut-off
Within One Quarter
total number
percentage of banking crises
Within Two Quarters
14
6.83%
9
4.39%
total number
percentage of banking crises
Within Three Quarters
28
13.66%
21
10.24%
total number
percentage of banking crises
Within Four Quarters
43
20.98%
34
16.59%
total number
percentage of banking crises
48
23.41%
39
19.02%
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We would focus here on the definition of banking crises with bailout —which in­
cludes cases of government intervention to rescue troubled banks— and on the 
cut-off definition of currency crises, as defined in Sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 of Chap­
ter 3, respectively.
In particular, we would look at two different cut-off measures of currency crises: 
a 10% cut-off and a 15% cut-off. The first is defined as a 10 per cent depreciation 
of the national currency that is also a 25 per cent increase in the rate of depre­
ciation with respect to the previous quarter. The second considers as currency 
crises a devaluation of 15 per cent, which should also be 20 per cent higher than 
the devaluation in the previous quarter.7
The total number and percentages of currency crises that are associated with 
a simultaneous banking crisis in our sample are reported in Table 4.1. They vary 
from a minimum of seven per cent to a maximum of twelve per cent, depending 
on the currency crisis definition.
Table 4.2 depicts the number of banking crises preceding a currency crisis in an 
interval that varies from one quarter (first row of Table 4.2) to one year (fourth 
row of Table 4.2). Similarly, Table 4.3 reports the total number and percentages 
of currency crises preceding banking crises.
Contrary to Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) who count as twin crises a bank­
ing crisis that follows a currency crisis within a period of four years, we restrict 
the twin crisis window to a maximum of one year. This is to minimise the risk 
of defining as twin crises episodes of banking and currency crises that are not 
related by a clear causal relationship.
7 The banking and currency crises episodes in our sample are listed in Appendix B and C of 
Chapter 3, respectively.
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If we focus on a one year window, the data reported in Table 4.2 and 4.3 show 
that the total number of currency crises in the four quarters preceding a banking 
crisis is higher than the correspondent number of banking crises preceding cur­
rency crises. Based on this comparison, we may be induced to infer that currency 
crises are more likely to lead banking crises than vice-versa. However, a more 
careful analysis of the data reveals that the same conclusion cannot be drawn if 
we restrict the time interval to just one quarter before a crisis. Therefore, any 
tentative conclusion based on simple descriptive statistics needs further investi­
gation on the grounds of multivariate analysis.
The summary statistics presented in this section cannot unanimously solve our 
original question of what type of interaction, if any, links the various episodes of 
currency and banking crises in our sample. The choice of the lag structure seems 
to be crucial when assessing the causal link between banking and currency crises. 
However, the mere existence of a temporal relationship between crises does not 
necessarily imply causation.
To shed some light on the determinants and causal links between banking and 
currency crises we have to resort to multivariate system analysis, introduce some 
dynamics and allow for intertemporal links between the two types of crises. The 
results presented in the next section are a first attempt to follow this route.
4.5 Joint Probit Results
This section presents the empirical results of our multivariate analysis of the de­
terminants of twin crises. We further exploit the panel dataset used in Chapter 
3 that includes quarterly observations on 92 countries from 1970 until 1997.8
The determinants of banking and currency crises are examined by adopting the 
two-equation system approach described in the previous section and formalised
8 The full list of countries is provided in Chapter 3, Appendix A.
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in Section 5.5.1 of Chapter 5. The set of explanatory variables has been selected 
according to the main predictions arising from the theoretical literature on the 
origins of financial crises.9 Some of the regressors are common to both equations, 
while others are either banking or currency-specific and are therefore included in 
only one of the two equations.
To avoid endogeneity problems, all the explanatory variables are lagged by at 
least one quarter. The choice of the lag structure has been determined by follow­
ing a general to specific approach and by dropping all the lags before/after the 
first which had a significant direct effect.
4.5.1 The Baseline Specification
The results of our baseline model are presented in Table 4.4. The first part of the 
table gathers the estimation results referring to the banking crisis equation, while 
those of the currency crisis equation are presented underneath. Finally, a third 
panel shows the estimated parameters associated with the error term structure.
Three different sets of estimates are available for the currency crisis equation: 
total effects, direct effects and indirect effects. The direct effects are the esti­
mated coefficients of the currency crisis equation. The indirect effects measure 
the impact that the explanatory variables of the banking crisis equation exert 
on the probability of currency crises through the contemporaneous banking crisis 
dummy that appears on the right hand side of the currency crisis equation. The 
total effects are the sum of the direct and indirect effects.10
9 See Appendix D of Chapter 3 for the variables’ definitions and sources.
10 The standard errors for the total effects are calculated using the Delta method.
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Tab. 4.4: The Baseline Model
Variables Total Effects Direct Effects Indirect Effects
Banking Crises Equation
Constant -1.526***
(-34.978)
Real GDP growth (lagged 2Q) -0.040***
(-2.447)
M2 over CB reserves 0.080**
(2.485)
Growth of claims on private sector 0.003**
over GDP (lagged 3Q) (2.272)
Real deposits interest rate (lagged 2Q) 0.000**
(1.800)
Growth of banking deposits over GDP -0.005**
(lagged 3Q) (-1.716)
Growth of foreign banking liabilities over GDP 0.000**
(lagged 2Q) (2.253)
Change in US interest rate 1.222***
(3.244)
US CPI inflation -0.194*
(-2.764)
RER undervaluation -0.006**
(-1.664)
Debt service paid over exports (lagged 2Q) 0.761**
(1.988)
Short term debt over reserves 0.003***
(2.334)
Private non-guaranteed external debt over 0.178
long term debt (0.322)
Capital account restrictions 0.069
(0.520)
Domestic financial liberalisation 0.100
(1.066)
Currency crisis previous quarter -0 .005
(-0 .025)
Banking crises previous quarter 1.993***
(16.365)
Currency Crises Equation
Constant -2.099*** -1.760*** -0.339**
(-7 .049) (-18 .315) (-1 .743)
continued on the next page
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Tab. 4.4: continued
Variables Total Effects Direct Effects Indirect Effects
Real GDP growth (lagged 2Q) -0 .022 -0 .013 -0.009
(-0.465) (-0 .709) (-0.883)
M2 over CB reserves 0.018 0.018
(1.009) (1.009)
FX reserves over imports -0.458*** -0.458***
(-4.464) (-4 .464)
Growth of claims on private sector 0.001 0.001
over GDP (lagged 3Q) (0.051) (0.051)
Growth of net claims on government 0.000** 0.000**
over GDP (lagged 2Q) (1.757) (1.757)
Real dep. interest rate (lagged 2Q) 0.000 0.000
(0.007) (0.007)
Growth of banking deposits -0.001 -0.001
over GDP (lagged 3 periods) (-0.046) (-0.046)
Growth of banking deposits -0.006*** -0.006***
over GDP (lagged 4Q) (-2.440) (-2 .440)
Growth of foreign banking liabilities 0.000 0.000** 0.000
over GDP (lagged 2Q) (0.014) (1.745) (0.014)
Change in US interest rate 0.272** 0.272**
(1.743) (1.743)
US CPI inflation -0.386*** -0.343*** -0.043*
(-5 .837) (-4 .173) (-1.561)
World interest rate 0.053*** 0.053***
(2.771) (2.771)
RER undervaluation -0 .019 -0.018*** -0.001
(-0 .433) (-4 .761) (-0.146)
Debt service paid over exports 0.169** 0.169**
(lagged 2Q) (1.701) (1.701)
Growth of external debt over reserves 0.000** 0.000**
(1.737) (1.737)
Short term debt over reserves 0.004 0.004*** 0.001
(0.128) (2.264) (0.101)
Private non-guaranteed external 1.272*** 1.232** 0.039*
debt over long term debt (14.398) (1.989) (1.443)
Fuel inflation -0.010* -0.010*
(-1 .331) (-1 .331)
Metals inflation -0.074** -0.074**
(-1 .978) (-1 .978)
Capital account restrictions 0.441*** 0.425*** 0.015
continued on the next page
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Tab. 4.4: continued
Variables Total Effects Direct Effects Indirect Effects
(7.349) (2.635) (1.111)
Domestic financial liberalisation 0.355*** 0.333*** 0.022*
(7.261) (3.225) (1.408)
Currency crisis previous quarter 0.131** 0.132 -0.001
(2.150) (0.458) (-0 .120)
Banking crises previous quarter 0.721*** 0.278* 0.443**
(2.572) (1.324) (1.751)
Contemporaneous banking crises 0.222** 0.222**
(1.744) (1.744)
Error Term Structure
0.175***
(5.060)
0.336***
(4.700)
Pb -0.357***
(-65.890)
p c -0 .102
(-0.719)
PSbit ’*tt 0.175***
(5.060)
Function value at optimum -1306.200
Notes: This table reports the estimated coefficients with z-statistics in parenthesis.
Number of observations: 4350. Currency crisis definition: 10% cut-off. Number of banking crisis observations: 
205. Number of currency crisis with bailouts: 196. All variables are lagged one period, unless otherwise specified. 
The significance of the parameters can be assessed using the Normal approximation. Given the size of our 
sample, the t-statistic is virtually Normal. We can therefore use the t-tables to assess significance. We use the 
critical values for the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, which are 2.326, 1.645 and 1.282, respectively, for a 
‘one-tailed’ test, and 2.576, 1.960 1.645 and for a ‘two-tailed’ test. *, ** and ***, correspond to the 10%, 5% 
and 1% significance levels, respectively.
The direct effects are the estimated coefficients of the currency crisis equation. The indirect effects measure the 
effect of the explanatory variables included in the banking equation on the probability of a currency crisis 
via the contemporaneous banking crisis dummy. The total effects are the sum of the direct and indirect effects.
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Tab. 4.5: Total Elasticities (Baseline Model)
Variables zero RE zero RE+s.e. zero RE—s.e.
Banking Crises Equation
Real GDP growth (lagged 2Q) -0 .041 -0.044 -0 .039
M2 over CB reserves 0.289 0.307 0.271
Growth of claims on private sector over GDP (lagged
3Q)
0.004 0.004 0.004
Real deposits interest rate (lagged 2Q) 0.008 0.009 0.008
Growth of banking deposits over GDP (lagged 3Q) -0 .007 -0 .007 -0 .006
Growth of foreign banking liabilities over GDP (lagged 
2Q)
0.005 0.005 0.005
Change in US interest rate -0 .005 -0.005 -0 .004
US CPI inflation -0 .227 -0.241 -0 .213
RER undervaluation 0.002 0.002 0.002
Debt service paid over exports (lagged 2Q) 0.184 0.195 0.172
Short term debt over reserves 0.012 0.012 0.011
Private non-guaranteed external debt over l.t. debt 0.015 0.016 0.014
Capital account restrictions 0.063 0.067 0.059
Domestic financial liberalisation 0.029 0.031 0.027
Currency crisis previous quarter - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000
Banking crises previous quarter 0.101 0.108 0.095
Currency Crises Equation
Real GDP growth (lagged 2Q) -0 .022 -0.023 -0 .021
M2 over CB reserves 0.062 0.067 0.059
FX reserves over imports -0 .435 -0 .463 -0 .401
Growth of claims on private sector over GDP (lagged 
3Q)
0.001 0.001 0.001
Growth of net claims on government over GDP (lagged 
2Q)
0.001 0.001 0.001
Real dep. interest rate (lagged 2Q) 0.002 0.002 0.002
Growth of banking deposits over GDP (lagged 3Q) -0 .001 -0 .002 -0 .001
Growth of banking deposits over GDP (lagged 4Q) -0 .001 -0.002 -0 .001
Growth of foreign banking liabilities over GDP (lagged 
2Q)
0.004 0.004 0.003
Change in US interest rate -0 .001 -0.001 -0 .001
US CPI inflation -0 .441 -0 .470 -0 .413
World interest rate 0.395 0.420 0.370
RER undervaluation 0.007 0.007 0.006
Debt service paid over exports (lagged 2Q) 0.040 0.042 0.037
Growth of external debt over reserves 0.003 0.003 0.002
Short term debt over reserves 0.017 0.018 0.016
continued on the next page
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Tab. 4.5: continued
Variables zero RE zero RE+s.e. zero RE—s.e.
Private non-guaranteed external debt over long term 
debt
0.106 0.112 0.099
Fuel inflation -0 .003 -0 .004 0.003
Metals inflation -0 .002 -0 .002 0.002
Capital account restrictions 0.394 0.420 0.370
Domestic financial liberalisation 0.100 0.107 0.094
Currency crisis previous quarter 0.006 0.006 0.007
Banking crises previous quarter 0.036 0.038 0.033
Notes: The elasticities measure the effect of a unitary change in one of the regressors on the probability 
of observing a crisis and are evaluated at the mean value of each variable. The elasticity numbers 
should be multiplied by 100 to convert them in percentages.
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The estimated coefficients reported in Table 4.4 are defined as the partial deriva­
tives of the latent variable with respect to each of the regressors. In order to assess 
the significance of these estimates we also show in parenthesis the associated z- 
statistics. We present in a separate table (Table 4.5), the estimated elasticities 
that derive from the baseline model.11 These are defined as the partial derivatives 
of the probability of observing a financial crisis —either a banking or currency 
crisis— with respect to each of the regressors. Given their definition, elasticities 
can be interpreted more easily than the estimated probit coefficients.
The results in the first panel of Table 4.4, which refers to the banking crisis 
equation, show that a slow down of domestic GDP growth significantly increases 
the likelihood of a banking crisis. This result is consistent with the findings of the 
previous chapter and may be explained by the increased difficulties encountered 
by banks’ borrowers in servicing their debts in a phase of economic recession. 
Nonetheless, variations in output growth fail to explain the occurrence of cur­
rency crises, as can be seen in the second panel of Table 4.4.12 A similar result 
was found by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) but in an univariate setting. Ac­
cording to the authors, one of the key differences between banking and currency 
crises is the role played by the real sector, which appears to be crucial in explain­
ing banking crises but not currency crises.
An important difference between banking and currency crises lies in the role 
of the ratios of M2 over reserve money and in that of foreign exchange reserves 
over imports. The first of these two ratios is an indicator of the liquidity of fi­
nancial systems and a measure of the money multiplier effect. An increase in 
the ratio of M2 to reserve money would imply an increase in liquid deposits and
11 The elasticities in column 1 are evaluated at the mean values of the dependent variables 
and are derived from the total effects coefficients of the benchmark model presented in Table 4.4 
with a random effect equal to zero. However, to check the sensitivity of the result to this last 
assumption, we also computed the elasticities within a confidence interval of ±  one standard 
error. These two sets of elasticities are reported in columns 2 and 3 of Table 4.5, respectively.
12 This last finding is robust to changes in the lag structure and model specification.
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currency in circulation. These are money instruments that can be easily cashed 
in by depositors in case of a bank panic, undermining the stability of the banking 
system. Our results indicate that the higher the value of this ratio, the higher 
the probability of observing a banking crisis; whereas it does not contribute to 
the explanation of currency crises.13
The second ratio, foreign exchange reserves over imports, is an indicator of foreign 
reserve adequacy. It measures the government’s ability to finance current account 
deficits and is, therefore, a better indicator of exchange rate sustainability. The 
higher this indicator, the higher the repayment capacity of a country, and thus 
the lower the likelihood of a currency crisis, as confirmed by the negative and 
significant sign associated with this indicator in the currency crisis equation.14
Another distinction between banking and currency crises arises from the effect 
of two sub-components of domestic credit. The probability of banking crises is 
influenced by domestic claims on the private sector, while currency crises are ex­
plained by the growth of claims on the government.
These results are widely consistent with the predictions of the financial crises’ 
literature. A sharp increase in the ratio of claims on the private sector to GDP 
is a proxy for lending booms. In a context of fast growth of private domestic 
credit and in the absence of appropriate banking supervision, banks’ ability to 
discriminate marginal projects declines, leading to an increase in the share of 
non-performing loans in their portfolios.15
13 If we include M2 over reserve money straight among the regressors of the currency crisis 
equation, its direct and total effects are not significant.
14 This ratio is not significant when included in the the banking equation instead of M2 over 
reserve money.
15 This argument has been emphasised after the Asian financial crisis.
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On the other hand, changes in net claims on the central government over GDP 
would capture the Krugman’s effect: excessive credit expansion due to the moneti­
sation of the government’s budget deficit as a factor determining currency crises.16
Following Rossi (1999), we consider the real interest rate on banks’ deposits 
among the explanatory variables of banking crises. According to this author, 
banking problems are more likely to surface when real interest rates are high. 
This is because banks may be unable to extract the higher return paid on their 
liabilities from borrowers, and, even if they can, the quality of their loan portfolio 
may deteriorate because high real interest rates not only make it harder for good 
borrowers to stay current on repayments, but also worsen the average quality of 
borrowers (adverse selection).
Our results indicate that an increase in the real interest rate on banks’ deposits 
significantly increases the probability of banking crises.17 This variable has not a 
total significant effect on currency crises. Moreover, it has not a direct significant 
effect when included among the regressors in the currency crises equation.
We include the growth of banks’ deposits over GDP and the growth of banks’ 
foreign liabilities over GDP in the baseline specification as indicators of banks’ 
soundness. Banks’ deposits would act as a proxy for deposit withdrawals and 
thus as an indicator of on-going bank runs.
Our results indicate that a sharp decrease in the growth of banks’ deposits over 
GDP significantly increases the probability of a banking crisis. Banking for­
eign liabilities are an indicator of the banking system’s dependence on foreign
16 We tried to include claims on the private sector as an additional explanatory variable in 
the currency crisis equation, but the associated coefficient was not significant. The same is true 
for claims on the central government when included in the banking crisis equation. The change 
in total domestic credit over GDP was not significant in either of the two equations.
17 Alternatively, the inclusion of the lending over deposit interest rates ratio does not yield 
significant results.
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resources and captures the system’s vulnerability to a sudden capital inflow re­
versal. Specifically, it measures the degree to which the banking system relies on 
off-shore capital to fund its activities. We find that the higher the value of this 
variable, the higher the probability of observing a banking crisis.
The same two banking variables appear as regressors in the currency crisis equa­
tion18 to test if the dummy for past episodes of banking crises remains significant 
in the currency crisis equation even after controlling for banking-specific vari­
ables.19
We also add to both equations a measure of real exchange rate (RER) under­
valuation. As explained in Chapter 3, this series was computed by subtracting 
each country RER series from the corresponding Hodrick-Prescott trend.20 Pos­
itive values indicate that the exchange rate is undervalued with respect to its 
trend, while negative values are symptoms of exchange rate overvaluation.
The link between the real exchange rate and currency and banking crises lies in 
the competitiveness effect derived from a misaligned RER. An overvalued RER 
would harm tradeables’ producers by decreasing their foreign exchange earnings. 
On one hand, this may have a direct impact on the quality of the loan portfolio 
of banks, increasing the probability of a banking crisis. On the other hand, it 
might create the expectation of a future weakening of the currency and lead to a 
preemptive speculative attack.21 The argument runs in the opposite way in case 
of an undervalued RER. The negative coefficient in both banking and currency
18 In the currency crisis equation, we included banking deposits lagged four periods (instead 
of three) since we looked for a significant direct effect of this variable on the probability of a 
currency crisis.
19 We shall come back to this point when commenting on the estimated coefficient of the 
banking crisis dummy in the currency crisis equation.
20 The RER series are authors’ computations, based on nominal exchange rates and relative 
CPI indexes. Both series were obtained from the IMF-IFS statistics.
21 Notwithstanding, the total effect of RER on the probability of a currency crisis is not 
significant.
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equations is consistent with our expectations as it implies that an undervalued 
RER reduces the probability of a financial crisis.22
Debt variables have been included in both banking and currency crisis equations. 
Contrary to the currency crises equation, where the growth of total external debt 
over reserves is the key variable, what is significant in the banking crisis equa­
tion is the ratio of debt service payments over exports.23 This is consistent with 
the fact that a temporary liquidity shortage can lead to an insolvency crisis if a 
country cannot generate enough export revenues to pay back its debt.
Another important conclusion that can be drawn from our results is that the 
maturity and composition of debt instruments matter when assessing banking 
and currency crises’ probabilities. The ratio of short-term debt over reserves has 
a significant direct effect in both equations.24 The share of long-term debt that is 
private and non-guaranteed is not significant in the banking crisis equation, but 
it has a strong effect on the likelihood of currency crises.
Another block of regressors included in both equations is that of global vari­
ables. These are meant to capture external conditions and are thus common to 
all the countries, but vary over time. Following Eichengreen and Rose (1998), we 
constructed a composite measure of world interest rates. This variable is obtained 
by weighting the interest rate series of France, Germany, Japan, Switzerland, the 
United Kingdom and the United States according to the share of external debt 
denominated in these respective currencies.
The results show that an increase in the level of world interest rates significantly
22 The positive sign of the associated elasticities, reported in Table 4.5, is driven by the mean 
value of this variable, which is high and negative. This indicates that on average in our sample 
RER were overvalued, increasing the probability of banking and currency crises.
23 This variable is not significant when included directly into the currency crisis equation. 
The only relevant effect is the indirect effect.
24 Interestingly, the total effect in the currency crisis equation is positive but not significant.
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increases the probability of a currency crisis. This is because it would raise the 
cost of servicing variable-rate debt, with adverse consequences on the countries’ 
ability to meet their external obligations. Eventually, it may also cause an outflow 
of capital that would exert pressures on the currency and increase the probabil­
ity of a devaluation, as confirmed by the results of our estimation.25 The world 
interest rate has a counterintuitive negative sign when included into the banking 
crisis equation. What is relevant, though, for the explanation of banking crises 
is the change in the US interest rate. This variable has a positive and significant 
effect on the probability of banking crises.
Following Moreno and Trehan (2000), we include in both equations the US infla­
tion rate as an additional global explanatory variable. Our results indicate that 
this variable has the expected negative sign and is significant in both equations.26
Two additional global variables appear in the currency crisis equation: the infla­
tion rates of fuel and metal prices. The first variable is obtained by multiplying 
fuel CPI inflation by a dummy variable that takes the value of one for coun­
tries that are exporters of oil, and zero otherwise. We applied the same method 
to identify those countries that are particularly vulnerable to changes in metal 
prices. Both variables are significant in the baseline specification, with a negative 
sign. This result is not surprising. The higher the value of oil or metals, the 
higher exports revenues, and the lower the probability of a currency crisis for 
those countries that are exporters of these commodities.
We also add to the baseline model two dummy variables to control for the exis­
tence of capital account restrictions and the effects of domestic financial liberali­
sation.
25 The same argument can be found in Moreno and Trehan (2000).
26 Moreno and Trehan (2000) argue that a deflationary shock in the US could have a negative 
effect on economies that are exporters to the US market because it would lower their export 
revenues and, consequently, domestic economic activity.
A Joint Probit Estimation of Banking and Currency Crises 209
The dummy for capital controls takes the value of one in periods characterised by 
the imposition of restrictions on the capital account. This variable is significant 
in the currency crisis equation only. Its positive sign indicates that the exis­
tence of capital restrictions tends to increase the probability of a currency crisis. 
This result is consistent with Rossi (1999), who argues that limitations on capital 
movements can be circumvented by setting up off-shore accounts or other types 
of operations that can eventually increase the vulnerability of domestic financial 
systems . 2 7
The second dummy for domestic financial liberalisation takes the value of one 
in periods in which domestic interest rates were freed. This variable significantly 
increases the likelihood of currency crises. This result seems to confirm that fi­
nancial liberalisation increases the fragility of financial systems.
Having controlled for this large set of explanatory variables, we can now turn 
our attention to the second objective of our analysis, that is the study of the 
interaction between banking and currency crisis episodes.
In line with the results of Chapter 3, we can infer about the existence of a strong 
state dependence among episodes of banking crises from the positive and signif­
icant coefficient associated with the lagged dependent variable in the banking 
equation. This means that having experienced a banking crisis in the past in­
creases the probability of observing another banking crisis one quarter ahead.
When turning to the currency crisis equation, it is important to note that the 
lagged dependent variable has a positive and significant total effect on the prob­
ability of a currency crisis one quarter ahead. However, the direct and indirect 
effects have opposite signs and are not significant.
27 There is also empirical evidence suggesting that capital account controls are largely applied 
by countries with unregulated and poorly supervised financial systems, which are thus more 
vulnerable to speculative attacks.
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This last result highlights the importance of jointly controlling for both direct and 
indirect effects when assessing the significance of each variable in the currency 
crisis equation. By simply looking at the direct effect of the lagged dependent 
variable we would tend to conclude that past episodes of currency crises do not 
influence the probability of another crisis, while the analysis of the total effects 
reveal the presence of state dependence among episodes of currency crisis.
In order to test the causal link between banking and currency crises, we include 
a currency crisis dummy lagged by one period in the banking crisis equation and, 
similarly, a lagged banking crisis dummy in the currency crisis equation.
Table 4.4 shows that the coefficient associated with past banking crises is positive 
and significant in the currency crisis equation, even after controlling for banking- 
specific variables. Instead, lagged currency crises do not have a significant impact 
on the probability of banking crises. 2 8  This result seems to suggest that banking 
crises lead currency crises.
The coefficient associated with the simultaneous banking crisis dummy in the 
currency crisis equation is positive and significant. This means that the occur­
rence of a banking crisis helps to explain the probability of a currency crisis in 
the same quarter, i.e. banking and currency crises are strongly intertwined, as 
suggested by the literature on twin crises. 2 9
Further insights about the direction of causality between banking and currency 
crises can be derived from the analysis of the estimated parameters associated 
with the error structure.
28 The results from the system estimation thus confirm those of the single-equation estimation 
of banking crises presented in Chapter 3
29 This problem is further analysed in the subsections below.
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First, the estimates of the parameter associated with the country-specific time- 
invariant effects, o and crjc, reveal the existence of unobserved heterogeneity in 
both equations; while there are only signs of autocorrelation in the error term of 
the banking crisis equation . 3 0
Second, the contemporaneous correlation between the banking and currency crises 
equations, ^  i is highly significant and positive. This result indicates the ex­
istence of common causes to banking and currency crises that are omitted from 
our baseline specification, i.e. we find further evidence that twin crises are driven 
by common unobserved factors.
4.5.2 Financial Crisis Indicators
To test the robustness of the results of the baseline specification, and before de­
riving any definite conclusion on the direction of causality between banking and 
currency crises, we re-estimated the benchmark model with a modified lag struc­
ture of the banking and currency crisis dummy variables.
Instead of looking at episodes of crisis occurred within one quarter, we would 
test the significance of a new indicator signalling a crisis in any of the four quar­
ters preceding another crisis. We call these new variables banking(currency) crisis 
indicators and use them as substitutes for both the lagged dependent variable 
(controlling for state dependence) and the lagged crisis dummies (testing the di­
rection of causality between crises).
Since the coefficients and significance of the economic fundamentals do not change 
substantially with respect to the baseline model, we report only the results that 
are relevant to the analysis of the causal link between crises (see Table 4.6).
30 However, the negative sign associated with pb cannot be easily interpreted.
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The estimated coefficients of the currency crisis equation reported in column 1 of 
Table 4.6 are the ones corresponding to the total effects. 3 1
The results in column 1  of Table 4.6 show that, once we control for a suffi­
cient number of lags in the dependent variable, the leading effect from banking 
to currency crises found in the baseline model disappears, so does the simultane­
ous effect of banking crises on currency crises. Moreover, the contemporaneous 
correlation across the error terms of both equations is no longer significant.
What we find instead is the presence of generalised state dependence in both 
equations. 3 2
Finally, the autocorrelated component in the error term of the banking equa­
tion has now a positive and significant effect, which eases the interpretation of 
this result.
4.5.3 The Error Term Structure
In order to test the relevance of the autocorrelated error term in each of the 
probit equations of the system, as well as the contemporaneous cross-correlation 
between the error terms of the two equations, we re-estimated the model with­
out these error terms but with the crisis indicators. The results are reported in 
column 2 of Table 4.6.
The omission of the positive and significant autocorrelated error term component 
in the banking equation, pb, artificially inflates the coefficient (and z-statistics) 
of the lagged dependent variable that accounts for state dependence.
31 The direct effects would lead to the same conclusions.
32 We interpret this as a more general type of state dependence than the one described in 
Section 4.3, because we consider the whole year preceding a crisis rather than just one quarter.
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Tab. 4.6: Controlling for Past Financial Crises and the Error Structure
Variables (1) (2) (3)
Banking Crises Equation
Currency crisis indicator 0.134 0.146
(0.985) (1.249)
Banking crisis indicator 0.435** 0.865*** 0.423**
(2.039) (9.032) (2.080)
Currency crisis indicator (1980s) -0.152
(0.607)
Currency crisis indicator (1990s) 0.240*
(1.639)
Currency Crises Equation
Currency crisis indicator 0.202*** 0.155*** 0.213**
(3.444) (3.474) (1.701)
Banking crisis indicator 0.045 -0 .060
(0.394) (-0 .676)
Banking crisis indicator (1980s) -0.231
(-0.758)
Banking crisis indicator (1990s) 0.145
(0.991)
Contemporaneous banking crisis -0 .069 -0.141** -0.082
(-0 .354) (-1.724) (-0.414)
Error Term Structure
0.213*** 0.227*** 0.222***
(2.835) (4.915) (3.022)
0.307*** 0.326*** 0.305***
(4.354) (4.926) (4.350)
Ph 0.439*** 0.439***
(3.097) (3.284)
Pc -0 .028 -0 .030
(-0 .340) (-0.367)
P^ t 0.060 0.050
(0.349) (0.277)
Function value at optimum -1323.461 1341.370 -1321.334
Notes: The Currency crisis indicator is a dummy taking the value of 1 if there was a currency crisis 
in at least 1 of the 4 quarters preceding the occurrence of a banking crisis, and 0 otherwise.
The Banking crisis indicator is similarly defined. The Currency crisis indicator (1980s) is a dummy variable 
that takes the value of 1 if a currency crisis occurred in any of the four quarters preceding 
one of the banking crises of the 1980s. Similarly for the Banking crisis indicator (1990s).
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In the currency crisis equation, the autocorrelated error term component was not 
significant, so the effect of omitting it from the estimation is not as important as 
for the banking equation. The z-statistic is higher but the coefficient is slightly 
smaller. This last effect is due to the original negative sign of p° in the model of 
column 1 .
The effect of eliminating the cross-correlation term across equations is reflected 
in the coefficient of the contemporaneous banking crisis dummy. This coefficient 
is now higher (in absolute terms) and significant at the 5 per cent level, distorting 
the effect of a contemporaneous banking crisis on the probability of a currency 
crisis.
Overall, these results point to the importance of estimating these models with a 
flexible error structure, in order to avoid biased results.
4.5.4 Indicators of Financial Crises by Decade
To investigate further the causal links between banking and currency crises, we 
differentiate the financial crisis indicators according to the decade in which the 
crises took place. For example, the currency crisis indicator (1980s) is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one if a currency crisis occurred in any of the 
four quarters preceding one of the banking crises that took place in the 1980s. 
Similarly, we also constructed two banking crisis indicators by decade that we in­
cluded in the currency equation. The 1970s are taken as the decade of reference. 
The results are reported in column 3 of Table 4.6.
As in the single equation estimation of Chapter 3, our results reveal the existence 
of a significant (albeit only at the 1 0  per cent level) leading effect of currency 
crises on banking crises in the 1990s.
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No significant effect is found of banking crises leading currency crises in any 
decade.
In summary, these results seem to suggest that banking crises are not good lead­
ing indicators of currency crises once we control for past occurrences of currency 
crises. On the contrary, past currency crises help to explain banking crises, but 
only when we focus on episodes occurred during the 1990s relative to those of the 
1970s.
4.5.5 Alternative Definitions of Currency Crises
Table 4.7 presents the results of the baseline model estimated using the crises 
indicators and alternative definitions of currency crises. Following Eichengreen, 
Rose, and Wyplosz (1996), we adopt a second currency crises definition based 
on an Exchange Market Pressure (EMP) index. This index is computed as a 
weighted average of quarterly changes in the nominal bilateral exchange rate — 
with respect to the dollar— and quarterly changes in reserves. 3 3  Periods in which 
the country index is above its mean by more that 1.5 standard deviations are de­
fined as crises. 3 4  3 5
This definition of currency crises differs from the cut-off definition used so far 
in the estimations because it would also capture unsuccessful speculative attacks, 
that may not translate into an actual devaluation of the currency because of the 
central bank intervention on the foreign exchange market. The new set of esti­
mates obtained using this alternative definition of currency crises are gathered in 
the first column, (EMP 1.5%), of Table 4.7.
33 The weights are chosen so as to equalise the conditional volatility of the two components.
34 Note that these thresholds are country-specific because the standard deviations are com­
puted within-country and not over the whole sample.
35 Countries with hyperinflation are treated differently from the rest of the sample.
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Tab. 4.7: Alternative Definitions of Currency Crises
Variables E M  P I. 5% 15% cut-off
Banking Crises Equation
Constant -1.389*** -1.503***
(-29.633) (-26.482)
Real GDP growth (lagged 2Q) -0.047*** -0.034***
(-2 .854) (-2 .323)
M2 over CB reserves 0.129*** 0.104***
(3.252) (2.738)
Real deposit interest rate (lagged 2Q) 0.000** 0.000**
(1.654) (1.732)
Growth of claims on private sector over GDP 0.003** 0.003**
(lagged 3Q) (2.306) (2.225)
Growth of banking deposits over GDP -0.005** -0.005**
(lagged 3Q) (-1 .681) (-1.765)
Growth of foreign banking liabilities over GDP 0.000** 0.004***
(lagged 3Q) (2.543) (2.440)
Change in US interest rate 1.054*** 1.041***
(2.463) (2.489)
US CPI inflation -0.240*** -0.204***
(-2 .973) (-2 .668)
RER undervaluation -0.008** -0.010***
(-2 .114) (-2 .377)
Debt service paid over exports (lagged 2Q) 0.553 0.910**
(1.206) (1.862)
Short term debt over reserves 0.003** 0.003**
(1.901) (2.016)
Private non-guaranteed external debt over long term debt 0.133 0.217
(0.178) (0.311)
Banking crisis indicator 0.457*** 0.350**
(3.062) (1.843)
Currency crisis indicator 0.199** 1.286**
Currency Crises Equation
(1.648) (1.863)
Constant -1.721*** -1.543***
(-5 .777) (-3.522)
Real GDP growth (lagged 2Q) -0.077** -0 .012
(-1 .874) (-0.252)
M2 over CB reserves 0.028 -0 .013
(1.140) (-0 .607)
FX reserves over imports -0.350*** -0.428***
(-4 .021) (-3.489)
Growth of claims on private sector over GDP -0 .0 0 0 0.000***
(lagged 2Q) (0.052) (-0.049)
continued on the next page
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Tab. 4.7: continued
Variables E M  P I. 5% 15% cut-off
Growth of net claims on the government over GDP 0.000 0.000***
(lagged 2Q) (0.780) (2.723)
Real deposit interest rate (lagged 2Q) 0.000 -0 .000
(0.006) (-0 .007)
Growth of banking deposits over GDP -0.001 0.001
(lagged 3Q) (-0 .045) (0.047)
Growth of banking deposits over GDP -0.001 0.008***
(lagged 4Q) (-0 .038) (2.738)
Growth of foreign banking liabilities over GDP 0.000 0.000
(lagged 2Q) (0.014) (0.005)
Change in US interest rate 0.226* -0 .135
(1.621) (-0 .717)
US CPI inflation -0.195*** -0.232***
(-3 .084) (-2 .592)
World interest rate 0.023* -0 .008
(1.287) (-0 .324)
RER undervaluation -0.019*** -0 .020
(-6 .153) (-0 .376)
Debt service paid over exports 0.118* -0 .118
(lagged 2Q) (1.596) (-0 .715)
Growth of external debt over reserves -0 .000 0.000**
(-0 .602) (2.172)
Short term debt over reserves 0.007 0.005
(0.147) (0.109)
Private non-guaranteed debt over long term debt 0.614*** 1.240***
(6.953) (11.918)
Fuel inflation -0 .007 0.003
(-0 .974) (0.628)
Metals inflation -0.046* -0.099***
(-1 .557) (-2 .523)
Capital account restrictions -0.196* 0.044
(-1 .415) 0.267
Domestic financial liberalisation 0.209** 0.100
(1.819) 0.819
Currency crisis indicator 0.453*** 0.724***
(9.629) (9.622)
Banking crisis indicator 0.202*** -0 .018
(2.556) (-0 .185)
Contemporaneous banking crises 0.214* -0 .130
(1.630) (-0 .892)
continued on the next page
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Tab. 4.7: continued
Variables E M  P I. 5% 15% cut-off
Error Term Structure
<J2b 0.203*** 0.221***A*
(3.247) (3.648)
° l '= 0.000 0.197***
(0.095) (3.222)
P6 0.330*** 0.497***
(3.923) (4.848)
PC 0.230*** -0 .052
(3.748) (-0 .580)
P^ t 0.239*** -0 .034
(2.096) (-0 .304)
Function value at optimum -1372.452 -1094.820
Notes: EM P1.5%  means 1.5 standard deviations over the mean of the EMP index. The number of 
currency crises corresponding to this definition is 210.
The 15% cut-off measure defines crises as a 15 per cent depreciation and a 20 per cent increase 
in the rate of depreciation. The number of currency crises corresponding to this definition is 124. 
See also comments to Table 4.4 and Table 4.6.
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The results in the second column, (15% cut-off), refer instead to a more restric­
tive cut-off definition of currency crises that applies a cut-off of 15 per cent on 
the nominal depreciation of the exchange rate, higher than the one used so far. 3 6
As can be seen from Table 4.7, the adoption of the EMP 1.5% definition of cur­
rency crises produces different results. The real output growth variable has now 
a negative and significant sign. Another important difference lies in the debt 
indicators, because only private non-guaranteed debt helps to predict this type 
of currency crises.
According to these results, banking crises tend to lead currency crises, but the 
vice-versa is also true: the currency crisis indicator is significant in the banking 
equation. These findings highlight how difficult it is to identify a clear-cut causal 
relationship between banking and currency crises. A somewhat more robust re­
sult is that of generalised state dependence among both banking and currency 
crises. 3 7  The contemporaneous influences between banking and currency crises, 
captured by the endogenous banking dummy in the currency equation and the 
simultaneous correlation in the unobservables, are also significant.
Interestingly, the parameter associated with unobserved heterogeneity in the cur­
rency crisis equation, <t£c, is no longer significant when we use the EM PI. 5% 
definition instead of 10% cut-off. This result suggests that this term was maybe 
capturing the willingness and ability of central banks to defend the exchange rate 
parity. These country-specific characteristics are already taken into account in 
the definition of currency crises based on the E M P  index, which incorporates 
changes in total reserves of the central bank, and are therefore no longer signifi­
cant in the estimation.
36 This 15 per cent depreciation should also represent a 20 per cent increase in the rate of 
depreciation with respect to the previous quarter.
37 We are using here the same indicator of crises used in the previous section, that takes the 
value of one if a banking (currency) crisis is observed in any of the four quarters preceding 
another banking (currency) crisis.
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When turning to the results obtained by using the 15% cut-off definition, it is 
worth noting that the currency crisis indicator included in the banking equation 
is significant at the 5 per cent level. This seems to suggest that more severe 
currency crises (as those indicated by a level of depreciation higher than 15 per 
cent) have a positive and significant impact on the probability of observing a 
banking crisis in the future. Instead, the banking crisis indicator in the currency 
crisis equation is not significant.
4.6 Conclusions
The econometric analysis presented is this chapter has highlighted some empirical 
regularities in banking and currency crises occurred in a sample of 92 developing 
and emerging market economies from the mid 1970s to the end of the 1990s.
Our results show that financial crises (banking or currency crises) are driven 
by a common set of economic fundamentals, as well as some banking and cur­
rency specific indicators.
Debt variables are common causes of banking and currency crises. The abil­
ity of a country to honour its debt payments, either measured by the debt service 
ratio or the amount of short-term debt over reserves, significantly affects the 
likelihood of banking crises. Speculative pressures on the domestic currency are, 
instead, more likely the higher is the growth of the total external debt of a country.
Banking crises seem to cause currency crises one quarter ahead, but this link 
vanishes when we extend the crisis window to one year.
More robust results on the causal relationship between the two types of crises 
are derived when we differentiate crises by decades. Our analysis shows a sta­
tistically significant differential effect of currency crises occurred in the 1990s on 
the probability of banking crises, independently of the specification chosen.
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Alternatively, we find a significant leading effect of currency crises on banking 
crises when we consider devaluations that are over a 15 per cent threshold.
If we change the definition of currency crises to include unsuccessful speculative 
attacks, the causal link works in both directions: banking crises lead currency 
crises and vice-versa.
To conclude, the results presented in this chapter suggest that, along with the 
increasing liberalisation and globalisation of financial markets, banking and cur­
rency crises have become closely intertwined and driven by common fundamen­
tals. Currency crises seem to lead banking crises, at least during the nineties, 
but a causal link between the two cannot be determined unambiguously over the 
whole sample period. Both types of crises share some common factors, but which 
crisis surfaces first is ultimately a matter of circumstances.
5. SIMULATION-BASED ESTIMATION OF LIMITED 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE MODELS USING PANEL DATA: 
MOTIVATION, METHODS AND APPLICATIONS.
5.1 Introduction
In the previous two chapters of this thesis we made use of simulation techniques to 
overcome the computational problems associated with the maximum likelihood 
estimation (MLE) on panel data of dynamic probit models with flexible serial 
correlation in the unobservables.
The main aim of this chapter is to explain why we had to resort to simulation- 
based estimation techniques and outline the key properties and advantages of 
the maximum smoothly simulated likelihood (MSSL) method that we used to 
estimate the probability of banking and twin crises. Using the banking and twin 
crises econometric models described in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, we would also 
show how the GHK-MSSL approach can be applied to the estimation of a sys­
tem of two dynamic probit equations with flexible serial and contemporaneous 
correlation in the unobservables. This is an original result in the field of applied 
econometrics.
The key problem associated with the estimation of a broad class of limited de­
pendent variable (LDV) models using classical MLE methods is the need to eval­
uate multidimensional probability integrals in likelihood functions or conditional 
moments conditions. The high dimensional order of integration makes these ex­
pressions computationally intractable.
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These computational problems may arise in the context of simple discrete choice 
models when, for example, individuals have to evaluate the choice between more 
than two alternatives (multinomial probit models) or in binary models that allow 
for flexible serial correlation in the unobservables, like the single-equation probit 
model of banking crises estimated in Chapter 3.
In the past, researchers have limited their attention to special classes of LDV 
models that were computationally tractable, by imposing for example some very 
restrictive conditions on the correlation structure of the unobservables. If one 
assumes that the errors are independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.), the 
probabilities would have logit functional forms that can be easily computed. How­
ever, this model would suffer from the assumption of the ‘independence of the 
irrelevant alternatives’,,, which does not appear to be applicable in our case . 1
The simulation technique developed by Geweke (1989), Hajivassiliou and Mc- 
Fadden (1990) and Keane (1990), better known as the GHK simulator, makes 
it possible to estimate by MSSL (developed by Borsch-Supan and Hajivassiliou 
(1993)) a broader class of LDV models with flexible covariance structure, which 
encompasses the banking and twin crises models described in Chapter 3 and 
Chapter 4 of this thesis.
The remaining of this chapter is organised as follows. In Section 5.2 we present the 
classical formulation of a limited dependent variable model. Using the example of 
the banking crises model of Chapter 3, we derive in Section 5.2.1 the associated 
maximum likelihood function and highlight the multivariate integration problems 
associated to classical estimation methods. In Section 5.3 we briefly review the 
main simulation-based estimation methods, while in Section 5.4 we explain how 
simulation routines work by focusing on the GHK simulator. In Section 5.5, we 
demonstrate the application of the GHK simulator to the estimation of the bank-
1 See McFadden (1973).
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ing and twin crises models that are used in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 of this thesis 
and formalised in this chapter. Finally, Section 5.6 concludes.
5.2 The Canonical LDV Model
In this Section, we follow the formulation in Hajivassiliou (1993), Borsch-Supan 
and Hajivassiliou (1993) and Hajivassiliou and Ruud (1994) to describe the class 
of limited dependent variable models.
The canonical limited dependent variable model can be described as a combi­
nation of a linear latent variable model and a nonlinear relationship, r, between 
the latent variable, y*, and an observable variable, y.
Consider a random sample of N  economic agents(countries). Assume each in- 
dividual(country) i is observed over 7* periods. The pooling of observations on 
a cross-section of individuals over several time periods, with i — {1, • • • , N }  and 
t =  { i  defines a panel dataset. Let observe the data array (t/i,Xj),
where yt is a (7* x 1 ) vector of limited dependent variables referring to individual 
z, and Xi is a (T* x K ) array of exogenous variables. We assume yi is an indirect 
observation on a latent vector y* according to a many-to-one mapping yi =  r (y *), 
with y* given by a linear model
y* =  Xi(d 4- €i where i =  { 1 , . . . ,  N }  (5.1)
where (3 is a AT-dimensional vector of parameters, and €j a (Tj x 1 ) vector of 
disturbances with covariance matrix 0 *.
Define:
D(Vi) =  {y*\Vi =  r(y*)} (5.2)
Then, the likelihood associated with the observation {y^Xi) on the generic indi­
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vidual i is defined as:
k(9\ Vi) =  [  9{y*i ~  X A  Qi)dy.* (5.3)
Jy*eD(yi)
where i =  { 1 , . . .  ,N } .  The function g indicates the joint multivariate density 
function of the disturbances e* of the latent variable model, and D{yi) is the set 
of latent variables y* obeying to the nonlinear relation r(-) for a given observed 
dependent variable y*.
In general, the integral in (5.3) will have a closed form solution only if g , the 
joint multivariate density function, and D(yi), the area of integration, are partic­
ularly benign. Multinomial logit models, for example, fall into this category of 
discrete choice models that can be easily estimated by MLE.
In most other cases, like a simple binary probit model with a flexible correla­
tion structure, the estimation of the parameters in (5.3) would require the eval­
uation of multi-dimensional integrals for each observation and each iteration of 
the maximisation process. This makes the use of classical estimation methods 
computationally intractable.
The banking crises model presented in Chapter 3 falls under this broad category 
of LDV models that require alternative estimation methods. In what follows, we 
describe the model specification and associated likelihood function.
5.2.1 A Binary Dynamic Probit Model of Banking Crises
Consider a panel dataset, where a sample of N  countries is followed over time, 
with country i being observed for T  consecutive periods. 2
2 We assume here a balanced panel dataset, where each individual is observed for the same 
number of periods, T.
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Let y\t be a binary limited dependent variable, which takes the value of one if 
a banking crisis takes place in country i at time £, and zero otherwise. Let y\t 
be an indirect observation of a latent vector y^ , specified as a linear function 
of a ( if  x 1 ) vector of explanatory variables, Xu, and a vector of parameters (3, 
according to a many-to-one mapping r (y£t*):
y\t =
1  if y\' =  x'itfi +  £j( >  0
0  otherwise
where i =  {1, • • • , N }  is the number of countries in our sample of emerging and 
developing countries, and t =  { 1, • • • ,T } is the number of time periods.
The set of explanatory variables encompasses macroeconomic fundamentals as 
well as global variables. The dynamic feature of this probit model derives from 
the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable on the right hand side of the probit 
equation . 3
Let the distribution of the latent vector of the generic country i  be the mul­
tivariate normal, with y\* ~  N(a:it(3,1 ). Then, the probability that a binomial 
random variable Yit equals one, conditional on a set of explanatory variables Xu, 
is given by <£>(a^ /3), where <£(•) denotes the standard normal cumulative distribu­
tion function (c.d.f.).
In view of the assumption of independence of (yft* | x it) across time and across 
countries, the estimation by maximum likelihood (MLE) of this binomial probit 
model does not pose any major problem and is performed by most of the available 
econometric software packages.
3 As explained in Chapter 3, this would allow us to test for the presence of state dependence, 
i.e. past banking crises affecting the probability of observing another crisis in the future.
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However, it suffices to modify the error structure, to allow for country specific 
effects and correlation across time among the observations referring to the same 
country i, to produce a likelihood function that contains multidimensional inte­
grals —of the order of the number of time observations for each country— that 
cannot be easily approximated.
This correlation feature is quite common in the context of panel data. One 
way of modelling this correlation is by means of a random-effect model combined 
with an autoregressive error structure. This is the error term structure adopted 
in Chapter 3 when estimating banking crises, ad can be formalised as follows:
Sit =  oti +  rjit, rjit =  PiVit-i +  v it (5.4)
where v it are i.i.d. and \p\ <  1 .
The first error term, a* represents country-specific, time-invariant unobservable 
determinants of banking crises, while the autocorrelated component, Tjit) allows 
for persistence in the unobservables.
In addition, we suspect that this error term may be correlated with the ex­
planatory variables on the RHS of the probit equation that describes banking 
crises. This correlation would impair the statistical properties of the estimated 
coefficients if not properly corrected for. To solve this problem, we explicitly 
model the linear dependence between the RHS variables and the error term and 
let oii =  7 'xi. +  & where X{. is the mean value of Xu over time, and £* is a residual 
term that accounts for unobserved country-specific effects.
This error term structure implies a variance-covariance matrix of the form £l(y*) =  
In (8) where i =  {!,•■■ , N }  and each block, £li, is defined as:
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( 1 
P
Ri = <rr
pt- '  \
p T - 2
P P 
\  PT~1 'PT~2
1 P 
P 1
(5.5)
where Jt is a (T x T ) matrix of ones and 0 <  cra <  l . 4
The probability of the sequence of events in country z, y\ =  (yf1}. . .  yfT), can 
be written as the Tj-dimensional integral over the vector yh*\
Pr{y^ ; 0, Xi} =  [  ~  x'i/3, &i)dyi* (5.6)
where 6 is the set of parameters to be estimated, i.e. 6 =  (/?, o-J,p), and the 
limiting values a and b are defined as follows:
Q>it ^
bit — ^
0 if Vit = l
—oo if ybit =  0
4 -co if ybt =  l
0 if ybt z= 0
Assuming independence of the unobservables across countries, we can write the 
likelihood function associated with this problem as the product of the events’ 
probabilities:
4 In this specification, the variance parameters a \  and cr% cannot be identified separately,
2
vtherefore the following normalisation cr% 4  a* =  1 is frequently used.
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N
£ ( A n )  =  n ^ ( { y , t} |{X j};/3,n) (5.7)
i~ 1
where the index i denotes an observation in a sample of N  countries and we 
stacked all the time observations referring to each individual in the (T» x 1 ) vec­
tor ?/i, with each of the probabilities in (5.7) given by the T  — z-dimensional 
integral (5.6).
In general, traditional numerical methods cannot compute such integrals with 
sufficient speed and precision to make the estimation by MLE feasible because 
the number of operations increases exponentially with the sample size, N.
An additional complication arises from the treatment of the set of initial con­
ditions that, for simplicity, we assume here as exogenous. 5
An alternative approach to the classical estimation of general LDV models is 
to exploit simulation results in parametric estimation to approximate the high 
dimensional integrals in the likelihood function (5.7).
Compared to the traditional methods of numerical integration, simulation allows 
the specification of quite general error structures over large panel datasets . 6  To 
estimate the likelihood of banking crises defined in (5.7), we applied the method 
of maximum smoothly simulated likelihood together with the GHK simulator 
described in the following sections.
5 We are aware of the limitation of this assumption but, given the time length of our sample 
that includes on average more than 8 observations (two years of quarterly data) for each country, 
this hypothesis does not significantly affect our results.
6 This is because the number of operations, for a given number of draws, increases only 
linearly with the dimension of the sample, N.
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5.3 Simulation-Based Estimation Methods tor LDV Models
The use of simulation-based estimation allows the approximation of the multi- 
dimentional choice probabilities in the likelihood function (5.7) or in scores and 
moment conditions that are otherwise computationally untractable with classi­
cal estimation methods. The various approaches to simulation-based simulation 
described below can be classified under the generalised method of simulated mo­
ments. This is the simulated counterpart of the generalised method of moments.
Following Hajivassiliou and Ruud (1994), we summarise below the main proper­
ties of the key simulation-based estimation methods, highlighting the comparative 
advantages of the Maximum Smoothly Simulated Likelihood (MSSL) approach 
that is used in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 of this thesis.
5.3.1 Maximum Simulated Likelihood
The maximum simulated likelihood (MSL) estimator was developed by Lerman 
and Manski (1981) who used Monte Carlo simulation methods to approximate 
the choice probabilities of a multinomial discrete choice probit model. The MSL 
approach consists of substituting the joint multivariate density function in the 
log likelihood function with an unbiased simulator. The maximum simulated like­
lihood estimator is then defined as the argument that maximises the simulated 
log-likelihood function for a given simulation sequence. 7
The simulation method proposed by Lerman and Manski (1981) is the crude 
frequency or crude Monte Carlo simulator (CMC), which consists of approximat­
ing the true discrete choice probabilities with an empirical frequency, computed 
by making repeated Monte Carlo random draws from the true distribution and 
then considering only those realisations that fall into the domain of the latent vec­
tor. Despite the advantage of being quick to calculate, this simulation method
7 See Hajivassiliou and Ruud (1994) for a formal definition of this estimator.
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presents a number of drawbacks.
•  First, it is not a smooth function in the parameters, thus hindering estima­
tion by MLE.
•  Second, the frequency simulator can take the value zero with positive prob­
ability. It could be the case that over R  replications, the number of observed 
matches is zero.
•  Third, a very large number of draws is required to obtain accurate estimates 
of small probabilities. This feature implies that the frequency simulator 
yields consistent estimates by MSL only when both sample size and number 
of draws go to infinity. 8
To overcome these difficulties, Borsch-Supan and Hajivassiliou (1993) developed 
the MSSL method adopted in this thesis.
5.3.2 The Method of Simulated Moments
McFadden (1989) suggested a way to overcome the simulation problems associ­
ated with the method of MSL by Lerman and Manski (1981). He proved that 
simulation is viable even for a finite number of replications, R , provided that: an 
unbiased simulator is used for the choice probabilities; the functions to be simu­
lated appear linearly in the conditions defining the estimator; 9  and the same set 
of random draws is used to simulate the model at different trial parameters values.
The method of simulated moments (MSM) developed by McFadden (1989) and 
Pakes and Pollard (1989) satisfies the properties listed above because choice prob­
abilities enter linearly in the moment conditions. The idea behind this approach 
is to simulate choice probabilities with an unbiased estimator and then solve the 
simulated moment conditions to derive the MSM estimator.
8 Hajivassiliou and Ruud (1994) prove that under a set of regularity conditions, the MSL 
estimator is consistent if the number of replications, R —* oo, as N  —► oo. They also show that 
under some restrictive conditions the MLS estimator is asymptotically efficient.
9 This condition is violated by the MSL estimator.
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Hajivassiliou and Ruud (1994) show that the MSM estimator provides consistent 
estimates with a fixed number of replications, R, provided the law of large num­
bers works. However, full efficiency can be achieved only by increasing R  without 
bound as the sample size, TV, increases.
5.3.3 The Method of Simulated Scores
An alternative approach to the methods above has been suggested by Hajivas­
siliou and McFadden (1990), who proposed to simulate directly the scores of the 
likelihood function rather than approximating the choice probabilities in the like­
lihood function or in the moment conditions. There are two ways of approaching 
this problem and they both rely on the proposition that every score function can 
be expressed as the expectation of the score of the latent variable conditional on 
the observed data : 1 0
V„ln f(0 ;y )  =  (5.8)
/(0;y)
=  E[V e \ n m y * ) \ y ]  (5.9)
where V# is an operator representing partial differentiation with respect to the 
elements of 6.
The first approach consists of using simulation to approximate directly the ex­
pectation of the score of the latent log-likelihood, (5.9), conditional on a set of 
observations.
Hajivassiliou and Ruud (1994) show that the method of simulated scores (MSS) 
estimator so derived is consistent and uniformly asymptotically normal (CUAN) 
provided an unbiased simulator of the score function is used.
10 See Hajivassiliou and Ruud (1994) for a derivation of this result.
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An alternative approach to the simulation of the score function is to simulate 
separately the linear derivative in the numerator and the likelihood in the de­
nominator of the score expression (5.8). This second method is faster to compute 
than the first one, but is affected by a simulation bias.
5.3.4 Maximum Smoothly Simulated Likelihood (MSSL)
The method of maximum smoothly simulated likelihood (MSSL) has been devel­
oped by Borsch-Supan and Hajivassiliou (1993). The authors have shown that 
by relying on accurate simulators that are smooth functions of the parameters, 
one can overcome the problems associated with the fact that the MSL estimator 
is a non-linear function of the simulator.
In what follows, we borrow from Hajivassiliou and Ruud (1994) the formal defi­
nition of the MSSL estimator.
For a given sample of observations {y^}, with (i =  1, • • • , N ), let the log-likelihood 
function for the unknown parameter vector, 0, be:
N
iN(e) =  £ > / ( » ; » < ) ]
i= 1
Let f(0;y,u>) be an unbiased simulator, so that f(0',y) =  Eu[f(0',y,uj) | y], and 
a continuous function of 0 and u, where the latter is a simulated vector of R 
random variates. Then the maximum smoothly simulated likelihood estimator is 
defined as:
N
Qmssl =  arg max lN(0) where lN(0) =  V ]  In f ( 0 ; yu Ui) (5.10) o
i = 1
for a given simulation sequence {cJi}. When /(•) is generated according to the 
GHK method described in Section 5.4.2, it satisfies the unbiasedness and conti­
nuity requirements of the MSSL definition.
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Hajivassiliou and McFadden (1998) prove that the MSSL estimator is consistent 
and uniformly asymptotically normal (CUAN), and asymptotically fully efficient, 
provided the number of simulations R  employed per individual observation raises 
without bound, at least as fast as y/N , where N is the sample size.
In practice, the MSSL estimator can be implemented by using a standard max­
imum likelihood optimisation package, modified to allow for the likelihood con­
tributions to be simulated using the GHK procedure. This is in contrast to the 
MSM and MSS simulation-based estimation methods that require more sophisti­
cated software.
An additional advantage of this simulation-based estimation method is that the 
computational effort of the MSSL approach increases almost linearly with the 
dimension of the latent variable vector, making its application particularly at­
tractive to the estimation of discrete choice problems with panel data.
For these reasons, we decided to use this method in conjunction with the GHK 
simulator, to estimate the probability of banking and twin crises in emerging 
markets.
5.4 Simulation Techniques
As explained in the previous section, the main idea behind simulation-based esti­
mation is to simulate the latent data generating process and then use such simula­
tions to evaluate the likelihood and log-likelihood functions and their derivatives 
with respect to the unknown parameters.
Following Hajivassiliou (1993) and Borsch-Supan and Hajivassiliou (1993), the 
two sub-sections below contain, first, a short description of how a generic simu­
lation routine works and, second, a more detailed explanation of the GHK simu­
lator.
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5.4.1 Simulation Routines
A generic simulation algorithm involves an iterative search over a vector of un­
known parameters, 6. The starting point of this iterative procedure consists of 
drawing a set of R uniform random variates, • • • , uf) ,  that will be kept
until the end of the simulation process. Then, for a given vector of trial param­
eters, 6 the procedure transforms these uniform draws u\ into 
a set of R simulated errors, This can be done by applying the inverse of the 
cumulative distribution function of the true e’s on the random draws u?. These 
simulated errors, in turn, would generate a set of R simulated latent vectors, 
~*r(0 (n)) ^ a t  can be used to calculate the empirical counterpart of the likelihood 
function, (5.10) .
The iterative search algorithm will continue trying different parameter vectors, 
6, using the same draw of random vectors until the relevant criterion, for 
example the maximisation of the simulated maximum likelihood, is satisfied.
5.4.2 The GHK or Smooth Recursive Conditioning Simulator
The GHK, or smooth recursive conditioning simulator, developed by Geweke 
(1989), Hajivassiliou and McFadden (1990) and Keane (1990), is based on draw­
ings from a recursively truncated multivariate normal p.d.f., after a Cholesky 
transformation.
The procedure used to construct the simulated probabilities relies upon the fact 
that normal random variables, conditional on other normal random variables, are 
still normal. In what follows, we borrow from Borsch-Supan and Hajivassiliou 
(1993) and Hajivassiliou (2002) a description of the GHK algorithm.
Define M  =  AQA', where A is defined according to (5.2), and let L be the 
lower triangular Cholesky factor of M , such that LL' =  AQA'.
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Instead of drawing from the original distribution of the latent variable, subject 
to the restrictions of the observed choices,
y* ~  N(X(3, Q) s.t. a < A - y * < b
we draw a random vector
e~ i V( 0 , J )  s.t. a* =  a - A X / 3 < L e < b *  =  b - A X P
Due to the triangular nature of L, these restrictions are recursive:
C! ~  N ( 0 ,1) s.t. a\ <  ln ei <  b{ (5.11)
&  a l / l n  <  ei <  b\ / l \ i
e2 ~  N( 0 , I )  S.t. 0,2 ^  2^1^ 1 +  2^2^ 2 ^  &2
^  ( a 2 — h\^ l ) /^2 2  <  ^2 <  (&2 — hl^ l ) /^22
The key contribution by Hajivassiliou and McFadden (1990) was to show that 
these univariate truncated normal variates, e* , can be drawn according to the 
formula e =  G_ 1 (C/) =  <J> - 1  [($(&) — $>(a)) • U +  $(a)], where U is distributed ac­
cording to a univariate uniform distribution on [0 , 1 ] and $  denotes the univariate 
cumulative normal distribution function . 1 1
The likelihood function (5.3), or the probability that a <  Ay* <  b, can be 
simulated by the probability that a* <  Le <  b*. This is the product of the 
probabilities Qi s that each e* falls in the respective intervals given by (5.11):
l(y \X -,P ,Q ) =  P rob(a l/ln  <  e, <  fcj/lu)
■Prob((a,2 — l21^l)/l22 <  ^2 <  (&2 — ^21^l)/^22 | ^ i )  • • •
•Prob{(a[ -  lu e i  lN i-iei-i)/lN N  <  e/)
<  Prob{b\ — In i i^  lm -iG i-i)/lN N  I ci, • • • , e^ -i)
— Ql ' Q2(ei) ’ Qziplfy) • • ' Q /(e 1, • • ' , 6 ;v-l)
This can be approximated by the simulator
ii See Proposition 1 in Hajivassiliou and McFadden (1990) for a derivation of this result.
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1 R N
I(y',X -,P ,n-,R) =  - £ n ^ . - , e , - j , r) (5.12)
r=l i= l
with e*r drawn from a truncated N (0,1), and R number of replications.
We summarise below the main properties of the GHK simulation method, which 
are formally derived by Hajivassiliou and McFadden (1990) and Borsch-Supan 
and Hajivassiliou (1993).
•  As established by Lemma 1 in Hajivassiliou and McFadden (1990), the 
simulator R) defined by (5.12) is an unbiased estimator of
l ( y ' ,X ,g ,0 ) .a
•  /(y*, A ;/? ,Q,',R) is a smooth simulator, i.e. it is a continuous and differ­
entiable function of the parameters (3 and Q, of the model. This feature 
implies that conventional numerical methods can be used to solve the first- 
order conditions associated with the simulated likelihood function.
•  The simulated probability values of the GHK simulator are bounded away 
from 0 and 1. This is in contrast to the crude frequency simulator used 
by Lerman and Manski (1981), which generates a discontinuous objective 
function that can take the value 0 with positive probability.
•  The computational effort in the simulation is mostly concentrated in draw­
ing the ej and it increases almost linearly with the dimensionality of the 
integral in (5.3). This makes the GHK simulator particularly attractive for 
panel data estimation over large samples.
Borsch-Supan and Hajivassiliou (1993) present Monte Carlo results on the dis­
tribution of simulated choice probabilities for the crude frequency simulator, the 
Stern simulator13 and the GHK simulator. They find that the GHK simulator 
dominates the other two methods, because it produces probability estimates with
12 See the cited paper for a formal proof.
13 See Stern (1992).
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much smaller variance than those associated to the frequency simulator or the 
Stern simulator. Thanks to this feature, the GHK simulator has a negligible ap­
proximation bias even for a small number of replications. 1 4
This result is important because it justifies the application of the GHK method 
to the estimation by maximum smoothly simulated likelihood that is described in 
Section 5.3.4 above. The comparatively smaller variance of the GHK simulator 
indeed simplifies the computation of the simulated probabilities in the maximum 
likelihood function with respect to alternative simulation methods, like the crude 
frequency simulator.
5.5 An Application of the GHK Approach to the Simulation of
Financial Crises’ Probabilities
This section illustrates the application of the GHK approach to the estimation of 
financial crises’ probabilities. We would first provide a formalisation of the twin 
crises model used in Chapter 4 of this thesis, and then derive the GHK canonical 
representation associated with the twins model.
5.5.1 Modelling Twin Crises
The model estimated in Chapter 4 can be formalised a follows. Consider a ran­
dom sample of N  countries, observed for T* periods. Let y\t define a vector of 
limited dependent variables, where i =  { 1 , . . . ,  N }  and t  =  { 1 , . . . ,  Tf\.
The variable y\t takes on the value of one if a banking crisis is observed in country 
i at time t, and zero otherwise. Similarly, yft is a limited dependent variable that 
takes on the value one if country i experiences a currency crisis at time t, and 
zero otherwise.
14 This is another advantage with respect to the crude frequency simulator, which requires a 
large number of replications to approximate small probabilities.
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We assume that banking crises, ybt =  1 , are an indirect observation of a la­
tent vector y\l according to a many-to-one mapping yhit =  r (y b^ ), with y\l given 
by the linear model
y’S = X ' ‘t0> +  e\t, (5.13)
where X bt is an array of predetermined variables, (3b is a vector of parameters to 
be estimated, and ebt is the disturbance vector.
The set of explanatory variables, X bt , in equation (5.13) includes, among other 
regressors, lagged values of both y\t and y^ t . As explained in Chapter 4, the in­
troduction of lagged values of y\t would test for the existence of state dependence 
among episodes of banking crises. The lagged values of ycit are included among 
the regressors of the banking crisis equation to test for a possible leading effect 
from currency crises to banking crises.
Similarly, we define currency crises, y cit =  1 , as indirect observations of the latent 
vector y%, which is defined as follows:
y * = 4  7 + ^  +  4  (5-14)
The term ybt7  would capture the contemporaneous links between banking crises
and currency crises. It would test whether the presence of banking sector prob­
lems accentuates the propensity of a country to experience a simultaneous cur­
rency crisis. The remaining terms in Equation (5.14) are defined in a similar way 
to those of Equation (5.13). Therefore, Xft includes lagged values of the currency 
and banking dummies, ycit and y\t .
The error term structure of this system of two dynamic probit equations is spec­
ified by the pair eit =  [£«,£«]. For the banking crisis equation, we assume
4  = /4 + 4> 4  = A L i + 4  (5-!5)
where ~  iV(0, crj6), ~  N (0,1), and ub0 ~  iV(0, a^b). Stationarity implies 
that a^b =  a^b =  1 / ( 1  — pb), p b and v bt are independent.
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Correspondingly, for the currency crisis equation assume
(5.16)
where //? ~  iV(0, cr£c), ~  N (0,1), and ~  N(0,<TqC). Stationarity implies 
that OqC =  =  1 / ( 1  — pc). fJ>i and vcit are also independent.
The time-invariant, country-specific fa terms in the error structure of both equa­
tions are meant to capture the fact that countries may differ in their propensity 
to experience a banking or currency crisis. These different predispositions may 
be either due to unobserved heterogeneity, given by fa, or to countries’ differences 
that are correlated over time. To control for the last effect, we included an AR(1) 
component, vit, in the disturbance.
Finally, we assume that cov{fi\, pf) =  0 and cov{y\t, v^) =  0, but allow for a 
contemporaneous correlation, ^  0 , between the error terms of the two
equations, so that cov(^t,^ t) =  cr^c. This simultaneous correlation would cap­
ture common unobserved determinants of banking and currency crises.
The choice of a flexible error structure in each of the two equations of the system 
defining twin crises, together with the contemporaneous correlation that links 
the banking to the currency equation, result in a non-scalar variance-covariance 
matrix.
Let’s stack the limited dependent variable observations first by time period, al­
ternating banking and currency crises observations, and then by country, with 
t — {1, • • • , Ti} and i =  {1, • • • , N }. The variance-covariance matrix would then 
take the general block-diagonal form:
independence across countries. However, each block along the main diagonal,
Cl =  Iff (3) £li (5.17)
The blocks off the main diagonal contain all zeros because of the assumption of
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which refers to a particular country i, has a (2 T* x 27*) dimension and is equal 
to:
( <r2b + <t26fX° u°
a Sb €c
n i =
\  • •
*V Pc^ tibZc 
<r2 c +  Pco-2
C^bSc 
<r2c +  cr2c
^b+P^ ^  
Pb~l(J^ ic
%
Ti-l
Pc <T(b Cc
O^c +  P c ‘
b^Cc 
<^ c + <72
(5.18)
The contemporaneous links in our model, which originate this 17 structure, imply 
the calculation of probabilities in the likelihood function that are given by high­
dimensional integrals which require the use of simulation techniques.
We use the maximum smoothly simulated likelihood in conjunction with the 
GHK simulator. We explain below the application of this simulation method to 
our estimation problem.
5.5.2 Simulation by MSSL/GHK
In this section, we formally derive the application of the MSSL/GHK approach to 
the estimation of the twin crises model described above. The presentation follows 
Hajivassiliou (2002).
Consider the two latent variables, y £  and y^, and the two binary limited depen­
dent variables yft and yhit as defined in Section 5.5.1. For the sake of illustration 
we would strip out the banking crisis indicator from the matrix of explanatory 
variables Xft of the currency crises equation, and the currency crisis indicator 
from the explanatory variables of the banking crisis equation, X \t. We would call 
the resulting matrices Zft and Z}t , respectively. We can then write:
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i  if yu=yiti + zcu0i + i(ZUiyi,t-s>o)sc+e%>o
Vit =
0  otherwise
„ . 1  if y^  =  Z ^  +  l(E » = ir f,(- » >  0)5t +  4  > 0
Vit =  S
0  otherwise
where l (£ » = i  y?,_s >  0 ) is an indicator variable that takes the value of one 
if a currency crisis occurred in at least one of the four quarters preceding a bank­
ing crisis, zero otherwise. Similarly, lQ Z * = 1  Vit-s >  0 ) is an indicator function 
for banking crises.
Consider the probability expression:
Prob(y?5, ybi5, . . . ,  y ^ ^ T ^ h  2/fi, • • •, J/w. I/?i> • • • > e) 
where 6 summarises all the parameters to be estimated.
For a typical observation yit :
T—H 
o
II 
II
4*>o 
y|T < 0
4  + 4.7 + Z f t f i  +  l (E t i  !&-. > 0)5“ > 0 
4  +  t A i  +  z m  +  i(ELi v lt- s  > O W  < 0
II 
II
O 
t-» V a > 0
4* < o
4  + z \ta \ + i(Ei=i v lt- s  > 0)56 > 0 
4  + 4 #  + i ( E L i > o)«$* < o
Therefore:
Prob(y°t , y bit, . . .  |Z?, Z b, , y ci4, y bn , . . . ,  y bi4, 6) =
4
Prob{(l -  2»S)[eJ +  yba l +  Z&fi +  1 ( £ > 0)F| < 0,
5 = 1
4
(1 -  2 ^ ) [ 4  +  Z lfr  +  l ( £  vit-, > 0)<5l <  o , . . . }
5 = 1
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In terms of the canonical GHK formulation, the probability of a pair (yft ,y bt) is 
equivalent to:
Applied to our estimation problem, this results in the following configuration:
Vit Vit ac bc ab bb
0 0 —oo + ZitPl + Hybit6c) —oo ~(ZitPb + HyftSb)
0 1 —00 - { y ^  + ZitPz + HybxtSc) -(Z*t(3bz + Hyft6b) OO
1 0 - (y bit'r + ZitPc* + Hy&c) OO —OO
1 1 -(yit'r + ZZtPz + Hybit6c) oo OO
where H ybit =  l ( £ j = i  >  0) and H ycit =  l ( £ t = i  >  0)
Therefore, the implementation of GHK requires the following steps:
1. Define the (2 x 1 ) vectors ait, bit, and eit. Stacking all the observations 
for country i , alternating the banking and currency dependent variables, 
gives the ( 2  • T* x 1 ) vectors a*, 6 », and £*, where Si is characterised by the 
(2 • Ti x 2 • Ti) variance-covariance matrix (5.18).
2. Through this representation, the probability of a sequence of banking and 
currency crises (yc, yb) in a given country i is given by events of the form:
P(Vi, • • • ,  2 / f i >  2 / i >  • • • > 2 / r J  =  Prob{ai < <  b { )
It follows that this approach fully incorporates:
•  The contemporaneous correlations in eu.
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•  The one-factor plus AR(1) serial correlations in £it.
•  The dependency of yft on y\t.
•  The dependency of y?t on past occurrences of y\ and vice versa.
The problem of estimating banking crises, described in Chapter 3 and formalised 
in Section 5.2.1 above, has an analogous representation.15
To implement the GHK approach in the estimations by maximum smoothly sim­
ulated likelihood we modified the procedures written by Vassilis Hajivassiliou to 
fit our problem. These procedures return the simulated likelihood probability, P , 
as a function of the following arguments: 
m =  dimension of the multivariate normal vector Z; 
mu =  E[Z ];
15 Let the binary limited dependent variable ybt be an indirect observation of the latent variable 
Vu-
„* =  /  1 if  Wit* =  x'ul3 +  «it >  0
f  0 otherwise
where the set of explanatory variables includes lagged values of ybt .
For a typical observation of country i at time t:
Vu V i *
1 eu +  x'pfi >  0
0 eit +  x itj3 <  0
In terms of the canonical GHK formulation, this can be represented through the linear inequal­
ity:
a b < eb <  7 b
where a b and 7 b are given by:
Vit a 7 6
1 ~ X'itP 00
0 —00
The probability of a sequence of observables {t/it}, where t  =  (1, • • • , T) is given by events of 
the form:
P ( y n ,  • • • ,  ViT) =  P rob(a t i  <  e* <  7 {)
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w =  V[Z];
wi =  w~x
c =Cholesky factor of w;
vectors a and b, defining the restriction region a <  Z  <b \
R =  number of replications; 
u = a  m x R  matrix of i.i.d. uniform [0,1] variates.
These procedures are available at:
http://econ.lse.ac.uk/~vassilis/pub/simulation.
5.6 Conclusions
In this methodological chapter we showed how simulation-based estimation meth­
ods can help overcome the computational problems associated with the classical 
estimation by maximum likelihood of a broad class of limited dependent variable 
models that includes the banking and twin crises model estimated in the second 
part of this thesis.
Our models are characterised by a series of dynamic features that, combined 
with the assumption of a flexible temporal and contemporaneous correlation in 
the unobservables, cause classical estimation methods to become computationally 
intractable.
After a brief review of the principal simulation-based estimation methods, we 
showed a direct application of the GHK-MSSL method to both the single probit 
model of banking crises estimated in Chapter 3 and the system of two dynamic 
probit equation describing twin crises in developing and emerging markets used 
in Chapter 4.
CONCLUSION
The debate over the nature and determinants of financial fragility intensified after 
the collapse of the Mexican peso in December 1994. This was the first of a series 
of currency and banking crises that hit developing and emerging markets in the 
late nineties. While some theories have stressed macroeconomic imbalances as 
the main sources of these crises, others have highlighted their self-fulfilling nature.
The research presented in this thesis was motivated by the desire to improve our 
understanding of the causes and outcomes of financial vulnerability. By using 
both theoretical and empirical tools of analysis, we focused on debt management 
policy as a potential deterrent or trigger of financial sector problems. We differ­
entiated between public and external debt, and looked at the influence of these 
variables on the sustainability of exchange rates and banking systems.
In the first part of the thesis, we developed a simple rules-versus-discretion model 
that embodies self-fulfilling elements to analyse the interaction between debt man­
agement and monetary or exchange rate policies. In particular, we examined how 
the choice and sustainability of a monetary policy target, be it, the inflation or 
exchange rate, can be affected by the type and characteristics of debt instruments.
We found this a challenging topic because of the apparent contradiction between 
the policy prescriptions arising from the theory and reality. Despite the fact that 
the anti-inflationary properties of indexed or foreign currency denominated debt 
are well known within the debt management literature, in many OECD countries 
the share of foreign currency debt declined since the late eighties, accompanied 
by a lengthening of debt maturities. At the same time, the presence of a large
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stock of foreign currency debt has neither prevented the emergence nor improved 
the outcome of currency and banking crises in many emerging markets over the 
past decade.
The theoretical results presented in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 suggest a possible 
explanation for these facts. We proved that the efficacy of debt characteristics 
as incentives for anti-inflationary policy depends on the type of monetary and 
exchange rate regime. If monetary policy can be delegated to an independent 
central bank, this is a better solution to credibility problems than increasing the 
costs of inflation by issuing indexed or foreign currency debt. In this case, our 
model suggests that nominal debt, possibly of a long maturity, should be issued 
to support output stabilisation. If, on the other hand, the central bank does not 
have full operational independence —or the policymaker and the private sector 
do not share the same information— foreign currency debt can reinforce the com­
mitment to an exchange rate peg by reducing inflationary expectations. However, 
the issuance of foreign currency denominated debt cannot rule out the possibility 
of a bad outcome, i.e. a devaluation of the currency. Conditional on a currency 
crisis, countries with higher shares of foreign currency debt would tend to devalue 
more. This result was confirmed by our econometric analysis of the episodes of 
official realignment within the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the EMS during the 
period 1979-1995.
In the second part of the thesis, we followed an empirical approach to examine the 
causal links between debt, exchange rate fragility and systemic banking failures. 
We turned our attention to episodes of banking and currency crises in developing 
and emerging markets from the mid-1970s to the onset of the Asian crisis in 1997.
In Chapter 3 we assessed the probability of banking crises by estimating a dy­
namic probit model with unoserved heterogeneity and autocorrelated errors using 
simulation-based estimation techniques for panel data. This approach allowed us
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to take into account the intertemporal nature of financial crises and examine the 
dynamics leading to, accompanying and following a crisis. In this respect, we de­
parted from the traditional literature that excludes observations in the proximity 
of a crisis and relies on static logit/probit models estimated on pooled observa­
tions.
We found that episodes of banking crises in emerging markets are driven by 
a combination of domestic macroeconomic fundamentals and global variables. 
Debt vulnerability is one of the key causes of banks’ unsoundness. The inclusion 
of the lagged dependent variable among the explanatory variables revealed the 
existence of a strong state dependence among episodes of banking crises, indicat­
ing that countries that experienced banking crises in the past are more prone to 
experience another banking crisis. Also, banks seem to react with some delay 
to a currency devaluation. The dummy variable testing for leading effects from 
currency to banking crises is significant only when lagged by one year. Interest­
ingly, the leading effect is strong and significant when we restrict our attention 
to episodes of crisis occurred in the 1990s, signalling crises of a different nature.
After controlling for a large number of explanatory variables, we found evidence of 
unobserved heterogeneity and autocorrelation in the error term. The first reflects 
country-specific, time-invariant characteristics, like historical or institutional fac­
tors that and not fully captured by the set of explanatory variables. The second 
is an unobserved source of persistence in the data. The consideration of these 
two terms is necessary to avoid spurious state dependence in the estimates of 
the lagged banking dependent variable. The set of results obtained by omitting 
the panel structure and pooling together all the observations, thus neglecting the 
country/time dimension of our data, suffered from this serious problem.
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In Chapter 4, we deepened the analysis of the causal link between banking and 
currency crises by examining the determinants of twin crises, i.e. concomitant 
banking and currency crises. We estimated by maximum smoothly simulated 
likelihood a system of two dynamic probit equations (analogous to the one used 
in Chapter 3), one for banking and another for currency crises. We tested the 
existence of a causal link from banking to currency crises by allowing a leading 
and contemporaneous effect of the banking dummy variable in the currency crisis 
equation. With respect to the single-equation estimation carried out in Chapter 
3, the system approach thus has the advantage of fully endogenising the occur­
rence of banking crises in the currency crisis equation.
Each of the two probit equations of the system was characterised by unobserved 
heterogeneity and autocorrelated errors. Moreover, we assumed simultaneous un­
observed correlation between the two equations, to allow for the possibility that 
twin crises are driven by omitted common factors.
The results presented in Chapter 4 suggested that, along with the increasing 
liberalisation and globalisation of the financial markets, banking and currency 
crises have become closely intertwined and driven by common fundamentals.
Currency crises seem to lead banking crises, at least during the nineties, but 
a causal link between the two types of crisis could not be determined unambigu­
ously over the whole sample period.
Additional insights might be gathered by reverting the causal link and endogenis­
ing currency crises in the banking crisis equation. This could be done within our 
framework by including the lagged and contemporaneous currency crisis indica­
tor in the equation describing banking crises. We leave this task for our future 
research agenda.
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